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Abstract
This is a study of how one can successfully justify the universality of human rights to 
people with a diversity o f beliefs and values. I argue that intercultural dialogue is an 
essential part of working out an interpretation o f human rights that is acceptable to a 
broad range o f cultures. I develop this position through critical engagement with three 
recent philosophical approaches to the intercultural validity o f human rights: John Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples, Martha Nussbaum’s Human Capabilities approach, and Abdullahi An- 
Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue approach. Inspired by Judith Shklar’s political liberalism o f 
fear and Iris Young’s critical theory, I seek an account o f human rights that has normative 
legitimacy from the perspectives o f marginalized and victimized people. Cross-cultural 
dialogue in my scheme is a bottom-up approach from the victimized and powerless people 
that can avoid the problem o f generality and provide multiple routes to reach agreement 
regarding universal human rights. In the end, I believe my approach will be descriptively 
more suitable to the moral reality of universal human rights, and provide a normative 
grounding o f human rights in a way that is more compelling than other approaches
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Chapter One: The Quest for Universality
I don’t know a single politician who doesn’t mention ten times a day “the fight for human rights” or 
“violations o f human rights.” But because people in the West are not threatened by concentration 
camps and are free to say and write what they want, the more the fight for human rights gains in 
popularity, the more it loses any concrete content, becoming a kind o f universal stance o f everyone 
towards everything, a kind o f  energy that turns all human desires into rights. The world has become 
man’s rights and everything in it has become a right: the desire for love the right to love, the desire for 
rest the right to rest, the desire for friendship the right to friendship, the desire to exceed the speed 
limit the right to exceed the speed the limit, the desire for happiness the right to happiness, the desire 
to publish a book the right to publish a book, the desire to shout in the street in the middle o f the 
night the right to shout in the street__
Milan Kundera,---------------------------- Immortality 1
The Discrepancy between Human Rights Theory and Human 
Rights Practice
For half a century, the world has lived with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(hereafter, UDHR), which the United Nations proclaimed a “common standard of 
achievement” for all people and all nations. Today, there are a number of normative texts 
setting out not only the fundamental rights that every individual ought to enjoy, but also, 
and correlatively, the self-constraints that every state should adopt in order to guarantee 
these rights.
Although the idea of human rights has come to occupy a dominant position in current 
international political discourse, and “it is difficult to make any sense o f international
1 Kundera, Milan, 1991, Immortality, translated from the Czech by Peter Kussi, Quality Paperbacks Direct, 
London.
relations without giving proper attention to human rights,”2 the call to reject both the
UDHR and subsequent covenants as truly universal has been heard from different 
countries and taken many forms in the aftermath o f World War I I .3 W hat is more 
important philosophically is that the question o f human rights justification constandy 
arises.4 In recent decades, many critics of Western rationalism have argued that claims 
concerning the universal validity of human rights are expressions o f cultural imperialism or 
masks for illegitimate forms of power. Moreover, any attempt to ground human rights in 
“human nature,” “human reason,” “human agency,” or “divinely sanctioned spirituality” 
has serious drawbacks and masquerades as universal when, in effect, it is propagating 
“Western ethnocentrism.”5 They are a “Western construction of limited applicability.”6 
The ethnocentric objection identifies human rights as specifically “Western” in origin or 
substance, either because they purportedly reflect only a particular set of moral 
philosophical ideas about the self and society originating from Western cultures7 or
2 Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global Civil Society and the Society of Democratic States (London: 
Roudedge, 2002), p 21.
3 For instance, Michael Ignatieff lists three sources that are negatively critical o f the promoted conceptions 
of human rights universality: an Islamic resurgence negatively critical o f human rights’ secular foundations; 
an East Asia assertion that community is more appropriate for “Asian cultures” than is human rights 
individualism; and a critique from Western academia that brings together a Marxist critique o f  rights with a 
postmodern rejection o f the Enlightenment project. See Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
4 It is both a question o f whether a universal set o f rights is conceptually possible and philosophically justifiable, 
and whether such a standard can be globally implemented. See Kirsten Hastrup, “Introduction,” in Kirsten 
Hastrup (ed.), Human Rights on Common Grounds: The Quest for Universality (Kluwer Law international, 2001), p.l. 
I divide this question into two separate categories: the search for the universality of validity and the search for 
the universality of applicability. In the first sense, the claim is that the idea o f human rights is held to be valid by 
all human societies, or within all major cultural, philosophical, and religious traditions. Alternatively, 
universality refers to the applicability o f a given norm to all human beings everywhere. The two notions are 
often employed interchangeably and are often mutually inclusive and mutually supportive. The universality o f  
validity can effectively support their universal applicability, and the universality o f applicability can provide a 
convincing account o f their universal validity.
5 Ann Cudd makes distinctions among four positions: (1) imperialism, which seeks to impose a universal 
standard that merely serves the interests o f the imperial power; (2) Missionary work, whose function is to 
change the deepest spiritual commitment o f the subjects o f the work; (3) Eurocentrism, which imposes its 
aesthetic and cultural norms on others; and (4) humanism, which tries to help the oppressed find a path out 
of their oppression. In what follows, my analysis o f ethnocentrism identifies three initial categories, and I 
propose an approach whose function is to help reach the ideal o f  humanism. See Ann Cudd, “Missionary 
Politics,” in Hypatia, Vol. 20(2005), pp. 164-82.
6 Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability,” in 
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds.) Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger 
Publishers Press, 1979).
Surely, the origin o f an idea in one context— whether cultural, religious, or historical— does not entail the
because they represent only the West’s faiths, interests, and provincial ways o f thinking. 
Behind this argument there is often the assumption that Westerners proposing universal 
human rights are imposing a “West is best” perspective on the rest of the world.8 
Critics have stated that what we call “universal” human rights is, above all, an expression of 
Western values developed in the West and derived from the Enlightenment. The idea of 
human rights began in Europe and, then, spread to the American colonies and was 
eventually enshrined in two documents: the American “Declaration of Independence” and 
the French “Declaration of the Rights o f Man and o f the Citizen.” Thus, the idea o f 
human rights emerged within the context o f particular social, economic, cultural, and 
political conditions. Moreover, in its original Western form, the idea of human rights is 
connected to the philosophical conception o f the Western natural-law tradition.9 It 
emphasizes mainly the primacy of the individual as both the fundamental unit of concern 
and the fundamental measure of value, a conception o f rights as political “trumps” against 
the demands of the state or the community. Therefore, the critics argue that to pursue 
human rights is to be intolerant of both non-Western practices and non-Western forms of 
life. The American Anthropological Association10 issued its well-known warning, authored 
by Melville Herskovits:
The problem of drawing up a Declaration o f Human Rights was relatively simple in the
eighteenth century, because it was not a matter o f human rights, but o f  the right o f  men
assertion that it should never be adapted to another context. In other words, despite human rights’ having 
their origins in the West, it does not follow that these rights therefore express Western values suitable and 
applicable only to the West. Accordingly, whether the notions o f  human rights should be accepted or rejected 
must depend on whether they are politically or culturally legitimate, not whether they originate from the West 
or the East. It is clear that the “genetic fallacy” surreptitiously resides in this argument. See Xiaorong, Li, 
“Asian Values” and the Universality o f Human Rights, in Patrick Hayden (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights 
(Paragon House Press, 2001), pp. 397-408.
8 See Alison Jaggar, “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue,” in Ethics and 
International Affairs, Vol 19(3)(2005), pp. 55-75.
9 In chapter five, by examining the history o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I will argue that this 
orthodox view is misleading when it identifies the principles and the practices o f  international human rights 
with the rebirth o f the Western natural-rights tradition. Also, all efforts to resolve the discrepancies between 
human rights theory and human rights practice would be fruitless if  the efforts originated from this 
misguided premise.
10 See American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human Rights,” in American Anthropologist 
(1947), pp. 539-543; reprinted in Morton E. Winston (ed.) The philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont: 
Wadsworth, 1989), p. 116-120.
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within the framework o f  the sanctions laid by a single society—
Today the problem is complicated by the fact that the Declaration must be o f worldwide 
applicability. It must embrace and recognize the validity o f  many different ways o f  
life.... Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any 
attempt to formulate postulates that grow out o f beliefs or moral codes o f one culture 
must to that extent detract from the applicability o f any Declaration o f Human Rights
to mankind as a whole  The Rights o f Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be
circumscribed by the standards o f any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations o f  
any single people. Such a document will lead to frustration, not realization o f the 
personalities o f vast members o f human beings.11
The other ethnocentric objection that identifies human rights as specifically “Western” is in 
regard to the content; the particular specifications of international human rights are 
Western in substance. For instance, Article 1 of the UDHR asserts that “All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 2 asserts that “Everyone is entided to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, or other status,” and thus, Article 2 includes an assumption o f the 
fundamental equality of persons. Moreover, Article 16 refers to the family as the “natural” 
unit in society and asserts that everyone is “entitled to equal rights as to marriage.” And 
Article 18 asserts that everyone “has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and 
religion,” an idea that is profoundly incompatible with Islam. During the drafting process, 
the Saudi delegation contended that the right to marriage and to the free choice o f a 
partner to establish a family is a direct challenge to the authorities in Islamic societies. The 
list of enumerated rights functions either “to proclaim the superiority o f one civilization 
over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the countries o f the world.”12 On 
the basis of the objections to Articles 16 and 18, the Saudi delegation refused to ratify the 
Declaration.
Another reason for the charge of Western ethnocentrism is that the present system o f 
international human rights has clearly evolved from Western cultural perspectives that were
11 “Statement on Human Rights,” p. 539.
12 Quoted from Michael Ignatieff, “The Attack on Human Rights,” in Foreign Affairs, 
November/December(2001), pp. 102-116.
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universalized through colonial hegemonic processes. Owing to colonial rule and foreign 
domination, most African and Asian countries were unable to participate in the drafting or 
the adoption of the UDHR. The UDHR was adopted by the 48-member United Nations 
General Assembly, which can hardly be held as representative o f the contemporary world 
community.13 Even though most non-Western countries achieved formal independence and 
were able to participate in the formulation of subsequent international human rights 
documents, these countries were deemed to be bound to the earlier documents. In this 
regard, the majority of non-Western countries were incorporated into the process that 
determined international human rights standards. It is very difficult to see how the non- 
Western countries’ representatives could have genuinely represented their countries’ 
respective traditions; indeed, it may have been unavoidable that these countries would 
initially accept Western philosophical assumptions regarding nature, society, and the notion 
of the good. Therefore, the standards articulated in international agreements and in various 
declarations are merely Western values being imposed— in an imperialist fashion— on all 
subjects.14 However, if human rights are in fact tied to certain modern Western liberal 
philosophical commitments that are not shared by the rest of the world, then the project 
of universalizing the rights would entail both a commitment to the superiority o f Western 
ideas and a global imposition o f the Western model o f prompting social change. In this 
regard, to advocate that human rights are universal is to claim a “parochial universalism,” 
that is, “an attempt to put forward a universally valid theory of justice that draws only on
13 The General Assembly’s members consisted o f  Europeans and North Americans, six members from Asia 
(China, India, Pakistan, Burma, the Philippines, and Siam), and nine Islamic nations (Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen). Three member countries had large Buddhist populations: 
Burma, China, and Siam. Four member countries were in Africa: Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, and South Africa. 
Six of the European members belonged to the Communist bloc. See Johannes Morsink, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 28-34.
14 We can find the same objections still hold against the subsequent covenants and the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme o f Action that, in 1993, was accepted by the second U N  World Conference on Human 
Rights, at whose forum 172 states and over 1,500 organizations from different countries were in attendance. 
They repeated commitment to international human rights and confirmed the principles o f universality and 
indivisibility.
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the moral aspirations and political practices found in liberal Western societies.”15 As long as 
we fail to justify the universality o f human rights, critics would not be unreasonable to 
charge human rights as being either biased against non-Western cultures, or merely an 
instrument of Western political neocolonialism. Unless we are able to explain to one 
another why we think human rights are important, the world community will not be able to 
summon the consistent support necessary to prevent human rights abuses. Thus, we may 
consider ourselves to be living in an era where human rights are given paramount 
importance; ironically, we also are living in an era of human rights abuses. The success of 
human rights practices, indeed, “poses a problem for ethical reflections about them.”16 
Accordingly, the central questions for this dissertation are thus: How, in the absence of an 
uncontroversial source of moral guidance, can we make political and moral claims across cultural divides? 
Is there a way of understanding what we mean about human rights that is consistent with pluralistic 
institutions embedded in the divergent world cultures and yet that continues to reflect the universal 
applicability of this way of understanding?
15 Daniel Bell, “The Limits o f Liberal Justice,” in Political Theory 26(1998), pp. 557-582 at 568.In empirical 
terms, moreover, human rights scholars and advocates have long argued that since the 1945 U N  charter and 
the UDHR, there has been emerging a worldwide human rights regime designed to identify and protect a 
growing number o f basic human rights. States’ increasingly global legal commitments to protect human rights 
indeed signal a fundamental shift in the structure o f international society, and international human rights laws 
initiate processes and dialogue whose function is to steer, through socialization, many abusive states toward 
an embrace o f better behavior. However, evidence shows that human rights language may not always 
influence actual state behavior in expected ways. For instance, the findings o f  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui’s 
study suggest that, for decades after abusive states’ ratification o f  human rights treaties, there was littie or no 
effect over time. For them, states often ratify human rights treaties as a matter o f “window dressing,” 
radically decoupling policy from practice and, at times, exacerbating human rights violations because the 
percentage of states reported to repress human rights has grown over time. In this regard, human rights talk 
is simply “cheap talk” and human rights treaties are simply not designed to hold ratifying governments 
accountable for their commitments. See Hafner-Burton, Emilie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Justice Lost! The 
Failure o f International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most,” in Journal of Peace Research 44(4) 
(2007), pp. 407-425, and Hafner-Burton, Emilie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Human Rights Practices in a 
Globalizing World: The Paradox o f Empty Promises,” in American Journal of Sociology, 110(5)(2005), pp. 1373- 
1411
16 Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without Foundations,” in Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 14(2007), p. 1. 
Available at SSRN: http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3lpapers. fm?abstract_id—999874.
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1.2 Rethinking Human Rights: Worldwide Acceptance and Two 
Minimalisms
In order to avoid the charge o f ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, in recent years, 
human rights theorists have proposed different approaches to showing how human rights 
really are acceptable across a wide range of cultures. For these theorists, if human rights 
norms are no longer treated as exclusively and essentially arising from and supported by 
Western traditions, then we should no longer view them as the sole property o f the West. 
Therefore, we need to take seriously the perspectives of non-Western cultures if human 
rights are going to be appropriate as global normative standards for a multicultural world. 
Seen in this light, the point at issue for human rights justification is whether or not— and if 
yes, how— it is possible to affirm a “theory-thin” conception o f human rights while 
respecting the myriad tradition-specific ways o f regulating social order or o f promoting 
human good. I call it “the minimalism approach” to human rights.
There are a number of attempts to justify the “minimalist,” or “thin,” conception of 
human rights on the basis o f premises that are least controversial, and there are also 
attempts to demonstrate the non-ethnocentric character o f human rights. We should begin 
by acknowledging that the minimalist conception o f human rights can be understood in 
two separate ways: one way (justificatory minimalism) justifies human rights on the basis of 
premises that, according to common belief, are least controversial and least metaphysical; 
the other way (substantive minimalism) restricts the content and political application of 
human rights.
I propose that there is no causal correlation between these two kinds of minimalism, that is, 
substantive minimalism does not follow from justificatory minimalism, and vice versa. After 
all, there are many justificatory minimalists who attempt to make a much broader list of 
rights, such as the UDHR, acceptable to the members o f different cultures around the
13
world;17 and there are substantive minimalists who attempt to narrow the content o f 
human rights on the basis o f a particular comprehensive doctrine.18
1.3 Justificatory Minimalisms: Multiple Foundations and De Facto 
Overlapping Consensus
Among those justificatory minimalisms, some may look back to the process o f the 
U DH R’s Draft Committee and argue (1) that pragmatic consensus for the list o f human 
rights is sufficient to prove that, although we might agree on human rights norms, we 
might agree to disagree on their philosophical or metaphysical foundation, and that (2) one 
needs to refrain from searching for the underlying foundations o f human rights because to 
refrain from this activity is, in effect, the key to the achievement of a pragmatic consensus. 
Others may simply adjust John Rawls’s notion of “overlapping consensus” for international 
application in respect of human rights justification. For them, the Rawlsian concept of 
overlapping consensus involves the idea that reasonable citizens of a modern democracy 
can affirm the same political conceptions o f justice though the citizens remain divided in 
their comprehensive doctrines, and this idea can be applied to the universal validity of 
human rights, even in the absence of full agreement on all other philosophical, 
metaphysical, or religious doctrines.
Before proceeding, we should recognize that there are two meanings o f “consensus” with 
respect to human rights justification. The first is the consensus that concerns the content 
and the meaning of international recognition for certain rights, namely, the consensus 
about which rights deserve to be recognized as human rights. The other meaning concerns 
the deeper consensus about the existence o f proposed human rights per se, that is, why 
these rights ought to be given recognition as human rights. The former meaning may rest
17 Joshua Cohen, ‘‘Minimalism About Human Rights: the Best We Can Hope For?,” in Journal of Political 
Philosophy 190(2004), pp. 190-213.
18 See Maurice Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights?” Daedalus 112(4) (1983), pp. 1-17; and John Finnis, 
Natural Daw and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
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on the assertion that (1) a pragmatic consensus about human rights norms is sufficient and 
should be the most we can hope for, and (2) we should eschew any discussion regarding 
contestable metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. By contrast, the latter meaning 
insists that (1) human rights will lose their very ability to stand in judgment of traditions if 
the human rights are grounded merely on a pragmatic consensus regarding the content and 
the nature of human rights norms. The latter meaning goes on to assert that, therefore, (2) 
a consensus should rest on a solid, immutable justification—  a foundation o f foundations, 
as it were. The consensus in human rights minimalism, discussed below, is mainly a 
variation of the first meaning.
1.3.1. Pragmatic Agreement: Jacques Maritain and Plural Foundations 
The justificatory minimalisms o f the consensus-based approach suggest that we might 
agree on human rights norms but that we might agree to disagree on their foundations. 
Upon recognizing the wisdom of integrating reasonable pluralism into the modern world’s 
common practices, we should abandon the traditional ideal of a philosophical justification 
for human rights that derives the rights from a single authoritative source, and we should 
allow divergent justifications for doing so. I call it the “plural-foundations thesis.”
Actually, the plural-foundations thesis can be found in the drafting process o f the UDHR, 
and undoubtedly it deeply reflects Jacques Maritain, a member on so-called Committee on 
the Theoretical Bases o f Human Rights established by UNESCO. During the drafting 
process, some members argued whether it was possible to produce agreements about the 
content of rights among people from different nations. Literally, for Maritain, an agreement 
regarding the UDHR showed that people could agree on practical conclusions while 
disagreeing on either a theoretical framework or a means for justifying those conclusions. 
In light of the extensive variety of the world’s cultures and traditions, no deeper
metaphysical or philosophical agreement would be possible, so the drafters wisely chose to 
eschew the use of contestable metaphysical language and appeals.19 Maritain remarked on 
this very theme:
To understand this, it is only necessary to make the appropriate distinction between 
the rational justifications involved in the spiritual dynamism o f  philosophical doctrine 
or religious faith [that is to say, in culture], and the practical conclusions which, 
although justified in different ways by different persons, are principles o f action with a 
common ground o f similarity for everyone. I am quite certain that my way o f  
justifying belief in the rights o f  man and the ideal o f liberty, equality and fraternity is 
the only way with a firm foundation in truth. This does not prevent me from being in 
agreement on these practical convictions with people who are certain that their way o f  
justifying them, entirely different from mine or opposed to mine, in its theoretical 
dynamism, is equally the only way founded upon truth.20
Indeed, Maritain set out his philosophical foundation for human rights based on a version 
o f natural-law theory, and he understood that the proponents o f other religions or cultures 
would not agree with his own natural-law theory, which was based on the Catholic 
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. However, he left the door open for discussion on 
practical issues. As he put it,
In the domain o f practical assertion.. .an agreement on a common declaration is possible 
by means o f an approach that is more pragmatic than theoretical, and by a collective effort 
of comparing, recasting, and perfecting the drafts in order to make them acceptable to all 
as points o f practical convergence, regardless o f the divergence in theoretical perspectives.21
Accordingly, responding to general and widespread skepticism and surprise that so many 
diverse perspectives could come to an agreement on human rights, Maritain argued that the 
agreement was grounded upon the condition that “we agree about the rights but on 
condition no one ask us why,” regarding the philosophical foundations of human rights.22 
In this sense, human rights consensus is an agreement that is based on philosophical and 
theological disagreements. Moreover, the human rights consensus at this level becomes, at 
the same time, common ground for an ongoing argument or conversation about
19 Sumner Twiss, “History, Human Rights and Globalization,” in Journal of Religious Ethics 32(2004), pp. 139-
70.
20 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretation, edited by UNESCO
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1949), pp. 10-12 at 11.
21 Jacques Maritain, Man and The State (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1951), p. 79.
22 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction”, p. 9.
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justification among interlocutors grounded respectively in various traditions. For Maritain, 
this pragmatic agreement on practical norms of human rights was self-sufficient; anything 
more would be, he deemed, superfluous and impractical because the task o f achieving a 
deeper consensus about the underlying justification could not reasonably be expected to 
succeed.23
Regarding the UNESCO discussion o f and the U DH R drafting committee for human 
rights, some scholars have shed light on the participants’ pragmatic understanding of the 
relationship between consensus and justification;24 as a result, divergent interpretations 
have arisen.
For instance, Sumner Twiss,25 a scholar in the field o f comparative- religious ethics, 
conceives the task of justification with respect to human rights as divided into two 
“distinguishable levels.” One is intercultural pragmatic negotiation and agreement in the 
international arena; and the other comprises “various forms o f intra-cultural justifications
23 This view was also reflected by Richard McKeon, another member o f the “Committee on the Theoretical 
Bases o f Human Rights.” As he simply put it, . .Agreement can doubtless be secured concerning the list o f  
human rights only if an ambiguity remains, both because o f the absence o f a uniform manner o f  
administering them and because o f the absence o f a single basic philosophy, but that ambiguity is the frame 
within which men may move peacefully to a more uniform practice and to a universal understanding o f  
fundamental human rights.” Richard McKeon, “The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances o f the 
Rights o f Man,” in UNESCO (ed.): Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations: (Columbia University Press, 
1949), pp. 35-46 at 46.
24 For example, see Charles Taylor, “Conditions o f an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in East Asian 
Challenge for Human Rights, in Joanne Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds) East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999J, pp. 124-44; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Toward a Cross- 
cultural Approach,” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im(ed) Human Rights in Cross-cultural Perspectives: A  Quest for 
Consensus, Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 19-43; Tore Lindholm, “Prospects for 
Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f  Human Rights: The Cases o f Liberalism and Marxism” in Abdullahi 
An-Na’im(ed), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A  Quest for Consensus. (Philadelphia: University o f  
Pennsylvania Press), pp. 387-426; Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Random House, 2001); and Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: 
the Best We Can Hope For?,” in Journal of Political Philosophy 190(2004), pp. 190-213.
25 See Sumner Twiss, “Comparative Ethics and International Human Rights Dialogues: A Pragmatic Inquiry” 
in Lisa Sowle and James Childress (eds.), Christian Ethics: Problems and Prospects (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim 
Press,1996), pp. 357-378; Sumner Twiss, “A Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and 
Human Rights” in De Bary and Tu Weiming (eds.), Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998),pp. 27-53; Sumner Twiss, “Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures,” in Journal of Religious 
Ethics 26(2)( 1998), pp. 271-283; Sumner Twiss, “Religion and Human Rights : A Comparative Perspective” in 
Sumner Twiss and Bruce Grelle (eds.), Explorations in Global Ethics: Comparative Religious Ethics and Inter-religious 
Dialogue(Bo\Adet, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 155-175; and Sumner Twiss, “History, Human Rights and 
Globalization,” in Journal of Religious Ethics 32(1)( 2004), pp. 39-70
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in more local arenas.” 26 For Twiss, the achievement o f the international human rights 
movement is the historical product of particular WWII-related crises and of prospective 
world circumstances: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and the possibility o f similar future events. 
According to a common recognition of a particular historical situation, diverse peoples can 
acknowledge their mutual respect for certain values embraced by a human rights
conception. The achievement is the product of diverse peoples’ recognition of a set of
values. In the face of pluralism, the members o f the drafting committee o f the UDHR 
recognized that it is very difficult to find common ground for philosophical justification 
and that they should proceed without benefit o f either a comprehensive or an 
uncontroversial theory o f human rights. Following Maritain, Twiss argues that the UDHR 
was reached through a pragmatic process of negotiation between different national and 
cultural traditions, and that, in general, the success o f the negotiation process of a human 
rights drafting is achieved according to a two-level justification. As Twiss points out,
...human rights are justified at two distinguishable levels, the first represented by
intercultural consensus and negotiated public agreements in the international arena (a
form o f pragmatic justification) and the other represented by diverse intra-cultural
justification, expressed in their own distinctive moral and philosophical idioms and 
warranting (internally) their agreement to abide by and participate in the international 
consensus.27
In terms of the first level of justification, international justification depends on a practical 
moral consensus that operates among diverse traditions and that accounts for the 
importance of basic values encapsulated in the concept o f human rights. Accordingly, the 
idea of human rights represents not a philosophy about the nature of individual persons 
but conditions perceived to be “necessary for personal (and social) development in diverse 
societies and cultures.”28 In the second level of justification, each tradition may justify the 
consensus by appealing to the tradition’s own set o f moral doctrines in culturally diverse 
ways. Furthermore, this pragmatic process got underway after World War II and has
26 Sumner Twiss, “History, Human Rights and Globalization” p. 45.
27 Sumner Twiss, “Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures,” p. 273.
28 Ibid, 273
continued up into the present, not only in drafting committees but also in the United 
Nations’ adoption of subsequent covenants, conventions, and treaties. Therefore, human 
rights are commonly justified by a “practical moral consensus” at the international level as 
well as by distinct appeals to the “beliefs, norms, and ways of thinking contained within 
particular philosophical or religious visions of the world.29 Twiss points out that Karel 
Vasak’s three-generations metaphor clearly explicates the development o f human rights as 
expressions of a set of different cultures’ important expectations; and that the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights assembled by the United Nations, reaffirmed and further 
broadened all the standards contained in the UDHR. It is simplistic to claim that the 
achievement of human rights constitutes Western cultural hegemony.
In this regard, the historical-pragmatic justificatory process appears to be more a process 
than a destination. Human rights justification proceeds from what is held in common to an 
evolution in and through the justificatory dialogue. W hat is held in common among 
interlocutors in cross-cultural dialogue is both a commitment to the U DHR’s values and 
call for human solidarity based on this “living document.” This historical-pragmatic 
approach, Twiss claims, would not only accurately characterize the development o f the 
international human rights movement, but also construct a convincing justificatory 
foundation for ongoing human rights discourse.30
1.3.2. De Facto Overlapping Consensus and Justification o f Hum an Rights
The core idea here— agreeing on basic principles, but not on a single set o f reasons 
underlying those principles— has been developed systematically by John Rawls in his idea 
of an “overlapping consensus.” For Rawls, overlapping consensus indicates the idea that
29 Sunmer Twiss, Religion and Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective,” p. 162.
30 Twiss’s historical-pragmatic justification is a reasonable descriptive framework, but it needs to say more to 
prove that the consensus is based on the right reasons rather than on a modus vivendi. In chapter five, I will 
unfold a different historical-pragmatic conception o f human rights.
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the reasonable citizens o f a democracy will affirm the same political conception of justice, 
though they may remain divided in their comprehensive views. In this sense, the political 
conception of justice is a free-standing idea— it remains accessible to and compatible with 
multiple comprehensive doctrines, though is neither conceptually tied to nor logically 
dependent upon any one of them. Rawls uses the metaphors o f “embedding,” or 
“inserting as a module,” to describe the various ways in which a political conception of 
justice can correspond to any particular comprehensive doctrine. As Rawls puts it,
...from those who hold well-articulated, highly systematic, comprehensive doctrines, it is 
from within such a doctrine (that is, starting from its basic assumptions) that these citizens 
affirm the political conception o f  justice. The fundamental concepts, principles and 
virtues o f the political conception are theorems, as it were, o f their comprehensive 
views.31
Some human rights theorists borrow the idea o f an overlapping consensus from Rawls to 
justify human rights and to make it possible for a wide range o f peoples with very different 
religious or philosophical commitments to support a core set of rights that the peoples 
view as either grounded in, or at least not in conflict with, their own comprehensive belief
systems.32
For instance, invoking the Rawlsian notion o f overlapping consensus, Amy Gutmann 
claims that human rights can be a matter of international agreement, even if a related 
argument relies on plural foundations. That is, there can be agreement about human rights 
even if the underlying justifications are inconsistent or even incompatible. As she clearly 
points out,
31 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Restatement, (ed) by Erin Kelly (Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 33.
32 See John Charvet, “The Possibility o f a Cosmopolitan Ethical Order Based on the Idea o f Universal 
Human Rights,” in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol 27(3)(1998), pp. 523-541; Jack Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2003); Joseph Chan, “A Confucian 
Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in Joanne Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds) Fast Asian 
Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999J, p. 212; Charles Taylor, “Conditions 
o f an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in Fast Asian Challenge for Human Rights, in Joanne Bauer and 
Daniel A. Bell (eds) Fast Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999J, pp. 
124-44; Amy Gutmann, “Introduction,” in Human Raghts as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 
2001), pp. vii-xxviii; and Tore Lindholm, “Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f Human 
Rights: The Cases o f Liberalism and Marxism,” in Abdullahi An-Na’im(ed), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives: A  Quest for Consensus. (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press), pp. 387-426.
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When international groups publicly respect a plurality o f grounds, rather than insisting 
on only one or no ground, human rights are publicly defended for a plurality o f  reasons 
as a recognized part o f  what it means for a pluralistic world to support an international 
human rights regime. If there are many reasonable grounds o f  human rights, rather than 
just one (or none), then there is a good reason for political morality to recommend that 
official international documents eschew any assertion o f “the” proper metaphysical 
foundation o f human rights. At the same time, there is also good reason for a human 
rights regime to welcome a plurality o f nonexclusive claims concerning the ways in 
which human rights can legitimately be grounded, in religious and secular claims o f  
various sorts.33
For Gutmann, reasonable pluralism means that no single grounding for human rights 
would be acceptable to all. Provided that people can “converge” on an agreed set o f rights, 
they should accept the diversity o f the supporting arguments.34
Likewise, Charles Taylor35 contends that it is possible to search for alternative 
underlying justifications that stand in contrast to the Western natural rights tradition 
because different cultures have different “social imaginaries.” For Taylor, much o f the 
difference between Western societies and non-Westem societies consists in different 
embodied understandings and social imaginaries. They are the driving forces that have 
brought about modernity. Because Western modernity is inseparable from a certain kind of 
social imaginary, then different cultures with different embodied understanding and social 
imaginaries will differ from one another in other important ways. Therefore, modernity is 
not a monolith. While modernizing, a culture can find resources in its traditional culture to 
take on modernist practices. That is, cultures creatively adapt by drawing on the cultural 
resources of their traditions. Each culture’s adaptations would differ from every other 
culture’s adaptations, and no non-Westem culture would have to copy the West’s 
adaptations if the non-Westem culture could find adaptations that are “functionally 
equivalent” to those o f the West. Thus, different cultures come to modernity via different
33 Amy Gutmann, “Introduction,” p. xxiii.
34 Similarly, Joseph Chan encourages all cultures to “justify human rights in their own terms and perspectives, 
in the hope that an ‘overlapping consensus’ on their norms will emerge from “self-searching exercise and 
common dialogue.” See Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,”
p. 212.
35 See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke University Press, 2004); “Modernity and the Rise o f  the 
Public Sphere,” in Grethe. Peterson (ed), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, (University o f Utah Press, 1993); 
and “Conditions o f an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in Joanne Bauer and Daniel A Bell(eds) East 
Asian Challenge for Human Tights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 124-44.
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routes and via different background understandings and may be able to develop functional 
equivalents o f modem institutions by creatively adapting their own traditions to existing 
modernities: these adaptations do not have to be— and, indeed, will not be— identical to 
one another across cultures.
This is a way o f detaching the consensus on human rights norms from that o f the particular 
legal forms and underlying justification. Taylor starts with the premise that “rights talk” 
originated in Western culture. From this premise, Taylor suggests that we can determine 
whether non-Western human-rights adaptations are functionally equivalent to Western 
human-rights adaptations. To make this determination, we should (according to Taylor) 
place a greater focus on functionally equivalent practices than on functionally equivalent ideas. 
On the other hand, it is supposed to accommodate diversity in human rights standards 
through flexibility. Thus, much of the world will agree on human-rights standards not by 
losing or denying cultural traditions but by creatively adapting cultural traditions to the 
standards. Taylor anticipates that the agreement will concern not a precisely defined set of 
Western standards but a loosely defined set o f standards, otherwise known as “norms of 
conduct.”
Like Maritain, Taylor believes that we can easily find a set of norms of conduct to 
which all cultural traditions have already subscribed. For instance, he states that “we can 
presumably find in all cultures condemnations o f genocide, murder, torture, and slavery, as 
well as of, say, disappearances and the shooting of innocent demonstrators.”36 Therefore, 
by using Rawls’s idea o f “overlapping consensus,” Taylor contends that we can reach an 
“unforced consensus” on these norms o f conduct while disagreeing on the underlying 
reasons and detaching human rights from its legal form. In this regard, he makes the 
following remarks:
What would it mean to come to a genuine, unforced international consensus on human
36 Taylor, “Conditions o f an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” p. 125.
rights? I suppose it would be something like what John Rawls describes in his Political 
liberalism as an overlapping consensus. That is, different groups, countries, religious 
communities, civilizations, while holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, 
metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to agreement on certain norms that 
ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way o f justifying this from 
out o f  its profound background conception. We would agree on the norms, while 
disagreeing on why they were the right norms. And we would be content to live in this 
consensus, undisturbed by the differences o f profound underlying belief.
For Taylor, philosophical justifications and legal mechanisms for human rights would have 
to exist in each society, but they would not necessarily be uniform. These particular 
justifications and mechanisms would build on the traditions of different societies.37 
In contrast to Rawls, whose comprehensive doctrine o f overlapping consensus rests on a 
politically liberal conception of justice, Charles Taylor provides concrete examples of 
overlapping consensus that reflect traditions. A point in fact: Rawls integrates the idea of 
human rights into The Taw of Peoples by referring to the appreciable shift in post-WWII 
international law, whereas Taylor makes a connection between human rights and modernity 
and outlines the possibility of “alternative modernities” that can serve as alternative 
foundations for a generally agreed-upon set o f human rights. Exploring how an “unforced 
consensus” on human rights might take root, Taylor argues that, without sacrificing their 
traditions, non-Western thinkers have found alternative ways to justify human rights. 
Human rights, in other words, may rest on foundations different from the foundations that 
first secured these human rights.
37 Taylor creates different possible clues for general agreement about human-rights matters. If the agreement 
is on certain norms o f  conduct, then the main task is to determine whether alternative legal forms or 
alternative justifications would still be compatible with the consensus or the enforcement regarding norms o f  
conduct. That is, we may keep a norm o f conduct, but allow for variations in the institutions and the 
practices concerning law and law enforcement, or we may keep a legal form but allow for disagreement 
regarding the justifications underlying the norms contained in the legal form. As he puts it, “Agreement on 
norms, yes, but a profound sense o f difference, o f unfamiliarity, in the ideals, the notion o f human excellence, 
the rhetorical tropes and reference points by which these norms become objects o f deep commitment for us. 
To the extent that we can only acknowledge agreement with people who share the whole package and are 
moved by the same heroes, the consensus will either never come or must be forced.” Ibid., p. 136.
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1.4 Substantive Minimalisms: Empirical Universality and Thin 
Morality
The substantive minimalism of the consensus-based approach suggests that the 
rationale of human rights should be neutral among divergent cultures so that they 
constitute the “lowest common denominator” or “thin morality” that can be found among 
divergent cultures and ideologies. I call them both the empirical-universality model, and 
thin-morality model.
1.4.1 Empirical Claims and Anthropological Universality
In drawing attention to the charge o f ethnocentrism, some scholars try to construct 
cross-cultural anthropological universals by searching for institutions, rules, or traditions 
that can be linked to human rights, and affirm that a least common denominator can be 
found among divergent cultures. Scholars can investigate normative concepts by asking 
whether any moral norm operates within all cultures. In this context, people who promote 
universal values assume that a particular value is present in every society or culture. 
Accordingly, the general goal is the discovery of cross-cultural universals through empirical 
research. In this manner, promoters of universal values attribute to human rights some sort 
of objective existence. The values and, in particular, the rights are facts o f the world to be 
discovered. Because the idea of human rights is incompatible with many cultural values, the 
scope of the least common denominator must be very limited.38 For instance, Alison 
Renteln illustrates this approach by conducting an extended analysis o f various cultures’ 
respective principles of retribution. In order to avoid ethnocentrism, she proposes that the 
only acceptable human rights standards be those empirically shown to be universal cultural 
ideas. She hopes to establish universality by finding “universals” in the empirical sense of
38 See Alison Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism. (Newbury Park, London, New  
Delhi: Sage Publications,! 990).
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their being ubiquitous. Renteln holds that although there is no philosophical basis for 
asserting the moral primacy of human rights, it may turn out that there are empirical 
regularities across the world’s moral cultures that permit us to argue that certain human 
rights are respected by all cultures. There may be what she calls “homeomorphic” 
equivalents to human rights in all moral cultures.39 She argues that a principle of 
proportional retribution is a plausible candidate for such a cross-cultural universal, and this 
candidacy, she further argues, reflects a universal standard that prohibits such mass killings 
as genocide. By contrast, Renteln would have us abandon other rights in the name of 
cultural authenticity because anthropological research has discovered no cross-cultural 
ideals buttressing these rights.
1.4.2. Thick and Thin Morality
The second way in which minimalism is substantive is its argument that the values 
underlying human rights constitute the thin morality attributable to divergent cultures. 
For example, by borrowing from Walter’s metaphor o f “thick” and “thin,” 40 Joseph 
Chan claims that there are two views o f human rights. The first view represents human 
rights as a thin morality that is “a set o f necessary minimum standards for everyone to 
lead a life o f dignity” and that “attempts to capture those elements in a morality that has 
the greatest and broadest appeal to people at home and abroad.”41 These elements often 
take a negative, or prohibitory, form: for instance, don’t kill, don’t torture, and don’t 
abuse power. According to the second view, “human rights are not merely abstract moral 
principles standing on their own,” but substantive issues o f “political morality” which are
39 Alison Renteln, “International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism,” p. 11.
40 Walzer suggests that a comparison o f the world’s “thick” moral codes might yield a “thin” “set o f  
standards to which all societies can be held...such as rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression and 
tyranny” See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at home and Abroad. (Notre D am e/ London, 
University o f Notre Dame Press, 1994).
41 Joseph Chan, “Thick and Thin Accounts o f Human Rights: Lessons from the Asian Values Debate;” in 
Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun Richmond (eds) , Human rights and Asian values: contesting national identities and 
cultural representations in Asia  (Surrey : Curzon,2000), pp.59-74.
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“embedded and elaborated in a society with a particular set o f circumstances.”42 From 
this view, both the determination of the scope and the prioritization of human rights 
require a detailed analysis and a detailed evaluation o f the thick political morality o f the 
particular societies.43 Chan follows Walzer in situating thick views in internal discourse 
and thin views in international discourse. For Chan, a thin account o f human rights is 
useful for situations where outsiders condemn human rights violations in a particular 
society and abroad to fight against human rights abuses by any government. “These 
people bring to public attention the paradigm cases o f human rights violations that have 
occurred in that society, and condemn the government in minimal, universalistic human 
rights terms.”44 In this context, government-advanced particularistic counter-arguments 
deserve little attention, as they are often just excuses for the governments’ human rights 
violations. However, in another situation, a thick view of human rights is needed. They 
would differ and argue among themselves, using “substantive arguments related to the 
political morality and concrete circumstances o f their own society.”45 Therefore, the thick 
view may allow for cultural interpretations o f human rights foundations, scope, and 
priorities, and can culturally differ from one another.
The variation in thin morality rests on the premise that the content of human rights 
should command “common assent” in all cultures. Accordingly, a human right is “a tool 
kit” that individual agents must be free to use as they see fit within the broader frame of 
cultural and religious beliefs they live by.46 International human rights can be meaningful 
only if they are limited because rights inflation tends to devalue the currency o f human 
rights in contemporary political discourse. This idea o f human rights as a tool kit can end 
up eroding the legitimacy of a defensible core of rights. Michael Ignatieff states the logic
42 Ibid, p. 62.
43 Ibid, pp. 61-63.
44 Ibid., p. 63
45 Ibid., p. 63
46 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,(ed) by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p. 57.
of this position with clarity:
The universalist commitment implied by human rights can be compatible with a variety 
o f ways o f living only if the universalism implied is self-consciously minimalist. Human 
rights can command universal assent only as a decidedly “thin” theory o f what is right, a 
definition o f the minimal conditions for any kind o f  life at all.47
Here is the typology of the human rights minimalism approach
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48 See Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Joseph Chan, “Thick and Thin Accounts o f  
Human Rights: Lessons from the Asian Values Debate;” Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies” in T. Dunne and N. 
Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1999), pp. 31-70; Ken 
Booth, “Human Wrongs and International Relations,” in International Affairs. Vol(71)(1995) , pp. 103-126; 
Upendra Baxi, “Voices o f Suffering, Fragmented Universality, and the Future o f Human Rights,” in Burns. H. 
Weston & Stephen P. Marks (eds), The Future of International Human Rights (Inc, Ardsley, NY, Transnational 
Publishers, 1999), pp. 101-156; and John Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
49 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” in UNESCO (ed) Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (Columbia 
University Press, 1949), pp. 9-17; Jacques, Maritain, “On the Philosophy o f  Human Rights,” in UNESCO (ed) 
Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 72-77. Richard McKeon, 
“The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances o f the Rights o f Man,” in UNESCO (ed): Human Rights: 
Comments and Interpretations (Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 35-46. Sumner Twiss, “Comparative Ethics 
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Christian Ethics: Problems and Prospects (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1996), pp. 357-378; Sumner Twiss, “A 
Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human Rights” in D e Bary and Tu Weiming 
(eds.), Confucianism and Human Rightryp.21 -5T, Sumner Twiss, “Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures,” in Journal 
of Religious Ethics 26(2)( 1998), pp.271-283; Sumner Twiss, “Religion and Human Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective” in Sumner Twiss and Bruce Grelle eds: Explorations in Global Ethics: Comparative Religious Ethics and 
Inter-religious Dialogue(Bo\Adei, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp:155-175; and Sumner Twiss, “History, Human 
Rights and Globalization,” in Journal of Religious Ethics 32(1) ( 2004), pp.39-70.
50 Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, London: Cornell, 2003). Tore Lindholm, 
“Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f Human Rights: The Case o f  Liberalism and 
Marxism,” in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A  Quest for Consensus 
(Philadelphia: University o f  Philadelphia University Press, 1992), pp.387-426.
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1.5 Consensus and Justification
Undoubtedly, the human rights minimalism approach has some im portant merits. 
The approach (1) permits divergent traditions to justify human rights in their own terms, 
(2) obtains widespread support for human rights from divergent cultures, and (3) can 
shake off the charge of ethnocentrism because human rights minimalism assumes that 
the principle of human rights is the neutral concern of all cultures and explicidy 
identifies the Western type o f justification as but one of many possible types of 
justification.
However, the human rights minimalism approach cannot exhaustively justify human 
rights. Although something like human rights may receive mention in sacred texts and 
may acquire depth through religious ideas, the question o f whether or not human rights 
consensus is equivalent to human rights justification remains unanswered.
First o f all, the minimalism approach implies either that competing human-rights 
perspectives force philosophical justifications of human rights to be local or hold that 
they are entirely unnecessary once a pragmatically negotiated consensus on human rights 
can be established. However, making human rights justification contingent on pragmatic 
agreements or on a de facto overlapping consensus of conventional moralities is an 
insufficient foundation for human rights.
More specifically, making human rights justification contingent on only pragmatic 
agreements is ultimately too shaky a foundation for human rights, because the consensus 
may represent nothing more than “an accidental, selective, and temporary 
convergence.”51 There is no guarantee that the involved parties accept the principles for 
the right reason (the reason wherein all participants believe that they can accept the
51 David Little, “Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism and Other Matters,” in 
Journal of Religious Ethics 27(1999), pp. 151—177 at 160.
principles as reasonable and fair). Furthermore, this argument, which equates consensus 
with justification, is an inaccurate description o f our moral intuition. The fact that 
several different religious or philosophical positions converge in supporting a given 
behavioral prescription does not verify anything about rightness or wrongness, since 
consensus cannot determine moral standards but simply recognizes it. For instance, we 
recognize that “torture” or “genocide” violates human rights not because there is a 
global consensus regarding one or the other issue, but because we acknowledge the 
nature and the consequences of torture as wrong per se. As David Little contends,
...the fact that several different religious or philosophical positions converge in 
supporting.. .a prohibition on extra-judicial killing.. .does not prove anything about the
rightness or wrongness o f that prescription  In order to move from “the is to the
ought? an additional argument would have to be supplied showing in what way shared 
beliefs are justified beliefs.52
Thus, it is not convincing to suggest that any resolution to the issue o f whether genocide is 
morally wrong or not depends on an international consensus, because this suggestion 
simply puts the cart before the horse.53 It is not a fact that Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, 
and secular humanists recognize torture to be a violation o f human rights. Each o f these
belief systems has unique reasons underlying its assertion that torture is wrong.54 It is one
thing to defend a conception of human rights by arguing that it should be the object o f a 
global consensus; it is another thing to say that a global consensus constitutes the 
authoritative account of human rights. The assertion that a global consensus justifies the 
rightness of a set o f human rights indeed requires additional argumentation. If  we suppose 
that movement toward a stronger consensus on human rights is desirable, we need to 
explain why human rights should become a more truly common morality. Unless we 
provide the reasons on which the consensus is based, we will not know whether it is a
52 Ibid., p. 159.
53 Ibid., p. 157, 171. David Little contends, “It is unconvincing.. .to suggest that one must first consult an 
existing consensus, including an international consensus (however ‘overlapping’ it may be) in order to 
determine whether violations o f  the prohibitions against massacre are morally wrong or not!”
54 In chapter five, I will propose an alternative to the grounding o f  human rights in the moral intuition o f fear.
genuinely moral consensus or merely the result of lucky circumstances, or a modus vivendi, 
that is, a consensus that would likely evaporate if the circumstances and the interests o f the 
parties were to change.
1.6 Misappropriation of Overlapping Consensus
Some scholars misappropriate the Rawlsian overlapping consensus for the purpose of 
human rights justification when they view human rights as fixed points located at the de 
facto intersection o f conventional moralities.55
More specifically, it appears that this approach argues that human rights are acceptable 
because all specific human rights norms derive from conventional moralities.56 For instance, 
some proponents of this approach may argue that all specific human rights can be derived 
from a mother notion, to wit, the idea o f human dignity, and that this mother notion can 
be accepted in all cultures. O r as Taylor has claimed, we can easily find norms of conduct 
among all cultures— norms such as a condemnation o f genocide, slavery, or torture. 
Because the mother notion of these norms o f conduct is universal, there can be no 
objection to the universal application of the related specific rights. Thus, the task o f 
justification is to find a set o f core moral principles that all cultures have already recognized. 
However, I argue that the assumptions in this approach are disputable.
First of all, in chapter two, I will argue that Rawls never claims that the political 
conception of justice will be compatible with or acceptable to all comprehensive doctrines. 
And I will argue that his works neither constitute nor reflect a search for de facto 
overlapping consensuses among divergent cultures or conventional moralities. Put in 
another way, my argument is that Rawls’s works are not about basing principles of justice
55 Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: the Best We Can Hope For?” p. 200.
56 Eva Brems, “Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human Rights Law,” in Andras 
Sajo(ed) Human Rights with Modesty: The Problem ofUniversalism (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Leiden/Boston, 
2004), pp. 213-230 at 215.
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primarily on their compatibility with all reasonable comprehensive doctrines; rather, the 
works present a framework in which principles of justice exhibit stability in the context of 
reasonable pluralism and in which people holding comprehensive doctrines “view the 
political conception of justice as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict 
with, their other values.”57 For Rawls, a political conception o f justice would be “political in 
the wrong way” if it were to first examine “particular comprehensive doctrines presently 
existing in society and then tailor itself to win their allegiance ”58 Moreover, scholars would 
dismiss an important fact if they argued that, for Rawls, any predication of an “overlapping 
consensus” on basic principles of justice is limited to contexts in which liberal democratic 
ideals are already held in common currency. As Rawls puts it,
What justifies a conception o f justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and 
given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding o f  ourselves and our 
aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in 
our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us.59
Furthermore, there is a kind of slipperiness in the move from this mother notion or 
from norms o f conduct to the idea of human rights, and this argument misconceives the 
relation between values and rights.60 Scholars have yet to examine whether or not the 
consensus that exists on the general level o f the mother notion also exists on the more 
specific level of human rights. Most cultures in the past have systematically used torture 
and slavery, including European societies. Also, many cultures have widely practiced 
genocide against powerless peoples. In other words, one needs to present a more rigorous 
justification for the assertion that a substantive connection exists between such a mother 
notion and the idea o f human rights. Even if there is a consensus on the general level of 
the mother notion, meanings differ from one another across cultures: the idea of human 
dignity means one thing in liberal society and can mean something very different in some
57 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 11.
58 Ibid., p. 10.
59 John Rawls, 1980, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Journal of Philosophy (77)(1980), pp. 515-72 
at 519.
60 Joseph Raz, “ Human Rights Without Foundations,” p. 4.
other type o f society.61 This point of different meanings is critical: for example, a society 
that identifies a functionally equivalent human rights instrument on the basis of creative 
adaptation lends credence to the argument that the idea of human rights is superfluous. 
Hence, even if people respect the value of human dignity, their definitions of ‘human 
dignity’ may gready differ from one another— to such an extent that some people could 
argue persuasively that a given definition o f ‘human rights’ undermines respect for the 
value o f human dignity.62 Besides, because different societies are differently constituted and 
entertain different conceptions of what is good, societies need to interpret and implement 
this mother notion or these norms o f conduct according to the societies’ respective ways of 
life. This interpret-and-implement issue raises two difficult questions: How we can ensure 
that they do not interpret this mother notion or these norms o f conduct out o f existence? 
And with what degree o f flexibility should a society be able to interpret and implement it? I 
argue that both to affirm a core notion of human rights and to render the core notion 
manifest from context to context constitute a more complicated enterprise than the 
consensus-based advocates initially envisioned. In this regard, grounding human rights on a 
people’s or peoples’ acceptance of conventional moralities would place human rights 
justification on a theoretically and a practically precarious footing. To ground a doctrine of 
human rights only on the endorsement of conventional moralities is to undermine the 
doctrine’s very ability to stand in judgment of the conventional moralities in question.63 
Charles Beitz has clearly critiqued this point:
Human rights are supposed to be universal in the sense that they apply to or may be
61 I am indebted to professor John Charvet for pointing out the fallacy underlying this predication o f  human 
rights on either a mother notion or norms o f conduct.
62 Eva Brems, “Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human Rights Law,” p. 215.
63 Kwame Anthony Appiah also points out, “It is not to say that the legitimizing foundation o f  human rights
is the consent o f a majority o f our species  I don’t think this is a coherent idea because our most
fundamental rights restrain majorities, and their consent to the system that embodies those restraints does not 
entail their consent to the rights themselves— otherwise there would be no need o f them” See Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, “Grounding Human Rights,” in Human Rights A s  Politics and Idolatry by Michael Ignatieff 
with commentaries by K. Anthony Appiah, David Hollinger, Thomas W Laqueur, and Diane F. Orentlicher, 
edited by Amy Gutmann. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 101-116.
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claimed by everyone. To hold, also, that a substantive doctrine o f human rights should 
be consistent with the moral beliefs and values found among the world’s conventional 
moralities is to say something both more and different, potentially subversive, o f  the 
doctrine’s critical aims.64
1.7 Empirical and Normative Universality
To prove that an idea is empirically cross-cultural is to prove only empirical 
universality, not normative universality. In other words, a convincing demonstration that 
there is an empirical consensus on the rightness of a set o f human rights cannot, itself, 
ground our belief in this rightness, and it is arguable that the relationship between 
normative validity and consensus should be reversed. In order to move from “the is to the 
ought ,” we need an additional compelling argument, o f which there are two likely candidates: 
either prove that the idea o f human rights evolved under special conditions granting it 
universal moral validity or present an independent reason proving that the empirically 
universal rights have prescriptive value. Therefore, rather than question whether or not a 
given set o f human rights is present in each of the world’s conventional moralities, we 
should question whether or not we can rigorously explain why a cultural tradition should 
support a given set o f human rights and why those human rights might sometimes 
legitimately challenge the cultural tradition’s principles65. It seems that the human rights 
minimalism approach can neither rigorously answer this two-fold question nor sufficiently 
execute the task of justification.
1.8 Justification and Legitimacy: Three Perspectives
In contrast to the human rights minimalism approach mentioned above, in this 
dissertation I will explore three of the most compelling attempts made in contemporary
64 Charles Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern,” in American Political Science Review, (95) (2001), pp. 
269-282 at 274. See also Peter Jones, “Human Rights and Diverse Cultures: Continuity or Discontinuity?,” in 
Simon Caney and Peter Jones, (eds.), Human Rights and Global Diversity. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 27-50.
65 Peter Jones, “Human Rights and Diverse Cultures,” p.36.
political thought to justify basic human rights. These attempts are to be found in the 
works of John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Abdullah An-Na’im. Each o f these 
attempts demonstrates the potential for addressing the tension between universal 
applicability of human rights and cultural diversity. The three approaches central to this 
study view human rights in legal and political terms and share a common aim in going 
beyond the natural rights tradition. Moreover, the three approaches argue that pragmatic 
consensus cannot satisfactorily realize the task of justification regarding the first level of 
human rights justification.
In chapter two, I will deal with the task of human rights justification from John 
Rawls’s The Taw of Peoples. In order to avoid the charge that his scheme is “peculiarly liberal 
or social to the Western tradition” or “politically parochial,” Rawls proposes an entirely 
different grounding for human rights and insists that, after examining the actual role that 
human rights play in international affairs, we should justify and define any relevant 
stipulations accordingly. Starting from his political constructivism and harnessing his idea 
of public reason, Rawls situates his human rights doctrine within his idea o f reasonableness 
(decency), which can function as a standard of legitimacy for international society. 
Moreover, Rawls argues that a human rights doctrine should be part of an international 
consensus, and he bases this part-whole organization on the international context’s 
requirements of public reason, which give human rights a freestanding justification that 
privileges neither any particular comprehensive moral doctrine nor any philosophical 
conception of human nature. For Rawls, his scheme can eliminate the charge o f 
ethnocentrism and can secure a consensus acceptable to culturally diverse parties seeking 
reasonable and mutually acceptable terms.
In chapter three, I will consider Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to human 
rights justification. Unlike Rawls’s justificatory strategy, whose function is to ground 
human rights on a defined standard of justice, which every society must achieve if it is to
be minimally just, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach takes up an essentialist account of 
human nature to ground human rights on the notion that all human beings are alike, and 
argues that we can reach a shared consensus that arises from among different 
comprehensive doctrines and that reflects on what is common to all human beings. 
Nussbaum’s approach is similar to Rawls’s approach in that, rather than rest on any 
metaphysical conception, Nussbaum’s idea of shared consensus represents a type of 
political liberalism akin to that outlined by Rawls. Commonalities among human beings 
can constitute a standard o f evaluation claiming validity across cultures and, indeed, 
constitute an alternative to the language o f human rights that refers to people’s basic 
entitlements. Responding to the accusation that human rights language is “Western 
output,” Nussbaum proposes that the idea of human capability can take the place of 
human rights language because the idea o f human capability is both independent of any 
cultural tradition and able to facilitate evaluations of possible human rights violations. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is worthy o f consideration for its sensitivity to cultural 
traditions and its avoidance of metaphysical doctrines. Moreover, as we know, the 
capabilities approach is not simply a topic bandied about in ivory towers, but a tool 
widely used by the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development 
Project. We should examine whether her account can provide a better solution than other 
schemes can and whether the language o f capabilities has practical effects that are 
superior to those o f human rights discourse.
In chapter four, I will analyze the cross-cultural dialogue approach o f Muslim 
scholar Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im. As we know, there is a prolonged debate regarding 
the relationships between human rights principles and religion. Some participants in this 
debate may argue that any religion is essentially incompatible with the principles of 
human rights because the idea of human rights is a secular one. Specifically, freedoms 
articulated in the UDHR are blasphemous from widely held perspectives of Islam.
However, An-Na’im emphasizes that Muslims can affirm human rights if they are in 
conformity with Islamic criteria. For him, if international human rights that win 
considerable support in non-Western countries can gain a global consensus, then the 
rights merit cultural legitimacy within each cultural context. Islamic societies, where 
religious beliefs strongly influence general beliefs and general behaviors, can accept the 
universality of human rights if the societies conclude that the rights are consistent with 
the prevailing religious beliefs. Accordingly, An-Na’im offers a hermeneutic method for 
the radical reform o f Islamic tenets— a method that, he argues, would enable Muslims to 
retain their cultural authenticity while consistently adhering to international human rights 
standards. Moreover, he proposes a cross-cultural dialogue to improve diverse societies’ 
mutual understanding and appreciation o f different human-rights justifications. An- 
N a’im’s scheme is a “sectarian” approach to human rights and, thus, does not fit within 
any type of minimalism, and his scheme differs from minimalist schemes that apply the 
idea of overlapping consensus to human-rights justification; nevertheless, Rawls 
characterized An-Na’im’s work as a “perfect example of overlapping consensus.” We 
would do well to examine the differences between An-Na’im’s justificatory strategy and 
other consensus-based approaches. Moreover, if Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s human-rights 
schemes are to prove convincing to non-liberal societies, we should try to understand the 
justification and the content of non-liberal societies’ relevant schemes.
1.9 Toward a Non-ideal Theory o f Human Rights
Although the three approaches central to this study successfully dispose o f several 
predicaments confronted by most conventional human-rights theories, in the current 
study, I critically examine the relationship between each of these approaches and efforts 
to ground human rights; moreover, I undertake the construction of a new historical- 
practical human rights scheme. I will argue that international human rights as a
historically formed international practice that emerged in response to the post WWI 
horrors.
My scheme draws on these three approaches and also reflects the considerable 
influence of Judith Shklar’s liberalism o f fear and Iris Young’s critical theory. It should be 
noted that I offer my own account of human rights justification. Because human rights 
discourse takes place under politically charged conditions, which are to say the very least- 
non-ideal circumstances rather than an “ideal” discursive situation, my scheme addresses 
scenarios in which theory-making practices take place under non-ideal conditions.66 In 
this regard, Jonathan Wolff clearly states that “ideal thinkers who want to have some 
impact on reality should pay more attention to issues of transition.”67 Considering in this 
light, I will provide a non-ideal theory o f human rights that can bring us closer to 
realizing human rights ideals.
My own approach contains three important characteristics: (1) It starts from concrete 
situations rather than “by way of abstraction” 68 and, in this regard, follows Iris Young’s 
critical theory.69 Neither abstracting from any particularity nor imposing abstractions on
66 In A  Theory of Justice, Rawls makes an important distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Ideal 
theory is the project o f determining the nature and the aims o f the “perfectly just” “well-ordered” society in 
which “everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions”. Accordingly, the 
aim of ideal theory is to work out the principles o f justice that should be met before we would consider a 
certain society just. It specifies a number o f conditions that have to be met before we can rightly consider a 
certain state o f affairs to be just. See John Rawls, A  Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 8, 
16,110. However, the ideal theory does not necessarily tell us anything about the route to take to reach the 
perfect just society. Thus, I will provide a non-ideal theory that identifies the theoretical foundations that, if  
accepted, can move us closer to the ideals o f society.
67 Jonathan Wolff, “Fairness, Respect and Egalitarian Ethos,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs (27)(1998), pp-97- 
122 at 113. Also, see Michael Phillips, “Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory,” in 
Nous, 19(4)(1985), pp. 551-570; Amartya Sen, “What D o We Want from a Theory o f Justice” in Journal of 
Philosophy, 103(5)(2006), pp. 215- 38; Charles Mills, “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” in Hypatia, 20(3)(2005),
pp. 165-184; and Ingrid Robeyns, 2007, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” paper presented at the ECPR joint 
session on “Social Justice: Ideal Theory, Non-Ideal Circumstances,” Helsinki, May 2007.
68 Rawls argues that abstraction is “a way o f continuing public discussion when shared understandings o f  
lesser generality have broken down. We should be prepared to find that the deeper the conflict, the higher the 
level o f abstraction to which we must ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view o f  its roots.” See John Rawls, 
Political Uberalism, p. 46.
69 In contrast to Rawls’s methodology, Iris Young uses a method that is explicitly non-ideal and directly focus 
on what is actually valued by people who are struggling in unjust situations. See Iris Young, “Toward a 
Critical Theory o f Justice,” in SocialTheory and Practice, Vol. 7 (3) (1981), pp. 279- 302; Justice and the Politics of 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990), Introduction, and Chapter 4; Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 14.
practical human-rights agreements, I promote the type of agreement that people make in 
concrete, particular situations. (2) Moreover, like Rawls, I argue that the idea of human 
rights is politically legitimate in a context of pluralism. However, in contrast to this 
study’s three central approaches, in which shared understandings of the reasonableness 
of claims make a consensus possible, my project does not base consensus on 
assumptions we already share because such assumptions are unlikely to exist in a non­
ideal context. The political legitimacy of human rights in my scheme is based on the 
norm o f dissent in the context of deprivation and domination. I will present a theory o f 
human rights that enables us to notice, assess, and address all of these rights violations. 
(3) Like Nussbaum and An-Na’im, I argue that we should take seriously the perspective 
of non-Western cultures if human rights are going to be appropriate as global normative 
standards. I also defend the assertion that the best test of the legitimacy of human rights 
norms is dialogue that represents multiple needs, interests, and perspectives. However, in 
contrast to Nussbaum and An-Na’im, the cross-cultural dialogue in my scheme rests on 
the voices o f victimized and powerless people. I hope that this bottom-up approach will 
enable my scheme to avoid the problem of generality and will reveal multiple routes on 
which debating parties can reach agreement regarding universal human rights. I believe 
that my approach is descriptively more suitable to the moral reality o f universal human 
rights than are other approaches and presents a normative grounding of human rights 
that is more compelling than the corresponding groundings of other approaches.
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Chapter Two 
John Rawls on Human Rights
Political philosophers have long been aware that there is a kind o f  paradox at the very heart o f  
liberalism. The paradox emerges most starkly if  you imagine someone trying to argue in favor o f  
instituting liberal policies in a nation whose culture and beliefs are not liberal. Anyone who wanted to 
argue that liberal policies should be instituted in such a society would face an intractable problem, for 
it is an essential tenet o f liberalism that political policies should be acceptable in the eyes o f the people 
who are governed by them. If liberalism is the doctrine that you cannot push people around in the 
name o f  what you think is right, then liberals themselves are committed to the view that they can’t push 
people around in the name o f the doctrine that you can’t push people around in the name o f what you 
think is right. To put the point more simply, we cannot tyrannize over others in the name o f liberalism 
and still be consistent liberals.
Christine Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-century Moral Philosophy1
Introduction
As we know, John Rawls developed a theory of justice that applies to domestic society 
and that has profoundly transformed the terrain of modem  debates about justice since the 
1970s. This theory is characterized by two principles of justice that require both respecting 
civil and political rights and limiting inequalities in the distribution of resources. Though 
Rawls presented a preliminary sketch about international justice in A. Theory of Justice? many 
advocates o f his approach argued that his conception of justice could apply, at the global 
level, to managing the relations among individuals, states, international organizations, and 
so forth— provided that the world is a system o f social cooperation in which the 
transnational economy and various institutions affect the fates o f individuals everywhere.3 
It seemed that the two principles o f justice could aptly apply to this “global basic structure” 
in which the representatives of persons in the global original position would choose
1 Christine Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-century Moral Philosophy,” in Journal of 
Philosophical Research (2003), pp. 99-122.
2 SeeM  Theory of Justice, sec. 58, pp. 331-335.
3 For instance, see Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1979); 
and Thomas Pogge, Realising Rawls (Cornell University Press, 1989).
principles as citizens would at the domestic level. However, Rawls disagreed that his theory 
should apply globally in this way. In his The Taw of Peoples,4 he defends a more restrictive 
theory of international justice that requires respect for a minimal set o f human rights but 
that requires neither constitutional democracy nor limits on socioeconomic inequality. 
Moreover, regarding such a minimal set of human rights, the scope and the content of his 
“human rights proper” is very limited and less expansive than the current international 
human rights convention initiated by the United Nations.
Many admirers o f Rawls’s work on liberalism and social justice reject the conception 
o f human rights that he presents in The Taw of Peoples, and charge that (1) Rawls affirms a 
set of basic human rights without specifying their grounds, that (2) there is a 
methodological inconsistency5 in his conception of domestic justice, and that (3) his human 
rights scheme is too thin to reflect either the achievements or the substance o f the politics 
pursued by many human rights movements in the aftermath of WWII.6 These critics go on
4 I will use the following abbreviations in referring to Rawls’s other writings: “Political Liberalism,” 1996, 
hereafter PL\ “Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,” 2001, hereafter JAFR, “The Idea o f  Public Reason 
Revisited,” 1999, hereafter TIPRR.
5 See Simone Caney, 2002, “Cosmopolitanism and the Law o f Peoples,” in Journal of Political Philosophy 10, pp. 
95-123; and Thomas Pogge, 2006, “D o Rawls’s Two Theories o f Justice Fit Together?” in David Reidy and 
Rex Martin (eds) Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A. Realistic Utopia?, pp. 206-225.
6 For the critique o f  the 1993 article as published in The Oxford Amnesty Lectures see Darrel Moellendorf, 
“Constructing the Law o f Peoples,” in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, (77)(1996), pp.132-154; Chris Naticchia, 
“Human Rights, Liberalism and Rawls’s Law o f Peoples, in Social Theory and Practice (24)(1998), pp. 345-374; 
Thomas McCarthy, “On the Idea o f a Reasonable Law of Peoples” in James Bohman and Mattias Lutz- 
Bachmann(eds-), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 201-217; Peter 
Jones, “International Human Rights: Philosophical or Political,” in Simon Caney, David George and Peter 
Jones(eds) National Rights, International Obligations (Westview Press, 1996), pp.183-204; Thomas Pogge, , “An 
Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23(3)(1994), pp. 195-224; Allen Buchanan, “ Justice, 
Legitimacy, and Human Rights, in Victoria W olf &, Clark Davion (eds.), The Idea of a Political Liberalism. Essays 
on Rawls (Rowman & Litttlefield Publishers Inc, 2000), pp.73-89; Kok-Chor Tan, “Liberal Toleration in 
Rawls’s Law o f Peoples,” in Ethics, (108)(1998), pp. 276-295; Fernando Teson, “ The Rawlsian Theory o f  
International Law,” in Ethics and International Affairs (9)(1995), pp.79-99. For the critique of 1999 book version, 
see, Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics, v. 110(4)(2000), pp. 669-696, and “Human Rights as 
Common Concerns,” American Political Science Review, v. 95(2)(2001), pp.269-282; Allen Buchanan, “Rawls’s 
Law o f Peoples: Rules for a Vanishing Westphalian World,” Ethics, v. 110(4)(2000), pp. 697-721; Simon Caney, 
“ Cosmopolitanism and the Law o f Peoples” in Journal of Political Philosophy (9)(2001), pp.1-29; Andrew Kuper, 
“Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law o f Persons,” Political Theory, v. 
28(5)(2000), pp. 640-674; John Tasioulas, “From Utopia to Kazanistan: John Rawls and the Law o f Peoples, 
in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (22)(2002), pp. 367-396; Thomas Pogge, “The International Significance of 
Human Rights,” Journal of Ethics, v. 4(1)(2000), pp. 45-69; and “Critical Studies”: Rawls on International 
Justice” The philosophical Quarterly v51(2002), pp. 246-253; Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity and Global Justice 
(Penn State University Press, 2000), esp. ch. 4; and “Critical Notice: John Rawls’s The Law o f Peoples” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (31)(2001), pp.113-132; Cecile Fabre and Daivd Miller, “Justice and Culture: A
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to argue that The Taw of Peoples is, thus, a disappointing concession to cultural relativism and 
that the work’s set of propositions “inflicts a serious blow to human rights activism by 
weakening the grounds on which nations can press each other.”7 They argue that it is 
methodologically inconsistent with his conception of domestic justice. If  his methodology 
had been consistent, then (1) Rawls would have developed a cosmopolitan conception 
requiring the redistribution o f wealth and regulation o f the global economy, and (2) a 
cosmopolitan conception requiring the recognition o f a human right to democratic 
government. For Rawls, however, The Taw of Peoples as a “realistic utopia” sufficiendy 
expresses liberal toleration as the basic principle of international cooperation, and his 
theory of human rights is neither distinctive of Western political tradition nor prejudicial to 
other cultures, and can be the basis of a consensus among different cultures. Starting from 
his political constructivism and harnessing his idea o f public reason, the human rights 
doctrine fits within his idea o f reasonableness (decency) as a standard o f legitimacy for 
international society. Therefore, the restrictions on both the content o f human rights and 
the principle o f international justice are determined. Moreover, because the human rights 
doctrine is part o f an international consensus organized by the requirements o f public
Review o f Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O ’Neill in Political Studies Review (1)(2003), pp. 4-17; Mathra Nussbaum, 
‘Women and The Law o f  Peoples” Politics, Philosophy and Economics (1)(2002), pp. 283-307; H e n r y  Shue, 
“Rawls and the Outlaws” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, (1)(2002), pp. 307-323; Amartya Sen, “Justice across 
Borders” in Ciaran Cronin and Pablo D e Greiff(eds) Global justice and Transnational Politics (The MIT Press, 
2002), pp. 37-52. For favourable view, see Chris Brown, “The Construction o f  a “Realist Utopia:” John Rawls 
and International Political Theory,” in Review of International Studies, (28)(2002), pp.5-21; Leif Wenar, 
“Constructivism and Global Economic Justice” in Metaphilosophy (32)(1)(2001), pp 79-94; and “The 
Legitimacy o f Peoples” in Ciaran Cronin and Pablo D e Greiff(eds), Globaljustice and Transnational Politics (The 
MIT Press, 2002), pp.53-76; “Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian” in David Reidy and Rex Martin 
(eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A. Realistic Utopia'? (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 95-113; Alyssa Bernstein, 
“Democratization as an Aim o f Intervention: Rawls’s Law o f Peoples on Just War, Human Rights, and 
Toleration,” in ARSP {Archiv fur Rechts und Sopialphilosophie) Beiheft Nr. 95 (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003); “A 
Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention,” in Rex Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s 
Eaw of Peoples: A  Realistic Utopia? (London: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006), pp. 278-298; Erin Kelly, 
“Human Rights as Foreign policy Imperatives,” in Deen Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and 
the Distant Needy (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.177-192; Stephen Macedo, “What Self-Government 
Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity and The Law o f Peoples”, in Fordham Eaw Review, 
V72(5)(2004), pp.1721-1783; and Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope 
For?” in journal of Political Philosophy, (12) (2004), pp 190-213; Amartya Sen, “Open and Closed Impartiality,”, 
in Andrew Kuper(ed), Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human R/^//f’(Routledge, 2005), pp 53-76; 
among others.
7 Fernando Teson, 1995, “The Rawlsian Theory o f International Law” in Ethics and International Affairs v. 9, p. 
89.
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reason in the international context, it could be said to have a freestanding justification that 
neither privileges any particular comprehensive moral doctrine nor any philosophical 
conception of human nature. For Rawls, the human rights principle not only can rid itself 
of the charge of ethnocentrism, but also can secure a consensus acceptable to parties from 
different cultures.
Obviously, Rawls’s approach merits serious attention in my study, where I rethink 
human rights relative to a diverse world, because his theory deals mainly with the 
challenges posed by “the fact o f reasonable pluralism.” The sensitivity o f his theory to the 
fact o f reasonable pluralism surfaces in both the theory’s style of justification and the 
content of the theory’s human-rights scheme. In order to avoid the charge that his human 
rights scheme is “peculiarly liberal or social to the Western tradition” or “politically 
parochial,” Rawls proposes a different justificatory strategy, and insists that we should 
examine the actual role that human rights play in international affairs and that we should 
then justify and define the rights’ nature and content accordingly.
The aim of this chapter is to clarify Rawls’s justification of human rights and to take up the 
critique of his project. Although The Taw of Peoples covers many important topics related to 
global justice, I am interested primarily in the account of human rights.
There are three main parts in this chapter. The first part is about his method o f justifying 
human rights. Because the principle of human rights is grounded in a political conception 
of justice, I begin with a brief sketch of his political conception o f both domestic justice 
and political constructivism, and analyze how his constructive procedure works outward to 
the international stage and how the rationale of human rights developed from the 
procedure. The second part is about his justification o f and the content o f his human rights 
scheme. I will examine his justification o f the human rights principles and clarify the 
content and the nature o f his human rights minimalism. Finally, I will devote myself to an 
internal critique of Rawls’s project. I will argue that although his argument is powerful and
his constructivist approach would be useful for my own approach, there are still some 
conceptions that merit modification for reasons that are internal to Rawls’s constructivism. 
My argument falls specifically into a four-part categorization: (1) I agree with Rawls that it 
is necessary to develop a conception o f human rights that is not simply Western or 
ethnocentric and that we should examine the actual role that human rights play in the 
international arena as the point of departure, but I will argue that Rawls’s justificatory 
strategy fails to ground human rights successfully without a cosmopolitan moral ground, 
which he initially intended to avoid; (2) I argue that his methodology makes it very difficult 
to establish the universal applicability of human rights; (3) I argue that Rawls’s 
constructivist approach, which he bases on the hypothetical agreement in the original 
position, places some substantive constraints on real engagement with non-Westem 
perspectives; and (4) I argue that his justificatory minimalism can be preserved without the 
regressive implications concerning human rights, for reasons that are internal to his 
political constructivism.
2.1 Justice, Stability, and Legitimacy
Justice as fairness, as a particular conception o f justice, is the main theme that 
penetrates Rawls’s theory, despite its shifting focus among three decades. In A. Theory of 
Justice, Rawls tried to justify principles of justice “on the basis of the best moral view 
available and to elaborate how to make it the best approximation to our considered 
judgments o f justice, and what the circumstances are that allow its enforcement.”8 
However, a complete theory of justice cannot do without its stability, because justice and 
stability are tightly intertwined in his theory. For Rawls, stability refers to the capacity of a 
conception o f justice to generate its own support. Justice is the first virtue o f social 
institutions, but if a conception of justice is unlikely to generate its own support, or lacks
8 See TIPRK, p. 179.
stability, then we should confront this fact seriously and consider that “a different 
conception o f justice might be preferred.”9 Accordingly, a third o f A  Theory of Justice 
addresses the problem of political stability, and it is Rawls’s dissatisfaction with his 
arguments there that led him to reconsider the problem of stability and that, hence, gave 
birth to the rest o f his work.
The reason for Rawls’s dissatisfaction with the originally articulated argument rests on his 
recognition that “reasonable pluralism” exists, or should exist, in modern free societies. 
There can be no comprehensive doctrine that can be the basis for the legitimate exercise of 
political power in a liberal society. If  no comprehensive doctrine will be acceptable to all 
citizens, no liberal society can maintain stability on the basis of a comprehensive doctrine 
without the oppressive use of state power.10 “Justice as fairness,” as it was articulated in A  
Theory of Justice, relied on premises about human nature and about what is valuable. And 
Rawls drew the idea from a particular comprehensive doctrine, inter alia, a form o f Kantian 
liberalism; which was clearly a comprehensive philosophical theory. However, drawn from a 
particular comprehensive doctrine, A  Theory of Justice would not be able to provide a stable 
justification for a liberal society in a pluralistic world because we could not reasonably 
expect everyone to believe the truth of this comprehensive doctrine. This fact reflects what 
Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment.”11 Accordingly, he proposes that we should abandon 
the search for principles whose truth all people can affirm, and should seek principles that 
all people can accept as providing a “reasonable” basis for ordering the institutions o f a 
society that are shared by all citizens. “Reasonable” means that (1) people accept the 
burdens o f judgment, (2) people are willing to live cooperatively with each other on terms
9 TJ, p. 145.
10 See PL, pp. 133-8; and p4FR, pp. 34-5.
11 Specifically, Rawls argues that we recognize such burdens o f  judgment as (1) conflicting natures and 
complexities o f evidence, (2) differences relative to the weighing o f considerations, (3) both vagueness o f  
concepts and borderline cases, (4) disparate experiences o f  diverse people, (5) different kinds and different 
degrees o f normative considerations on various sides o f an issue, and (6) a tendency o f  social institutions to 
force us to privilege some values and to marginalize others. See PL, pp. 54-58.
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that no one may reasonably reject, and (3) people are willing to accept basic principles and 
basic institutions as legitimate even at the expense o f the people’s own interests, provided 
that others are willing to do so.12 Therefore, deeply recognizing the shaky argument for 
stability he made in A. Theory of Justice, in Political Uheralism and other later works, Rawls 
focused on the construction o f the political conception o f justice to provide a reasonable 
basis for a system of social cooperation, and to find the stable conditions that must be 
satisfied to secure compliance with the conception of justice. That is, Rawls attempts to 
show “how a conception of legitimacy can in part determine the content of principles of 
justice.”13 Burton Dreben clearly critiques this subject:
The first book deals with justice, a much discussed topic; the second books deals with 
legitimacy, a topic that few contemporary philosophers in the liberal tradition have 
focused on.... The question o f legitimacy ... is a central question for present-day society.
And that is what Rawls is really considering.14
Because the conception of legitimacy15 is the principle that can determine the content 
o f principles of justice, Rawls in Political Uberalism offers an alternative explanation for the 
stability o f a regime:
The point, then, is that the problem o f stability is not that o f  bringing others who reject 
a conception to share it, or to act in accordance with it, by workable sanctions, if  
necessary, as if the task were to find ways to impose that conception once we are 
convinced it is sound. Rather, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first place unless 
in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained 
within its own framework. Only so is it an account o f  the legitimacy o f political 
authority as opposed to an account o f how those who hold political power can satisfy 
themselves, and not citizens generally, that they are acting properly. A  conception of political 
legitimacy aims for a public basis of justification and appeals to public reason, and hence to free and 
equal citizens viewed as reasonable and rational.16
Thus, when Rawls considers the construction o f the political conception of justice, an
12 PL, pp. 48-54.
13 Allen Buchanan, “Justice, Legitimacy, and Human Rights,” in Victoria Davion and Clark W olf (eds), The 
Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 73.
14 Burton Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in Samuel Freeman (ed), The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 317.
151 was persuaded by Leif Wenar’s instructive discussions about Rawls’s theory o f legitimacy. See Leif Wenar, 
“Constructivism and Global Economic Justice,” in Metaphilosophy 32(1)(2001), pp. 79-94; “The Legitimacy of 
Peoples” in Ciaran Cronin and Pablo D e Greiff (eds) Global justice and Transnational Politics (The MIT Press, 
2002), pp .53-76, esp. p. 61, and its updated version “Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian” in David 
Reidy and Rex Martin (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A  Realistic Utopia? (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 95-113.
16 PL, pp. 143-44, emphasis added.
important relationship takes hold between legitimacy and political stability. A legitimate 
society’s stability would be secured if the society’s basic structure were effectively ordered 
by a reasonable political conception of justice that is affirmed by free and equal citizens 
holding different reasonable views. It is a society that reveals itself to be in accordance with 
citizens’ own intuitions about justice, and can be stable for the right reasons. In this regard, 
justice as fairness becomes a theory concerned with the legitimate use o f coercive power and 
with grounding stability for the right reasons. In other words, to show that a conception of 
justice is stable is to show citizens that the coercive power of the state needs to be justified 
in some way.17
The principle o f legitimacy can be a fundamental criterion for the basic structure of a 
liberal society, or of a non-liberal decent society, or o f the global basic structure, because 
coercive powers o f enforcement always underlie the establishment o f those institutions.18 
The Uiw of Peoples, developed within Political Uberalism and being an extension o f a liberal 
conception of domestic justice to international society, concerns mainly the legitimacy of 
global basic structure and how members of the basic structure may use coercive power 
(namely, how the constraints of legitimacy determine the content of principles of 
international justice). It is clear that we should start from the main ideas of legitimacy and 
o f stability in Political Uberalism to look into Rawls’s construction of The Uiw of Peoples and 
his human rights scheme.
2.2. The point o f departure: “Justice as Fairness” as a Political 
Conception o f Justice
In Political Uberalism, Rawls explicitly interprets three main features o f his political 
conception of justice:19 First, it is limited in scope to the basic structure of a society. Second,
17 JAFAR, pp. 184-6.
18 Leif Wenar, “The Legitimacy o f Peoples,” p. 60; and ‘"Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” pp. 
100- 2 .
19 PL, pp. 11-15, p. 175.
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it is a freestanding conception, that is, it is presented without reliance on any comprehensive 
doctrine. Third, it stems from the fundamental conceptions implicit in the public political 
culture o f a constitutional regime.
2.2.1 The Basic Structure as Subject
First, it is clear that “justice as fairness” takes the basic structure as the primary subject of 
political justice.20 For Rawls, the basic structure comprises the major social institutions that 
“assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division o f advantages that arises 
through social cooperation.”21 The basic structure has a profound effect on all o f its 
members because it includes coercive institutions within which the activities o f associations 
and individuals take place, and citizens’ aspirations and their life plans reflect the profound 
effects of the basic structure, which— in Rawls’s view— themselves reflect both the 
“constitutional essentials” (i.e., the general form of government and the fundamental rights 
of citizens) and the basic matters o f social and economic justice.22 Rawls puts the matter 
simply:
The basic structure o f a society is the way in which the main political and social 
institutions o f a society fit together into one system o f social cooperation, and the way 
they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division o f  advantages that arises from 
social cooperation over time. The political constitution within an independent judiciary, 
the legally recognized forms o f property, and the structure o f  the economy (for example, 
as a system o f competitive markets with private property in the means o f production) as 
well as the family in some form, all belong to the basic structure. The basic structure is the 
background social framework within which the activities o f associations and individuals 
take place. A just basic structure secures what we may call background justice.23
Moreover, according to his moral psychology,24 a situation in which citizens grow up under 
a just basic structure can effectively lead the citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of
20 JAFR, p. 10.
21 PL, p. 258.
22 PL, pp. 227-230.
23 JAFR, p. 10.
24 For Rawls, stability involves two questions, one is whether citizens who grow up under just institutions 
acquire a sense o f  justice, and the other is whether the conception o f justice can be the object o f an 
overlapping consensus that satisfies the principle o f legitimacy. See “The Idea o f an Overlapping Consensus,”
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justice and to be willing to take part in this arrangement; thus, this social cooperative 
system can assure political stability over time.25 In other words, if just institutions can be 
well-ordered, the gravest forms of political injustice will eventually disappear.26 Thus, Rawls 
tries to justify the idea of justice by describing it as the fair terms of social cooperation that 
people can reasonably apply to the basic structure, and Rawls tries to elaborate on the 
results that would follow a full realization of this idea. Here, Rawls states,
.. .we start with the organizing idea o f  society as a fair system o f  cooperation and then 
make it more determinate by spelling out what results when this idea is fully realized (a 
well-ordered society), and what this idea applies to (the basic structure). We then say how 
the fair terms o f cooperation are specified (by the parties in the original position) and 
explain how the persons engaged in cooperation are to be regarded (as free and equal 
citizens).27
Accordingly, the basic structure as the primary subject of political justice means that the 
structure is the subject that works out the idea o f social cooperation. A fair system o f 
social cooperation is a well-ordered society, and this assertion means that a well-ordered 
society is “effectively regulated and fully realized by a public conception o f justice.”28 In 
order to justify the political conception of justice, Rawls uses the tools o f the social 
contract from A. Theory of Justice. Rawls uses the original position, with its veil o f ignorance, 
as a “model o f representation” that models fair and reasonable conditions under which 
situated parties can select principles for regulating the basic structure.29 
Crucial to this conception is the distinction between social cooperation and “socially 
coordinated activity.”30 The idea of social cooperation is different from coordination, 
because social cooperation is realized through rules and procedures that participants accept 
as appropriate for regulation of their conduct, provided that the rules conform to 
standards that the participants regard as reasonable and fair. Rawls describes it thus:
in PL, p. 141.
25 JAFR, p. 122, p. 148, p. 196.
26 See LPb, pp. 6-7, p. 15, p. 44.
27 JAFR, p. 25.
28 JAFR, p. 8.
29 For instance, the veil o f  ignorance does not allow the parties to know individuals’ comprehensive doctrines 
or individuals’ status in society.
30 JAFR, p. 6.
Fair terms o f cooperation specify an idea o f reciprocity, or mutuality: all who do their 
part as the recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed- 
upon standard.31
According to this criterion, there can be different kinds o f well-ordered societies 
functioning as systems of social cooperation, each ruled by a different kind o f conception 
o f justice. For instance, Rawls sketches a well-ordered society as a system of social 
cooperation that is unified by “the common-good idea o f justice.”32 In this society, publicly 
accepted principles o f social justice rest on a general comprehensive doctrine— moral, 
religious, or philosophical— to govern the political institutions and the other institutions of 
society. Moreover, the common-good conception of justice specifies both what is the best 
human life and how society should be structured to cultivate human flourishing. In 
contrast to a liberal society, the above-outlined society may not treat persons as free and 
equal because the rights and the obligations of individual persons derive mainly from the 
different roles that the persons should play for the accomplishment o f the common good. 
The society is hierarchical but has a decent consultation institution to look after the 
interests of all members o f the society. Moreover, persons can recognize their moral duties 
when they “accord with the people’s common good idea o f justice.”33 The system of social 
cooperation ruled by a liberal-democratic conception o f justice is but one of many different 
kinds o f well-ordered societies.
Accordingly, a society is well-ordered in the sense that it rests on a common understanding 
and a common acceptance o f principles o f justice34 that are effectively realized in the 
society’s practices and institutions and that can serve as a framework for settling various 
disputes among citizens.
31 Ibid., p. 6.
32 See LPb, p. 71, p. 77.
33 LPb, p. 71.
34 Reciprocity or mutuality means not that people benefit equally, but that the standard o f  validity depends on 
whether the public accepts it.
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2.2.2 Reciprocity, Reasonableness, and Duty o f Civility
How are we to justify and to elaborate the public agreed-upon standard that derives from 
an idea of reciprocity? This issue refers to the second feature o f the political conception of 
justice: the political conception o f justice should be freestanding and not represent itself as 
relying on any comprehensive doctrine about the ends of life.
Apparendy, the common-good idea of justice is not acceptable in a modem liberal- 
democratic society. For Rawls, if we recognize the fact o f reasonable pluralism that 
fundamental disagreements in liberal societies are unbridgeable, coupled with the fact that, 
in a democratic regime, the basic political principles should be acceptable to the people 
who are obliged to obey the principles, then we will appreciate that only a limited form of 
liberalism, one that is both detached from its own comprehensive moral doctrine and 
restricted to the domain o f politics, can present itself as a just form to all reasonable people. 
Hence, Rawls claims that the conception of justice should satisfy the following principle: 
“political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution 
(written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can 
endorse in the light o f their common human reason.”35 This is what he called “the liberal 
principle of legitimacy.”36
The principle of liberal legitimacy rests on the criterion of reciprocity, which expresses 
people’s commitment to live cooperatively with other people while acknowledging 
reasonable disagreement regarding the comprehensive doctrines. 37 For Rawls, 
notwithstanding the fact that diverse comprehensive doctrines circulate among citizens, the 
fact that stable democratic society can assuredly exist implies that democratic citizens 
holding different comprehensive doctrines may agree only on a political conception of
35 See JAFR, p. 41; PL, p. 137.
36 Ibid.
37IPKR, p. 137.
justice.38 This political conception of justice provides a sufficient, as well as the most 
reasonable, basis for social cooperation available among citizens in a democratic society. 
Thus, the aim o f Political Liberalism is to provide a solution that restricts liberalism from 
being an overarching philosophy o f life to a political outlook that governs only political life 
in a stable and just society. Accordingly, “justice as fairness” as a form of political 
liberalism applies only to the political and social institutions o f the basic structure that 
deals with citizens’ “political relationship.” This is a relationship of persons within the basic 
structure of society, which is “a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death.”39 
Thus, Rawls set reasoning about justice within the context of a bounded society,40 and 
within “free and equal moral persons” who think of themselves as “citizens living a 
complete life in an ongoing society.”41 Rawls states that
.. .a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and 
closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all 
the main purposes o f human life. It is also closed.. .in that entry into it is only by 
birth and exit from it is only by death.... Thus, we are not seen as joining society at 
the age o f reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society 
where we will lead a complete life.*2 
When restricted to the political arena of a pluralistic liberal society, liberalism can be the
object of an overlapping consensus among different comprehensive doctrines.
However, as I indicated in chapter one, securing a consensus alone is not sufficient means
by which to constitute a freestanding justification. Nor is a set o f agents’ unanimous
acceptance of some set o f principles a sufficient reason on which to justify those principles.
There is no guarantee that the parties involved will accept the principles for the right
reason— namely, on the grounds that the principles are reasonable and fair. Thus, an
overlapping consensus needs to submit to the requirements o f public reason that all
members of the society could accept as reasonable and fair. If public reason bolsters an
overlapping consensus, then it could be said to have a freestanding justification and to
38 See Rawls JAFR, pp. 35-37.
39 JAFR, p. 40; PL, p. 136.
40 I will point out the inadequacy o f  this assumption in chapter six.
41 JAFR, p. 8, p. 27, p. 40.
42 PL, p. 41, emphasis added.
subsist on different doctrines in a liberal society.
Furthermore, when the members o f a society who are playing public roles (such as officials, 
legislators, or just active citizens) offer justification to one another for their own positions 
on fundamental political questions,43 then the citizens fulfill their duty of civility toward 
each other. When the members of the society fulfill their duty of civility, the resulting laws 
are morally binding on the citizens, and then “the legal enactment expressing the opinion 
of the majority is considered to be legitimate law.”44
2.2.3 Public Political Culture
Because no comprehensive doctrine can provide the content of a legitimate political 
conception o f justice, where do these standards come from? Because the common good 
idea o f justice is not obviously feasible in a modern democratic society, Rawls claims that 
the fundamental ideas for the construction o f a political conception of justice are implicit or 
latent in the public political culture o f that society. Rawls believes that the appropriate 
political conceptions o f justice should depend on contingent social facts about what he 
calls the “public political culture” o f a society. The public political culture is “made up of 
the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions o f their 
interpretations as well as historical texts and documents that have become part o f common 
knowledge.”45 From these members’ shared political beliefs, it is possible to constitute a 
political conception o f justice. Rawls states,
.. .we start.. .by looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund o f implicidy 
recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate those ideas and 
principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception o f justice 
congenial to our most firmly held convictions.46
It is assumed that citizens in a democratic society have at least implicit shared
43 See LPb, pp. 165-6.
44 TIPRR, p. 137.
45 See PL, p. 14; and JAFR, pp. 19-20.
46 PL, p. 8.
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understandings47 of these ideas that surface in everyday political discussion and in debates 
about the meaning of constitutional rights. Public political culture is the only available 
source of doctrine48 if we are not able to rely on any comprehensive doctrine. Democratic 
citizens can accept the political conception o f justice drawn from these basic shared 
understandings. Rawls states,
Justice as fairness aims at uncovering a public basis o f justification on questions o f  
political justice given the fact o f reasonable pluralism. Since justification is addressed to 
others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common, and so we begin from shared 
fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope o f developing from 
them a political conception that can gain free and reasonable agreement in judgment, this 
argument being stable in virtue o f its gaining the support o f an overlapping consensus 
o f reasonable comprehensive doctrines.49
If a political conception of justice stands free from all comprehensive doctrines, it is 
possible for it to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and to serve as the basis for 
legitimate coercion. It is possible also for such principles to order society stably for the 
right reason, because they can be the focus o f an overlapping consensus.50
2.3 Methodology: Rawls’s Constructive Approach
Insofar as Rawls profoundly recognizes the fact o f reasonable pluralism, Rawls’s 
constructivist procedure of the political conception o f justice does not begin from 
“universal principles having authority in all cases,” so that the constructivist procedure is 
not “suitable as fully general principles.”51 Moreover, he seeks to avoid “claims to universal 
truth or about the essential nature and identity of persons” and stresses that the political 
characteristics of justice as fairness start from fundamental ideals implicit or latent in the 
public political culture within a liberal tradition. For a constructivist liberal theory to be
47 Examples o f these shared ideas include the propositions “persons are conceived as free and equal citizens,” 
society is conceived as “a fair scheme o f cooperation” and “well-ordered,” etc. See TZPRR, p. 143.
48 Leif Wenar’s articles are the first to explain the importance o f  public culture in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples. 
See Leif Wenar, “Constructivism and Global Economic Justice,” “The Legitimacy o f Peoples,” and its 
updated version “Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian.”
49 PL, pp. 100-101, emphasis added.
50 PL, pp. 38-40, pp. 132-49.
51 LPa, p. 46.
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considered “universal in its reach,” Rawls claims that it must be able to extend itself in 
several ways.52 Departure from domestic justice, when it is completed, then “works outward 
to the law o f peoples and inward to local justice.”53 So Rawls argues that, to develop a 
complete theory o f justice, including a set of international principles of justice, the 
constructivist procedure should adapt to the subject and should develop according to a 
reasonable procedure for each kind of subject.54 Hence, his constructivist method must be 
applied a number o f times to a number o f different subjects beyond the basic structure of 
a single closed society. In this regard, Rawls notes,
Typically, a constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a series o f subjects, starting, 
say, with principles o f political justice for the basic structure o f a closed and self- 
contained democratic society. That done, it then works forward to principles for the 
claims o f future generations, outward to principles for the law o f  peoples, and inward 
to principles for special social questions. Each time the constructivist procedure is 
modified to fit the subject in question.55
Therefore, a complete theory of justice must be constructed on the basis of different 
subjects— domestic, international, and local— so that representatives in similar, but distinct, 
original positions negotiate fair terms.56 The flexibility of the design o f the original 
position reveals itself at “each step of the procedure by its being modifiable to fit the 
subject in question.”57 Thus the conception that justice is “universal in reach” means that it 
can yield principles for all politically relevant subjects. Rawls explores this point in some 
depth:
...thus, a constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it is extended to give 
principles for all politically relevant subjects, including a law o f  peoples for the most 
comprehensive subject, the political society o f  peoples. Its authority rests on the 
principles and conceptions o f practical reason, but always on these as suitably adjusted 
to apply to different subjects as they arise in sequence; and always assuming as well that 
these principles are endorsed on due reflection by the reasonable agents to whom the 
corresponding principles apply.58
52 See LPb, p. 85.
53 JAFR, p. 11.
54 LPa, p. 46.
55 Ibid, p. 46.
56 Many critics have used different terms for this construction. For instance, for Allen Buchanan, it is “The 
Duality o f Justice thesis;” for Simone Caney, it is a “domain restriction.”
57 LPb, p. 86.
58 LP  a, p. 46; emphasis added.
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In so doing, Rawls’s constructive method illustrates the moral privilege of domestic justice 
over other levels o f justice,59 and Rawls must postpone the question o f justice between 
peoples until he fully considers political justice for a closed and self-contained society.60 
If the above explanation of Rawls’s idea is sound, then we can have a clearer background 
for understanding both Rawls’s oudook on international justice and the rationale of human 
rights in his The Taw of Peoples.
2.4 A Law of Peoples as a Result o f the Outward Political 
Conception o f Justice
According to political constructivism, the law o f peoples stems from Rawls’s extension of 
his political conception o f justice to the international stage. In contrast with the 
constructivist procedure in domestic justice, the construction o f a law o f peoples needs to 
deal with the following questions: (1) What is the subject o f international justice? (2) How 
can we justify the political conception that international justice has a freestanding status? And 
(3) what are the fundamental ideas that can be seen as implicit in the international political 
culture for the construction of international justice? This section explores questions 1 and 3, 
and presents a reason for which “a people,” not “a person,” is an agent o f justice in Rawls’s 
scheme. The next section will analyze question 2, and will deal with the justification for the 
construction of a law of peoples.
2.4.1 The Legitimacy o f Global Basic Structure
Following the constructive procedure, the basic structure o f international society is the 
subject of justice when “justice as fairness” works its way outward to the international stage.
59 Many cosmopolitans criticize Rawls for not aptly explaining the primacy o f peoples and for wrongly 
assuming that the question o f domestic justice has priority over the question o f international justice. I think 
the possible answer for Rawls is that his political constructivism inevitably determines this moral priority.
60 PL, p. 41.
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But what does this basic structure look like? For Rawls, there are three ways o f 
understanding the construction o f global basic structure and moral agents in the global 
normative order: (1) the global society is a society o f individuals (cosmopolitan view), (2) 
the global society is a society o f states (classical realist view), and (3) the global society is a 
society of peoples. Rawls affirms the view that we should think o f the global society as a 
society of peoples, not a society of individuals.61
Let us recall that the third feature of the political conception o f justice is that it rests on 
certain fundamental ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture. Analogously, if a 
law o f peoples is a freestanding view without reliance on any comprehensive doctrine, 
Rawls needs to find ideas latent in the global public culture that can be reasonably 
acceptable to all. However, if we look for the shared ideas implicit in the global public 
political culture to find the content for a conception o f international justice, there is no idea 
within global public political culture emphasizing that citizens o f different countries ought 
to be treated as free and equal in a single worldwide scheme o f social cooperation,62 but we 
clearly find that the global public political culture contains ideas concerning how states, not 
persons, ought to relate to one another.63 Accordingly, there is no global basic structure that, 
functioning as a fair scheme o f worldwide cooperation among “citizens of the world,” is 
regarded as free and equal, but indeed we find a state system in which international political 
institutions regard states (peoples), not individuals, as free and equal. That is, the agent of 
justice is not a person but an entire domestic society (a people) represented as a basic 
structured In this regard, Rawls cannot construct a global original position that, by veiling
61 LPb, p. 61.
62 See Leif Wenar, “The Legitimacy o f Peoples,” pp. 62-65.
63 Many critics disagree with this argument. For instance, Charles Beitz (2000) argues that institutions such as 
the European Union and the International Criminal Court tend to recognize individuals as fundamental units 
of international law. See Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f Peoples,” in Ethics, 110 (4)(2000), pp. 669-696. See 
also Fernando Teson, “The Rawlsian Theory o f International Law” in Ethics and International Affairs 9(1995), 
pp. 79-99.
64 See Donald Moon, “Rawls and Habermas on Public Reason: Human Rights and Global Justice,” vn. Annual 
Review of Political Science 6(2003), p. 265.
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morally arbitrary features such as state boundaries, creates “world citizens.”65 
But why is the focus on peoples66 rather than on states? Following the traditional view of 
the state, Rawls treats states as rational, self-interested collective agents that possess 
absolute internal autonomy and that aim mainly for the acquisition o f military, economic, 
and political power over other states. The term ‘peoples’, then, is meant to emphasize three 
features that are not present in states as traditionally conceived, and to highlight peoples’ 
moral character.67 Peoples respond not only to their prudent or rational interests, the so- 
called “reasons of state;”68 but also to principled reasons for actions. Thus, the idea of 
limited internal autonomy belongs to Rawls’s concept of peoples. In accord with the recent 
shift in international law and practice, Rawls tries to distinguish his view from the 
traditional notion of sovereignty established in 1648 at the Peace o f Westphalia, and tries to 
deny states the traditional rights to wage war and to maintain unrestricted internal 
autonomy. Rawls declares,
Since World War II international law has become stricter. It tends to limit a state’s right to 
wage war to instances o f self-defense (also in the interests o f  collective security), and also 
tends to restrict a state’s right to internal sovereignty. The role o f human rights connects 
most obviously with the latter changes as part o f the effort to provide a suitable definition 
of, and limits on, a government’s internal sovereignty. At this point I leave aside the many 
difficulties o f interpreting these rights and limits, and take their general meaning and 
tendency as clear enough. What is essential is that our elaboration o f  the Law of Peoples 
should fit these two basic changes, and give them a suitable rationale.69
Moreover, an extension of political-justice principles to the international domain creates a 
law of peoples where a just, well-ordered society becomes a just society o f well-ordered 
societies. That is, the extension is a move from the liberal conception o f political justice 
about the basic structure of a well-ordered, closed, and self-contained society to the global
65 See Leif Wenar, “Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” p. 103.
66 In addition to liberal peoples, Rawls divides the world’s regimes into four other ideal-types: (1) non-liberal 
decent people who follow a common-good conception o f justice, honor human rights, and have peaceful 
relations with their neighbors; (2) benevolent absolutists that observe basic human rights but do not permit 
their citizens a meaningful role in political processes; (3) societies that, burdened by unfavorable conditions, 
are neither expansive nor aggressive but cannot become well-ordered by their own efforts; and (4) outlaw 
states that wage wars o f aggression and violate the human rights o f  their own subjects. LPb, p. 4.
67 See LPb, pp. 23-7.
68 LPb, p. 27.
69 Ibid., p. 27.
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basic structure among well-ordered societies. In this move, the law o f peoples applies mainly 
to the mutual relations among well-ordered peoples, specifies the rights and the duties of 
different societies, and provides principles for the regulation of interactions and the 
mediation of conflicts. In this regard, “maintaining mutual respect among peoples 
constitutes an essential part o f the basic structure.”70 Consequently, a just world order is 
best seen as a society of well-ordered peoples (a society o f societies), and a law o f peoples 
is a theory of just foreign policy per se, rather than a theory of global justice.71
2.4.2 Decency and the Common-good Idea o f Justice
Let us now recall the second feature of the political conception o f justice: the conception 
has a freestanding justification, and the function of political liberalism is to show that 
liberalism (1) is a deeply tolerant political outlook embraced by followers o f different 
philosophies o f life and (2) can be the focus o f overlapping consensus by the requirement 
of public reason.
Analogously, in the construction o f a law o f peoples, the political conception o f justice 
among peoples must rest on public reason’s conception of what is reasonable, to wit, 
stability for the right reason rather than a modus vivendi. Because a law of peoples is an 
extension of the liberal principle of justice outward to relations among societies, the 
construction o f a law of peoples needs to show that different societies can embrace the law. 
Thus, the question is this: what principles are to govern the relations among different 
peoples around the world?
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy specifies the proper functioning o f coercive power 
within a liberal society. When extended outward, to international society, this principle of 
legitimacy needs to modify the use o f coercive power because the constructivist procedure
70 LPb, p. 62.
71 Rawls states, “I emphasize that, in developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception o f  justice, we 
work out the ideals and principles o f the foreign policy o f a reasonably just liberal people.” LPb, pp. 9-10.
changes so that it can “fit the subject in question.” The political conception of justice that 
rests on public reason is one that all members o f a society or societies could accept as 
reasonable and fair. Thus, what the requirement of public reason implies regarding 
international justice is that societies aim to reach agreement with one another and then 
construct common standards o f justice together. Standards o f international justice should 
represent the terms of both a common concern over an issue and a common commitment 
among societies to find mutually acceptable terms of ordering their relations regarding the 
issue.
Because reasonable pluralism in the international realm is more obvious than ever, not all 
institutions can reasonably be liberal. Therefore, liberal peoples should constrain their 
aspirations for a universal liberalism, and should avoid coercively holding non-liberal 
peoples to liberal standards.
For Rawls, liberal domestic society ought to be governed jusdy, but a liberal just society 
ought to allow space for not just government elsewhere. Otherwise, a law of peoples will 
be hostile toward other societies.72 Non-liberal societies’ public orders are regarded as 
legitimate in the eyes of these societies’ citizens,73 and the societies’ basic structure indeed 
reflects their own public political culture. If a law of peoples requires non-liberal societies 
to comply with the liberal principles of justice and insists on the idea that citizens are or 
should be free and equal (an idea that is anathema to non-liberal peoples), then the law of 
peoples would not only violate the liberal principle o f legitimacy, but also fail to be a deeply 
tolerant political outlook.74 But because it would be wrong to support a government that is 
too unjust, it is important to clarify the criterion o f legitimacy in order to recognize which
72 According to Rawls, cosmopolitan theory wrongly assumes that only liberal democracies are acceptable and 
that all non-liberal societies are unacceptable. But, according to Rawls, this assumption will lead both directly 
to a foreign policy that seeks to shape all non-liberal societies into liberal societies and would contradict the 
liberal principle o f legitimacy. See LPb, pp. 82-3.
73 See JAFR, p. 199.
74 For Rawls, if  we do not implement toleration and respect to non-liberal societies, we not only violate the 
liberal principle o f legitimacy, but also “may wound the self-respect o f  decent non-liberal peoples as peoples, as 
well as their individual members, and may lead to great bitterness and resentment.” LPb, p. 61.
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society is decent enough to be a well-ordered partner. Thus, two new questions arise: What 
coercive principles can legitimately support relations among members of a society of 
peoples? And how do we determine which peoples qualify as partners-in-good-standing in 
international society?
2.4.3 The Criterion o f Legitimacy and the International Duty o f Civility 
Because not all members o f a society of peoples are liberal, and because it is clear that a 
shared liberal political culture does not exist at the international level, liberal peoples must 
find some reasonable terms and justification that are acceptable to non-liberal peoples. In 
this regard, Rawls develops the normative concept of a “decent people,” which designates a 
type of society that meets a minimal standard of legitimacy but that does not meet the 
standards o f the principles o f justice for a liberal society. Rawls suggests that we should 
relax the idea o f reasonableness and replace it with the idea of decency, which would 
henceforth function as the requirement o f membership in international society. Only by 
doing so can we incorporate non-liberal societies into a society o f peoples.75 Rawls claims 
that a decent people satisfies the criteria of legitimacy because the people has a fair system 
of social cooperation in the sense that the system rests on a common-good conception of 
justice, which the non-liberal society effectively realizes in its practices and institutions, and 
which can serve as a framework in which the non-liberal society settles disputes among its 
citizens. By this idea o f decency, Rawls attempts to portray a political structure o f a society 
that lacks the liberal-democratic notion of citizenship but that is acceptable to a liberal 
people. Rawls invents a particular decent society— Kazanistan— as an example o f a Muslim 
society that has no separation of church and state but that meets the criteria of decency.
The idea of decency, set as a minimal idea of legitimacy, lays out three important criteria: (1)
75 The normative idea o f  decency is central to a law o f peoples in the same way in which the normative idea 
of reasonableness is central to political liberalism, notwithstanding the idea o f  decency’s relative weakness. 
See LPb, p. 67.
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a decent society must honor human rights; (2) it must impose bona fide legal duties and 
obligations on all persons within the territory; (3) members who administer the legal system 
must believe that it is guided by a common-good idea o f justice.76
Because the assertion that a non-liberal society can be a fair system o f social cooperation 
indeed fits within the criteria o f legitimacy, there is no reason for a liberal people not to 
accept a non-liberal society as a member in good standing, though it is still unjust from a 
liberal point of view. So Rawls contends that non-liberal peoples have a moral status 
justifying their role in international society and that liberals must respect and tolerate them 
even though such peoples are illiberal and hierarchical. If  liberal societies insist that all well- 
ordered partners be liberal and that a just global society must be among global citizens 
regarded as free and equal, then the construction of a law o f peoples will exclude some 
reasonable non-liberal peoples who achieve the minimum of decency but whose 
comprehensive doctrines do not conceive of citizens as free and equal.
On the other hand, analogous to domestic justice, a political conception o f justice by way 
of public reason is one that all members of the societies in question could accept as 
reasonable and fair; thus, standards of international justice should represent the terms of 
the common concern and commitment among societies to find mutually acceptable terms 
of ordering their relations. If  the members of a society of peoples play public roles on the 
international stage and offer justification to one another on fundamental political questions, 
then the members fulfill their “constitutive relationship of civility” toward one another.77 
Following the constructivist approach with modifications that contrast with the 
construction of domestic justice, in the end, Rawls defends his claim that a law o f peoples 
is acceptable to both liberal peoples and decent non-liberal peoples and that the law
76 LPb, pp. 65-7.
771 am indebted to professor Alyssa Bernstein for pointing out this issue to me, and I was persuaded by her 
paper “Democratization as an Aim o f Intervention: Rawls’s Law o f Peoples on Just War, Human Rights, and 
Toleration,” presented at the Special Session on John Rawls’s The Law o f Peoples in the Politics o f  Human 
Rights Workshop, World Congress o f the IVR, Lund, Sweden, 2003.
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comprises normative principles for international society.78
2.5 Universal in Its Reach
Regarding methodology, there are two stages for the construction of a law o f peoples. The 
first one is the construction of an ideal theory in which liberal and decent peoples assume a 
set of principles for the governance of international society. The principle o f honoring 
human rights falls under this first stage. Moreover, there are two steps in this stage. One is 
the construction that applies to relations among liberal peoples. It needs to justify the 
international principles to which the representatives o f liberal societies agree in the original 
position. At this stage, liberal peoples agree on the principles that all peoples should honor 
but that they do not yet agree on regarding the principles’ specific substance. For instance, 
the peoples agree on the assertion that “people are to honor human rights” but do not 
agree on a specific scheme of human rights. Subsequently, liberal peoples specify the 
content of human rights only when they ascertain both the idea of decency and the 
qualification of a decent people. The other step in the first stage is to expand relations to 
include certain well-ordered non-liberal peoples. It aims to show how and why 
representatives o f certain non-liberal but well-ordered societies would also endorse the 
same set of principles. That is to say, a law of peoples tries to achieve political stability for 
the right reason, and not stability as a modus vivendi. Thus, in the second part o f the ideal 
theory, Rawls extends a law of peoples to include decent peoples and argues that they
78 Those principles are as follows:
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other 
peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty o f  non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right o f  self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct o f war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a 
just or decent political and social regime. See LPb, p. 37.
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would agree to the same law of peoples under fair and reasonable conditions. At this first 
stage, the scheme of human rights establishes itself. In order to include decent people, the 
scheme o f human rights cannot include all o f those rights typically found in liberal 
democracies; otherwise the scheme, as a whole, might be unacceptable to some non-liberal 
peoples. By contrast, the scheme can show that persons would recognize and enforce 
human rights within a decent non-liberal society and that human rights are not peculiar to 
the Western tradition.
Moreover, liberal and decent peoples would agree on a foreign policy toward oudaw states. 
Recall that the conception of justice is “universal in reach,” which means that it can extend 
principles to all politically relevant subjects. It means that the conception’s political (moral) 
force can extend to all societies whether or not they are accepted locally. On the one hand, 
because liberal and decent peoples— under fair and reasonable conditions— agree on a law 
of peoples as a set o f principles for the governance o f international society, liberal and 
decent peoples can justly exclude outlaw states, either by excluding them from membership 
in the society o f peoples or even by excluding them from the original position.
Moreover, because outlaw states are aggressive and dangerous,79 which mean that they 
cannot be part of an international system of social cooperation, liberal and decent peoples 
can jusdy intervene in such societies with the aim of bringing these societies up to the level 
of legitimacy.80 Therefore, the Law o f Peoples establishes the universal applicability o f 
human rights to oudaw states. Rawls comments on this point:
As we have worked out the Law of Peoples for liberal and decent peoples, these 
peoples simply do not tolerate outlaws. This refusal to tolerate those states is a 
consequence o f liberalism and decency. If the political conception o f political 
liberalism is sound, and if  the steps we have taken in developing the Law of Peoples are 
also sound, then liberal and decent peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, 
not to tolerate outlaw states.81
79 See LPb, p. 81.
8,11 would argue that inadequacy plagues this argument. See below section 2.8.2.
81 LPb, p. 81.
Accordingly, in the second stage, the theory needs to deal with the non-ideal conditions of 
the world, with the world’s great injustices and widespread social evils. Two instances of 
injustice are the problem of noncompliance, as where outlaw societies refuse to comply 
with a reasonable law of peoples, and the problem of unfavorable conditions, where 
burdened societies lack the basic resources to become well-ordered. Rawls treats these 
issues as the non-ideal part o f his theory.
2.6 The Nature o f Human Rights and the Idea of Social 
Cooperation
If the above interpretation is sound, then we have a clearer picture with regard to the 
nature and the content of human rights in a law o f peoples. So understood, human rights 
are declared “intrinsic to the Law of People/ ’ in three ways: (1) they are necessary to 
establish the decency o f a people’s institutional arrangements; (2) they are sufficient to 
“exclude justified and forceful intervention” by others, and (3) their political (moral) effect 
is retained everywhere whether they are bolstered locally or not.82
To begin with, liberal peoples and decent peoples agree on a law of peoples as a set o f 
principles for the governance of international society. Among these principles, is peoples’ 
honoring of human rights. Human rights principles are embedded in an idea of well- 
ordering in which the fulfillment of human rights is a prerequisite of any system o f social 
cooperation.83 Any well-ordered society as a fair system of social cooperation must respect 
basic human rights, and any human-rights violation is “equally condemned by both 
reasonable liberal and decent hierarchical peoples.”84 W ithout the protection o f these basic
82 LPb, pp. 79-81.
83 Charles Beitz criticizes Rawls for specifying neither why institutions should be held to human-rights 
standards nor exacdy how he arrives at the list he presents. I accept Beitz’s critique and elaborate it in the next 
section, but, as I see it, Rawls’s theory suggests that this list o f  rights specifies basic interests that must be 
protected for peoples as willing participants in a form o f  life. See Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f  Peoples,” p. 
686 .
84 LPb, p. 79.
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rights, the social practice of the society would not in any sense be cooperative but would 
depend on mere domination or force. In this regard, the respect for human rights is one of 
the conditions that a law of peoples imposes on any political regime if the law is to 
recognize the regime as a member in good standing o f a just political society of peoples.85 
Persons can also appeal to the law in assessing the justice o f the regime that governs their 
own society.
Moreover, in order to accommodate a reasonable range o f disagreement across cultures 
and nations, a conception of minimum decency embracing human rights should be capable 
o f securing an agreement among the followers o f various conceptions o f justice. Thus, 
peoples cannot correctly reject human rights as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western 
tradition, because the rights have a freestanding justification that eliminates the charge o f 
ethnocentrism. And because peoples cannot agree on any underlying concept like human 
dignity or on principles of natural law as such, the best that the peoples can do is to agree 
on principles of fair social cooperation. Seen in this light, human rights acquire their 
justification only insofar as they result from a constructivist procedure of justification, 
rather than from human nature or God. Rawls states,
These rights do not depend upon any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or
philosophical doctrine o f human nature. The Taw of Peoples does not say, for example,
that human beings are moral persons and have equal worth in the eyes o f God, or that 
they have certain moral and intellectual powers that entitle them to these rights. To argue 
in any o f these ways would involve religious and philosophical doctrines that many 
decent hierarchical people might reject as liberal or democratic, or as in some way 
distinctive o f Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures.86
Because liberal societies and decent societies can justify a human-rights scheme for their 
own public reasons, there is no need for a single agreed-upon justification of human rights. 
On the one hand, they can be a proper subset o f a broader class o f rights that citizens
possess in liberal democracies. On the other hand, a decent society would affirm the same
85 LPa, p. 78.
86 LPb, p. 68.
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rights on the basis o f a common-good conception o f justice. Accordingly, a society’s 
fulfillment o f human rights is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by 
other peoples. Persons can appeal to these principles in reasoning about the moral 
justification of intervention regarding political affairs o f another society. The more rights a 
country acknowledges for its citizens, the less interference is justified from abroad. A 
society’s fulfillment of human rights suffices to give it immunity from outside interference 
even if the society is not liberal. Otherwise, just societies have reasons to interfere with 
unjust societies in order to protect basic human rights. In the extreme case, just societies 
may even go to war in order to protect people from their own governments. In this view, 
the justification for interference with the autonomy o f states becomes the primary purpose 
for enforcing principles such as human rights.
Finally, the human rights principle is part of the accepted standards within global political 
culture that constrain peoples in their relations with other peoples. The human rights 
principle can accommodate reasonable pluralism regarding principles of domestic justice 
without abandoning the idea that there could be some universally applicable normative 
principles o f international justice. Moreover, the human rights principle sets up the 
threshold o f toleration in a reasonable society o f peoples. That is, respect for human rights 
is the standard for demarcating the scope of acceptable pluralism in international society. 
The conception o f human rights functions as a minimum threshold below which an 
offending society would no longer have good standing in the international order of 
cooperating societies. In this regard, liberal and decent peoples can use a human rights 
doctrine, as part o f a minimum of decency, to criticize the principles of domestic justice if 
those societies do not satisfy human rights. Because outlaw states have a system of 
institutions, and because all such systems are required to satisfy the minimum standards of 
well-orderedness, if outlaw states violate this minimal list o f human rights, liberal and 
decent peoples should not tolerate the outlaw states and should subject the outlaw states to
condemnation, sanction, and even military intervention. Therefore, the political force of 
human rights extends to all societies, and is binding on all peoples and societies, including 
outlaw states. As Rawls points out,
Human rights honored by both liberal and decent hierarchical regimes should be 
understood as universal rights in the following sense: they are intrinsic to the law o f the 
peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally.
That is, their political (moral) force extends to all societies and they are binding on all 
peoples and societies, including oudaw states.87
Thus, human rights in this sense are universal in reach, applying equally to people who live 
in societies that are not well-ordered, regardless of whether all states have legally 
committed themselves to respect and secure these rights.
2.7 The Content o f Human Rights
In order to obtain the widest possible agreement among liberal and decent peoples on 
human rights, and to show that they are not “politically parochial,” Rawls narrows the 
content o f human rights. For him, the content o f human rights includes only those rights 
that (1) can be recognized by liberal and decent peoples, and (2) whose violations would 
call for intervention.88 Therefore, Rawls designates “human rights proper” as a “special 
class of urgent rights,” and it is smaller in scope than the liberal-democratic notion of 
citizenship. In section 8.2.2.a, Rawls claims this schedule o f rights includes,
The right to life (to the means o f subsistence and security), to liberty (to freedom from 
slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure o f  liberty o f  
conscience to ensure freedom o f religion and thought); to property (personal property), 
and to formal equality as expressed by the rules o f natural justice (that is, that similar 
cases be treated similarly).89
Although Rawls does not explicate all o f the human rights in his list and starts his list with
87 LPb, pp. 80-1
88 James Nickel claims that theses two standards are (1) wide acceptability and (2) role-related importance 
testing. See James Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?” in Rex Martin and 
David A Reidy (eds.), Pawls's Law of Peoples: A. Realistic Utopia? (London: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006),
p. 266.
89 LPb, p. 65.
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the word “among human rights,”90 it is clear that the list of human rights outlined above 
omits several rights identified in the UDHR and in the various covenants initiated by the 
UN. For instance, Rawls affirms only the content of human rights specified in Article 3-18 
o f the UDHR, and thus excludes the freedoms of opinion, expression, and the press 
(Article 19), the freedoms o f assembly and association (Article 20), the right to political 
participation (Article 21), the right to education (Article26), the right to health and social 
services (Article 25), and so forth.
Rawls rejects Article 1, which specifies that “human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity,” because Article 1 fully described “liberal aspirations.” Moreover, he rejects Article 
2 regarding the right against discrimination by governments, because there is no shared 
idea o f persons as free and equal in the international public political culture, and a decent 
hierarchical society’s conception of persons is not the same as the liberal idea that persons 
have equal basic rights.91 For Rawls, members of many non-liberal decent societies function 
in public life as responsible and cooperating members of different groups, and these 
societies are “associationist in form.”92 If a law of peoples included liberal principles for 
respecting persons as free and equal citizens, then decent peoples would certainly not 
accept “human rights proper”.
Furthermore, “human rights proper” forbids religious persecution, and liberty of 
conscience is relatively narrow by the common standard because he allows that a decent 
society may “deny full and equal liberty of conscience” and that “the established religion 
may have various privileges.”93 Besides, “human rights proper” does not include the 
freedoms traditionally associated with political participation— speech, press, association,
90 In section 10, Rawls affirms the content o f “human rights proper” specified in Article 3-18 o f  the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. See Alyssa Bernstein, “A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and 
Intervention,” in Rex Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A  Realistic Utopia? (London: 
Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006), pp. 278-298; and David Reidy, “Political Authority and Human 
Rights” in Rex Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A  Realistic Utopia? (London: Blackwell 
Publishing Company, 2006), pp. 169-189.
91 LPb, p. 66.
92 LPb, p. 64.
93 LPb, p. 74.
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and assembly— except the right to make one’s voice known to sincere officials. This 
narrowness is because such rights may not be acceptable to members o f societies whose 
public cultures do not already reflect the values of democracy. Moreover, following 
Thomas Scanlon, Rawls contends that we must not interpret the idea of basic human rights 
in a way that logically presupposes or requires democratic governmental institutions.94 The 
list o f human rights plays a special role in Rawls’s conception of international justice by 
restricting “the justifying reason for war and its conduct” and by specifying “limits to a 
regime’s internal autonomy,” so “human rights proper” excludes the voting right altogether. 
Finally, “human rights proper” excludes many of the social and economic rights specified 
in Articles 22-27, except the right to subsistence and to personal security, because the 
excluded rights “appear to presuppose specific kinds o f institutions.”95 
In sum, beginning from a liberal domestic conception of justice, Rawls attempts to 
formulate a notion o f minimum decency that is acceptable to persons in other societies as 
well. Rawls formulated human rights principles as part o f the conception o f decency and 
as an important aspect of the international extension of the domestic conception of liberal 
justice. On the one hand, this conception of decency is a standard for membership in a 
society of well-ordered peoples. It maintains the mutual relations among peoples for the 
right reason. In this way, the international community can be viewed, in ideal theory, as a 
society of well-ordered societies, with its own public political culture and its conception of 
public reason. On the other hand, because “human rights proper” was formulated from 
notions implicit in the public culture of international cooperation, it has a freestanding 
justification and can be an object of possible agreement among the world’s political 
cultures. Human rights are norms that govern the conduct o f governments and that 
anyone who belongs to one o f these cultures can accept without renouncing other
94 Thomas Scanlon, “Human Rights as a Neutral Concern.” In Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (eds.), 
Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Policy: Principles and A.pplications (Lexington, MA & Toronto: Lexington Books, 
1979), pp. 83-92.
95 LPb, p. 80ff.
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important political principles. Thus, the universality o f human rights is to be grounded 
neither in metaphysical principle nor in any comprehensive doctrine. In this way, Rawls 
claims that his theory of human rights is not “in some way distinctive of the Western 
political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures” and that a wide range o f cultures can 
endorse his theory.96
Accordingly, the role of human rights in a conception of international justice emerges 
within a sort o f ideal dialogue between societies, not all of which are liberal. The emergence 
conception of human rights functions as a minimum threshold below which an offending 
society would no longer have good standing in international society. Decent peoples can 
justify interventions to change other societies from illegitimacy to legitimacy.
2.8 Critique
If my interpretation is sound, we can find that Rawls provides a nonstandard view of 
human rights. For avoiding the charge that his scheme is “peculiarly liberal or social to the 
Western tradition,” Rawls proposes an entirely different justificatory strategy. Rawls’s 
approach is instructive in that human rights are a proper subset of the rights possessed by 
the members of a liberal democracy, or o f the rights o f the members of a decent 
hierarchical society.97 Under this view, the role of a human rights doctrine should 
determine the content of the human rights doctrine, and the role is to serve as a “public 
basis of action for both liberal and decent societies committed to preserving a world in 
which such societies can prosper.” Thus, the roles that human rights play in international 
practice constrain the content of human rights.
Rawls’s instructive approach has its virtues. His novel suggestion is that a focus on the role 
of human rights, in contrast to traditional controversies surrounding competing views of
96 Ibid., p. 80.
97 LPb, p. 81.
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human nature, is a more appropriate point of departure to justify human rights in a diverse 
world. In chapter five, I will flesh out this point in my constructivist approach, and submit 
a different justificatory strategy.
However, in what follows in this chapter, I will argue that the task o f justification in his 
scheme is not successful. My critique will focus mainly on the justification and the content 
of human rights in Rawls’s approach.
2.8.1 Does a Human-rights Principle Have a Freestanding Status?
Traditionally, human rights have been understood as moral protection that extends to 
individuals and that rests on human dignity or moral status. But in The Taw of Peoples, they 
are understood as principles governing relations among peoples. For Rawls, although the 
appeal to particular moral conceptions o f the person might have the advantage o f directly 
justifying universal human rights, it would be unacceptable insofar as the rights would be 
“in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and prejudicial to other 
cultures.” Because people cannot agree on the respects in which all human beings are alike, 
the best they can do is to agree on principles o f fair social cooperation. In this regard, 
Rawls’s account o f human rights in The Taw of Peoples is primarily institutional in that it 
applies to the basic structure of a society of peoples. Peoples who agree to honor human 
rights acquire their information from the interests of peoples, not the interests o f persons, 
because the latter would inject an individualistic element that would be unacceptable to 
decent peoples.98 The primary reason for which well-ordered people should seek to enforce 
human rights is not an allegiance to the individuals who are the victims o f human-rights 
violations, but a desire to encourage “all societies eventually to honor the Taw of Peoples and 
to become full members in good standing of the society o f well-ordered peoples.”99 Leif
98 See Thomas Pogge “An Egalitarian Law o f Peoples,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23(3)(1994), p. 211.
99 See LPb, p. 93.
Wenar clearly puts it thus:
Because Rawls’s global theory works exclusively in terms o f peoples, it cannot show any 
direct concern for individuals. This is clear in Rawls’s account o f human rights and 
humanitarian intervention. When a Rawlsian people intervenes in another people’s 
affairs, to stop human rights abuses or to provide food aid, the intervention is not for 
the sake o f the well-being o f the oppressed or the starving individuals in the other 
country. Rather, the intervenor aims at bringing the “outlaw” or “burdened” people up 
to the level o f legitimacy, so that it can play its role in the society o f peoples. It is as if  
societies were individuals, with their members being merely the cells o f  their bodies, and 
one society intervened to give medical treatment to another to enable it to enjoin the 
scheme o f social cooperation. The fact that the conception o f people cannot “trickle 
down” to become concerns for individuals gives Rawls’s account o f human rights and 
humanitarian intervention a bloodless, institutional character.100
Moreover, if a people’s efforts to honor and to enforce human rights stem merely from the 
assertion that respect for human rights enables a society to function smoothly; the scheme 
cannot offer full protection to stateless persons around the world. But it is not adequate at 
all if  it still leaves out those who are not part o f a system.
I think that (1) Rawls is quite wrong if he believes that human rights principles, based on 
his constructivist device, can get rid of the notion of individualism, and (2) indeed there is a 
cosmopolitan claim that Rawls cannot avoid in his idea of social cooperation.
Recall that the principle of liberal legitimacy is based on the criterion o f reciprocity. A 
conception of justice applicable to the basic structure of a system of social cooperation is 
reasonable only if it satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. According to the criterion of 
reciprocity, people treat the terms of cooperation as reasonable and fair only if those 
proposing them have good reasons to regard them as acceptable to all of the participants.
In this regard, human rights are important instruments for individuals’ political autonomy 
within a system of social cooperation. Rawls states,
What have come to be called human rights are recognized as necessary conditions of  
any system o f social cooperation. When they are regularly violated, we have command 
by force, a slave system, and no cooperation o f any kind.101
However, why does respect for human rights constitute a necessary condition for any
100 Leif Wenar, “The Legitimacy o f Peoples,” pp. 64-5; and “Why Rawls Is N ot a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” 
p. 104.
101 LPb, p. 68.
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system o f social cooperation? Why is “a slave system” an illegitimate form of social 
organization for human beings? If  slaves, as Rawls points out, suffer social death,102 what 
does Rawls mean?
Following Charles Larmore, I think the reason is that the idea o f reciprocity is based on a 
liberal commitment independent of the collective will o f citizens, namely, the idea of respect 
for personsf3 It is this moral commitment that requires political principles to be justifiable to 
those whom these principles bind. Political liberalism is grounded on the idea o f respect 
for persons whose validity is external to the collective will o f citizens. Therefore, the liberal 
principle of legitimacy itself cannot be justified only on the basis of its acceptability to 
reasonable citizens, and cannot be a freestanding view. Larmore clearly identifies the issue 
here:
We would be wrong to suppose that the moral principle o f respect for persons has the 
political significance it does because reasonable people share a commitment to it. On the 
contrary, the idea o f respect is what directs us to seek the principles o f  our political life in 
the area o f reasonable agreement. Respect for persons lies at the heart o f  political 
liberalism, not because looking for common ground we find it there, but because it is what 
impels us to look for common ground at all.104
Accordingly, political liberalism’s fundamental principle should be understood as the 
principle o f respect for persons. The idea of reciprocity is an expression of the idea that 
the principles regulating the basic structure should be ones that respect the equal status of 
persons qua citizens.105 If  political liberalism is based on the moral principle o f the idea of 
respect, political liberalism must assert its fundamental principle in both domestic and 
international domains. Therefore, consistently, the non-liberal society must not violate the 
equal status o f all persons qua citizens, which should function as the fundamental principle 
governing the basic structure.
JAFR, p. 24.
103 See Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis o f Political Liberalism,” in The Journal of Philosophy, 96(12) (1999), 
pp. 599-625. See also Jean Hampton ‘The Moral Commitments o f  Liberalism” in David Copp, Jean Hampton, 
and John Roemer (eds), The Idea o/Democray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 292—313.
104 Larmore, “The Moral Basis o f Political Liberalism,” p. 608.
105 See Blain Neufeld, “Civic respect, political liberalism, and Non-Liberal Societies,” in Politics, Philosophy &  
Economics, 4(3)(2005), p. 283.
I 73
Seen in this light, it is difficult not to presuppose the idea o f human agency in Rawls’s 
human rights theory. Indeed, some scholars clearly argue that the idea of social cooperation 
presupposes a form o f human agency in Rawls’s human rights theory.106 Hinsch and 
Stepanians state,
In his earlier work, Rawls conceives o f basic rights and liberties— the rights and liberties 
incorporated in his first principle o f justice and effectively guaranteed in well-ordered 
liberal democracies— as basic goods that all persons need in order to adequately develop 
and exercise the capacities constitutive for their moral agency, i.e., their capacity for 
rational action, fair cooperation and for the pursuit o f the individual and the common 
good. Since Rawls considers the human rights o f the Law o f  Peoples to be a subset o f the 
rights identified by his first principle o f  justice, human rights clearly qualify as basic goods, 
too. There is no reason, then, to assume that their value basis is different from the value 
basis o f those liberal basic rights and liberties that are part o f  the first principle o f justice as 
fairness. And there is also no reason to assume that the rationale for the human rights o f  
the Law o f Peoples is basically different from the rationale for the basic rights and liberties 
o f domestic justice in Rawls’s earlier writing.107
In other words, if the idea o f social cooperation is not merely a command system of social 
coordination, it must presuppose a form of agency for the protection of individuals. 
Buchanan points out,
If it is so important that every society be a scheme of cooperation, then surely this must 
be because o f  how the differences between being a scheme o f  cooperation and being a 
“command system based on force” affect human beings. Otherwise, we must attribute 
to Rawls the spooky, repugnant, and implausible view that protecting individuals’ human 
rights is only instrumentally important because it guarantees that societies will have a 
certain characteristic, namely, that they will be cooperative schemes. But if  what is so 
important about cooperation is that it serves certain morally important interests—  
including the interest in freedom— that all human beings have, then the cooperation 
argument, if  sound, tacitly appeals to just the sort o f premises about basic human 
interests and the moral equality o f persons Rawls says he avoids.108
The idea of human rights grounded in the value of individual agency does not logically 
rely on any comprehensive doctrine and does not necessarily entail adopting any 
conception o f the good. The members of social cooperation can reasonably expect that 
the principles o f justice will appeal to all reflective persons and that human rights
106 See Donald Moon, “Rawls and Habermas on Public Reason: Human Rights and Global Justice”; Wilfried 
Hinsch and Markus Stepanians, “Human Rights as Moral Claim” in David Reidy and Rex Martin (eds) Rawls's 
haw of Peoples: A. Realistic Utopia? (Blackwell publishing, 2006), pp. 95-113,' and Allen Buchanan, “Taking the 
Human out o f  Human Rights,” in Rex Martin and David A Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s haw of Peoples: A  Realistic 
Utopia? (London: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006), pp. 156—168.
107 See Hinch and Stepanians, “Human Rights as Moral Claim,” pp. 123-4.
108 Allen Buchanan, “Taking the Human out o f Human Rights,” p. 165.
principles can be compatible with diverse cultural or religious traditions.
Put concretely, representatives of peoples in the second-level original position are aware 
that they represent peoples that are made up of individuals. The representatives are also 
aware both of how individuals are thought o f in their own society and that the idea of 
respect for the person, as elaborated in the representatives’ respective society, is different 
from that in liberal society, which treats cittiens as free and equal. Thus, peoples’ concern 
for individual persons and their rights, does not influence Rawls’s people-centered 
methodology. In other words, justice among peoples can include principles that have 
individuals as their objects. If members o f the society of peoples should intervene in a 
situation on behalf of human rights, it is because bringing the worst persons up to a very 
basic standard of living is a moral priority.
Indeed, Erin Kelly, a student of Rawls and the editor o f Justice as Fairness: A. Restatement, 
accepts the view that Rawls’s human rights scheme has cosmopolitan roots, namely, the 
equal moral status o f persons. Because of this moral claim, we should think that (1) the 
principles that “guide our social interactions are compatible with the basic interests o f all 
persons” and (2) the moral status o f people derives from this moral claim.109 For Kelly, 
Rawls explains human rights as stemming from negotiations among peoples rather than 
among individuals, because Rawls sincerely acknowledges that individuals may have 
different “cultural claims,” and that “cosmopolitanism must leave room for the importance 
of cultural claims.”110 Cultural claims can be understood to be compatible with the basic 
human rights of persons as such. Here, Kelly declares,
The content o f human rights can be understood to be the subject o f negotiation between 
societies that are supported by morally concerned individuals who affirm that the 
fundamental interests o f all persons matter morally. Recall the moral intuition with which 
we started: the basic interests o f all other people matter no less when we do not share their 
culture, ethnicity, religion, national identity or geographical region. This intuition is central 
to a cosmopolitan moral philosophy. Using this intuition to guide us helps to show how a 
conception o f international justice that takes seriously the moral claims o f peoples or
109 Erin Kelly, “Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives,” in Deen Chatterjee (ed), Ethics of Assistance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 178, p. 184.
110 Erin Kelly, “Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives,” pp. 184-5.
societies can be situated within a cosmopolitan moral conception— one in which shared 
ethical concern for human rights generates international pressure to ensure that all 
societies are decent.111
In this regard, although Rawls says that a law o f peoples is concerned mainly with the 
justice of societies, in contrast with cosmopolitanism, which is concerned mainly with the 
well-being of individuals, there is still a cosmopolitan moral ground that Rawls’s human 
rights scheme purports to erase.
2.8.2 Universal Applicability o f Human Rights: Political Stability or Humanity?
Rawls argues that basic human rights are rights that members o f international society 
should legitimately enforce, regardless o f whether all states have legally committed 
themselves to respect and secure these rights. This assertion means that a society is obliged 
to respect human rights regardless of whether it accepts the principles o f the law of 
peoples that presents the principles, and regardless of whether the society’s interests are 
considered within the second original position. If  a society violates human rights principles, 
just societies have reasons to interfere in order to protect basic human rights. In extreme 
cases, just societies may even go to war to protect persons from the abusing governments. 
However, the justification with respect to the universal applicability for human rights is still 
unexamined. For instance, why does the fact that human rights are common to both liberal 
and decent peoples establish the rights’ applicability to other societies? If  human rights are 
defined as shared standards of the society of peoples, it is not clear why they apply to 
countries that are not part o f the society o f peoples as well. Because outlaw peoples and 
burdened societies do not have representation in the second original position, it is 
unjustifiable from that position to conclude that outlaw states and burdened societies 
should respect human rights.112 Peter Jones and Charles Beitz explicitly argue that Rawls’s
111 Ibid, p. 184.
112 See Peter Jones, “International Human Rights: Philosophical or Political?” in Simon Caney, David George,
two-stage original position is simply a model o f interaction among just countries. Human 
rights principles are morally prior to the model, and the model asserts that human rights 
are common to the well-ordered peoples. Therefore, the model would fix the content of 
human rights— what well-ordered society guarantees— before defining well-ordered 
political institutions. Any “people” that guarantees these rights is, by definition, well- 
ordered and is a member of the society of peoples. Because human rights hinge on the 
members of liberal and decent peoples, all of whom guarantee the rights, this definition 
may show that intervention is prohibited among well-ordered peoples. However, it is not 
convincing as a justification o f intervention in the domestic affairs o f non-members o f the 
society of peoples. Merely arguing that human rights are a necessary condition o f any 
system of social cooperation and thus that human rights violators cannot be part of an 
international system o f social cooperation, does not show that liberal and decent peoples 
have the right to intervene in oudaw states’ domestic affairs. Because badly ordered people 
have neither representation in the second original position nor an opportunity to argue for 
their own approach to human rights, there is no reason to think that badly ordered peoples 
should protect human rights. Holding them to members’ human rights standards would be 
an arbitrary use of power.113
One reasonable response for Rawls is that basic human rights constitute the minimum 
standard of legitimacy that any system would need in order to become part o f the system of 
cooperation. Oudaw states, because they have a system of institutions, must satisfy the 
minimum standards o f legitimacy as well. By virtue o f the fact that oudaw states are 
aggressive and that their violation o f basic human rights seriously threatens international 
peace, well-ordered societies must do something to stop governments’ abuse for the sake 
of international stability. In other words, violations o f basic human rights pose a
and Peter Jones (eds), National Rights, International Obligations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 183-204. 
Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f Peoples” Ethics, v. 110(4)(2000), pp. 669-696.
113 Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f Peoples,” pp. 683-6.
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fundamental threat to peace and stability within the international order. In this regard, the 
justification o f obliging a country to honor human rights relies not on a cosmopolitan 
understanding o f the rights of individual persons but on an understanding that states that 
violate human rights are dangerous to other peoples.
However, there is no causal correlation between facts about internal repression on the one 
hand and aggression toward other peoples on the other. It is possible to see that some 
oudaw states violate the human rights o f their own peoples without posing any serious 
threat to international stability.114 Therefore, to justify imposing an obligation to honor 
human rights on a state merely to strengthen international peace, not to counter human- 
rights violations per se, would justify human rights in a politically wrong way.115
2.8.3 The Limits o f Public Reason
It is clear that Rawls treats the justification o f human rights as distinct from the justification 
of the content o f human rights. Human rights are justified from a constructivist procedure 
of justification and can be acceptable not only to liberal peoples, but also to non-liberal 
decent peoples who meet minimal requirements. Moreover, in order to obtain the widest 
possible agreement on rights, and to dispose o f the charge that human rights are peculiarly 
liberal or a Western tradition, Rawls narrows the rights’ content. Because a people’s 
compliance with human rights largely determines the extent to which all other peoples’ will 
respect the former people’s institutional arrangements, technically, outsiders can use any 
human-rights violation to justify humanitarian intervention. This limited but serious role 
that human rights are to play in world politics thereby creates a powerful incentive to avoid 
the problem of human rights inflation.116
114 Henry Shue, “Rawls and the Outlaws” in Politics, Philosophy and Economics (2002), pp. 307-323.
115 Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f Peoples,” p. 686.
116 Cf Phillip Alston, “Conjuring Up N ew  Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control,” in American 
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However, his justificatory minimalism accompanies no substantive minimalism in this way. 
In this section, I argue that the restricted content o f “human rights proper” rests mainly on 
a failure to distinguish between justification o f human rights and the interpretation- 
implementation of them. In the next section, I argue that we could preserve Rawls’s 
constructivist approach without relying on the regressive implications concerning human 
rights.
In general, any conception o f human rights must address two issues: (1) the justification 
as to why we should recognize these rights as human rights and (2) the justification as to 
which rights we should recognize as human rights.117 If  we accept that Rawls furnishes 
grounds for resolving the first issue, we still lack sufficient means to deal with the second 
issue.
Recall that liberal peoples and decent peoples reach their agreement on a law of peoples in 
their respective original positions. They then find that they have agreed upon the same 
principles. Furthermore, Rawls refers to the second-level original position as not only a 
justificatory device for the principles, but also a justificatory device from which those 
principles are to be further interpreted. Rawls states,
The eight principles are open to different interpretations. It is these interpretations, o f
which there are many, that are to be debated in the second-level original position The
problem o f how to interpret these principles can always be raised and is to be debated 
from the point o f view o f the second-level original position.118
This passage identifies the importance of the original position as the justificatory device 
from which the principles ought to be interpreted— including the principle that people 
are to honor human rights. But it is not clear what principles or procedures would guide 
peoples within the original position in establishing a settled interpretation of human 
rights. Rawls simply offers the interpretation o f what should and should not be expected
117 See Thomas Pogge, “The International Significance o f  Human Rights” and “World Poverty and Human 
Rights.”
118 LPb, p. 42.
of decent peoples, and asserts that decent people would agree on the same law, but 
offers no further reason.
The only reason I can find is that liberal and decent peoples reach the “human rights 
proper” by agreeing to the assertion requiring “peoples to honor human rights 
principles.” However, it is not clear that liberal and decent peoples sharing a common 
concern for human-rights principles per se would share the same interpretation of human 
rights as well.
It seems that Rawls ignores the fact that defining human rights must involve a degree of 
abstraction that is consistent with at least some variation in interpretation and 
implementation.119 Agreement on rights at the level o f “principle” or “concept” is 
consistent with a certain range o f dispute at the level o f interpretation and at the level of 
implementation. A perfect agreement at the concept level does not preempt the 
interpretation and implementation.
Indeed, as Frank Michelman clearly points out, disagreement about interpreting human 
rights shows what he calls “the fact of reasonable interpretative pluralism,” which he defines as 
“the fact of irresolvable uncertainty and, in real political time, irreparable reasonable 
disagreement among inhabitants of a modern country about the set of entrenchments 
and interpretations of human rights.”120 In spite o f agreement on the law of peoples and 
on honoring human-rights principles, there is no dialogue between liberal and decent 
peoples regarding interpretations o f human rights. There are internal dialogues among 
liberal peoples, but there is no framework for cross-cultural discussion o f human rights 
between liberal and decent peoples. How can it be reassuring to a liberal simply to 
imagine a tolerable decent society that would agree with the liberal’s standards? W ithout a 
detailed account of the rights that decent peoples uphold, why should liberal peoples
119 See James Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?”
120 See Frank Michelman, “Human Rights and the Limits o f  Constitutional Theory,” in Ratio Juris (13) (2000), 
p. 70.
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tolerate the decent peoples? Without actual engagement in cross-cultural dialogue, we 
cannot clearly know how liberal and decent peoples can both ensure the same 
interpretation regarding human rights principles and reach agreement on the content o f 
human rights.121 In this regard, the justification o f “human rights proper” remains 
unexamined.
Moreover, I argue that Rawls is confused by an oversimplified conception of the relation 
between peoples and cultures. The non-liberal culture that Rawls describes seems 
homogeneous and static because decent peoples gain political legitimacy in the eyes of 
citizens. Rawls exaggerates the differences between liberal and non-liberal culture in that 
the distinction “over-plays differences while ignoring both similarities and assimilations 
between cultures.” In this regard, Amartya Sen clearly points out,
Since each civilization contains diverse elements, a non-Western civilization can then be 
characterized by referring to those tendencies that are most distant from the identified 
“Western” traditions and values. These selected elements are then taken to be more 
“authentic” or more “genuinely indigenous” than the elements that are relatively similar to 
what can be found also in the West.
 Through selective emphases that point up differences with the West, other civilizations
can, in this way, be redefined in alien terms, which can be exotic and charming, or else 
bizarre and terrifying, or simply strange and engaging. When identity is thus “defined by 
contrast,” divergence with the West becomes central.122
Moreover, when cultures are presented as hermetic and sealed wholes, unchanging continuities, 
the internal contradictions and debates within cultures are dismissed; also, the different 
conceptual and normative options which are available to the participants of a given culture 
and society are ignored123.
One reasonable response for Rawls is that because non-liberal peoples are as legitimate for 
their own members and reflect their own public political culture, non-liberal society can be 
a fair system of social cooperation, though it is still unjust from the liberal point o f view. 
However, Rawls neglects that there is an internal criterion for external respect by other
121 In terms o f “actual engagement,” compare: Iris. M. Young, Justice and Politics of Differences (Priceton 
University Press), pp 101-102.
122 Amartya Sen, “East and West: The Reach o f Reason” in New York Review of Books, July 20(2000), pp. 33-38.
123 See Uma Narayan,“Undoing the Tacking Picture’ o f Culture,” in Sign: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society (25)(2000), pp: 1083-1086.
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peoples: the internal acceptance of the society’s political legitimacy by its members. Rainer 
Forst states,
...if one presupposes the culture’s own self understanding, such a culture (or state) 
demands respect on the basis o f  its acceptance by its own members as an ethical source 
o f the experience o f their own lives as meaningful and sublated’’ (aufgehoben). A society 
or culture may only demand that its “shared understandings” be accepted and respected 
as its internal morality if  these understandings really are shared and are not forced upon 
any segment o f the population.124
Accordingly, the legitimate acceptance o f the decent people based on the common good 
conception of justice presupposes that the members o f the people understand the current 
practice as an appropriate expression of their own convictions. But I will argue that, 
without some core rights that Rawls has excluded, the principle o f internal acceptance 
cannot be successfully proved, for reasons that are internal to the idea o f decency.
2.8.4 Substantive or Justificatory Minimalism? An Internal Critique 
While Rawls does not express clearly why Articles 19 and 20 should be rejected as basic 
human rights, it appears to show that Rawls thinks that the freedom of expression, the 
freedom of association, and the right to political participation presuppose specific kinds of 
typical democratic aspirations that decent societies could reasonably reject if their public 
cultures do not already reflect the values of democracy. Rawls wants to secure basic human 
rights by other institutional means. If diverse kinds o f political structure are able to secure 
the basic human rights, liberal society has no reason to reject them. Because it is possible 
for a government as a decent consultation hierarchy that is not procedurally democratic to 
be legitimate, the political rights specific to procedural democracy (one person, one vote) 
do not necessarily belong on the list o f basic human rights.125
If we follow Rawls’s methodology and accept human rights as belonging to the conception
124 Rainer Forst, “The Basic Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception o f Human Rights,” 
in Constellations, (6)(1999), p. 38.
125 Alyssa Bernstein argues that these rights cannot be internationally enforceable basic human rights, but that 
the rights can be regarded as derivative human rights. See Alyssa Bernstein, “A Human Right to Democracy?” 
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of decency that is a standard for membership in a society o f well-ordered peoples, Rawls is 
right to reject the duty of every decent society to implement equal political participation 
and universal suffrage if democracy is not an institution available to the societies. In 
chapter five, I will flesh out this point in my own approach. However, I contend that Rawls 
cannot reject Articles 19 and 20 regarding political rights in his human rights scheme for 
reasons that are internal to the idea o f decency.
First of all, Rawls insists that the liberal principle of toleration requires us to admit 
hierarchical societies as members in good standing, provided that they meet the required 
minimum conditions o f decency and respect for human rights. Insofar as there is no 
conception of persons as free and equal in a non-liberal decent society, liberal peoples 
following the liberal principle o f legitimacy should relax the standard to make human rights 
principles acceptable to non-liberal societies; in this way, human rights can have a 
freestanding status, independent of any particular comprehensive doctrine.
As many critics have charged, by allowing decent people to be bona fide members o f a 
society of peoples, Rawls has paid a heavy price for tolerating inequality within decent 
societies. Rawls also dismisses the fact that the interests of persons and o f peoples do not 
necessarily correspond, and the fact that there are many serious conflicts within peoples 
with internal plurality.126 The possible response from Rawls is that, a decent well-ordered 
society grounded by “the common good idea of justice” indeed is regarded as legitimate in 
the eyes of its own people. It specifies a decent scheme of social cooperation, and deserves 
the respect of other peoples. If  most members accept a particular idea of the common- 
good conception o f justice, members do not have to treat their citizens as equals, so long as 
a decent consultation hierarchy provides all members an opportunity to choose and govern 
their own institutions. Liberal peoples can then allow this decent people to be a member of
126 See Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law o f  
Persons” in PoliticalTheory (28)(2000), p. 646; Martha Nussbaum, “Women and the Law o f  Peoples,” p. 294; 
FOJ, p. 252; and Allen Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law o f Peoples: Rules for a Vanishing Westphalian World,” pp. 
697-721.
a society of peoples.
Furthermore, for Rawls, securing the basic human rights o f all members is part o f the 
criterion of political legitimacy. The criterion o f political legitimacy requires that a 
common-good idea o f justice guide a well-ordered society’s system o f law. This idea 
leads to two further stipulations for well-ordering. First, the society’s system o f law 
must impose bona fide moral duties and obligations on all members o f the society—  
here, members recognize the society’s system of law “as fitting with their common 
good idea of justice,” and not as “mere commands imposed by force.” Second, 
officials and judges administering the system of law must ensure that “the law is indeed 
guided by a common good idea of justice.”127 The important point to notice here is 
that the system of law, as guided by the common-good idea of justice, not only 
specifies duties and obligations distinct from basic human rights, but also specifies 
rights distinct from basic human rights— this is the case when Rawls insists that “the 
legal system of a decent hierarchical system must contain a decent consultation 
hierarchy.”128 That is, there are some political rights that are corollaries o f the right to 
freedom from mental and physical abuse. Indeed, a consultation hierarchy is a society 
having the minimal standards of participation, representation, and accountability, 
standards that do not suffice for the designation o f democracy.
The following items are examples o f the minimal standards:
(1) Participation: a decent society guarantees all citizens a right to participate in the 
consultation hierarchy to a substantial degree. They must have substantial influence on 
setting the agenda o f important public issues and endorsing policies, and citizens are to 
“ ... play a substantial role, say through association and groups, in making political 
decisions.”129 In this regard, Rawls cannot count societies o f “benevolent absolutism” as
decent societies because “their members are denied a meaningful role in making political 
decisions.”130
(2) Representation: The government must truly represent citizens’ views and interests. The 
basic structure of decent society must include “a family of representative bodies to take 
part in an established procedure o f consultation,”131 and “persons as members o f 
associations, corporations and estates have the right at some point in the procedure o f 
consultation (often at the stage of selecting a group’s representatives) to express political 
dissent.”132 But every person need not have equal influence or representation over the 
government, as long as the least powerful have substantial influence over government, 
including representation.133
(3) Accountability: Every citizen has the right to dissent; the appropriate authorities 
must address any questions or objections if the dissent is expressed within “the basic 
framework of the common good idea of justice.”134 Government must sincerely 
consider the interests of all the people. That is why a decent hierarchical regime is 
different from a paternalistic regime. Rawls states,
.. .the dissenters are not required to accept the answer given to them, they may renew 
their protest, provided they explain why they are still dissatisfied, and their explanation 
in turn ought to receive a further and fuller reply. Dissent expresses a form o f public 
protest and is permissible provided it stays within the basic framework o f the common 
good idea o f justice.135
It seems that, for Rawls, the idea o f self-determination means that people are 
collectively ruling over themselves, that is, self-governing. Therefore, decent society is 
one that provides the minimal conditions within which a government can be said to 
sincerely act for its people. It should include the minimal criterion of legitimacy, which 
contains the requirements o f participation, representation, and accountability.
However, without the rights contained within Articles 19 and 20, we simply have no reason 
to think that the common-good idea o f justice is freely supported and judged legitimate by 
the reasonable members o f the decent society in question.
First o f all, in terms o f condition (1), though a decent hierarchical government allows 
people to play a substantial role in the procedure o f consultation, it is the “group” that is 
represented in the consultation hierarchy and not individual persons because Rawls 
envisions a hierarchical society to be associationist in form. Thus, the right to dissent is 
individually expressed, but ultimately individual persons have a say only through their 
groups or associations.
However, it is true that a group may hold a fixed belief but that different individuals within 
the group may interpret that belief differendy, because even groups appearing to be 
culturally homogeneous are likely to contain internal diversity; therefore, we should know 
whether persons can truly have a say through their groups. Nevertheless, without the 
freedoms o f speech and press, it is difficult to know whether or not individuals can 
substantially participate in the consultation process without fear. If individual persons can 
express opinion only through their associations or groups, we should face the truth that the 
relations of power exist in groups regarding the interpretation of cultures or 
comprehensive doctrines.136 Without freedom of speech, leaders of groups or associations 
can possibly prohibit demonstration or peaceful protest to create an uneasy or chilling 
effect on political discussions. The officers can ban the dissemination o f literature that is 
deemed dangerous or blasphemous. Moreover, without freedom of speech and press, it is 
difficult to ensure that persons can sincerely express their opinion “at the stage o f selecting 
a group’s representatives” without fear. In liberal societies, persons can advocate non-liberal 
comprehensive doctrines or ways o f living without fear because that comprehensive
136 See Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies” in Tim Dunne and Nicholas. J. Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global 
Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 31-70.
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doctrine is operating within a liberal basic structure. By contrast, in a decent hierarchical 
society, there is no institutional opportunity for people holding diverse opinions against the 
dominant comprehensive doctrines to express the opinions without fear.
Moreover, in terms of condition (2), Rawls stresses that each member o f society must 
belong to a group and that each group has a representative in the consultation table; 
however, it is not clear whether or not the consultation hierarchy should take into account 
the interests o f every group during the consultation procedure. For example, a minority 
group such as a homosexual group, whose identity is forbidden by the comprehensive 
doctrine, will certainly not form part o f the consultation hierarchy in a “decent society” like 
Kazanistan. Without the freedoms of speech and press, it is also difficult to know whether 
or not minority groups within the decent hierarchical society can openly challenge an 
existing decision and can openly express their views without fear, and hence it is difficult to 
know whether or not the common good conception o f justice is genuinely common to all 
persons within a given community.137
Finally, in terms o f condition (3), Rawls claims that the appropriate authorities must 
address any questions and objections that persons express within “the basic framework of 
the common good idea o f justice.” But as I stated, liberal peoples should respect the shared 
understandings of a common-good idea o f justice only if the society’s members really share 
and willingly accept these understandings; that is, external respect presupposes genuine 
internal acceptance. There is an internal criterion of legitimacy built into the defense o f 
people’s self-determination.138 However, without the freedom of press, government can 
control citizens’ access to the mass media and interrupt much useful information in 
circulation, so that citizens can receive only information that the state power permits or 
propaganda. Furthermore, because decent peoples prohibit dissent expressed against the
137 See Cecile Fabre and David Miller, “Justice and Culture: Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O ’Neill,” in Political 
Studies Review (1)(2003), pp. 10-11.
138 Rainer Frost, “The Basic Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception o f Fluman Rights,” p. 
171.
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common-good idea of justice itself, the officers may legitimately jail dissenters if their 
actions go beyond “the framework o f the common good idea of justice.”139 Although 
Rawls insists that citizens o f such societies have a right o f emigration, this right is not 
matched by any corresponding duty on the part of other societies or peoples to accept 
immigration from these societies. Citizens of liberal societies have the right to exit and to 
reject non-liberal doctrine, should they choose to do so, whereas citizens of decent 
societies have no such right.
Accordingly, when members of decent peoples lack the protection o f these political rights 
contained in Articles 19 and 20, conformity to the basic rules of a society would neither 
reflect the willing cooperation of its members nor express the will o f its people. A 
government that maintains its authority by violating these political rights cannot express 
the public political culture of its society. Accordingly, the conception of human rights that 
Rawls defends should be expanded to include the political rights outlined above.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed Rawls’s justificatory strategy for grounding human rights in 
a pluralistic world. Rawls rightly aims to develop a political conception o f human rights 
that is not simply Western or ethnocentric. But I contend that his attempt is not successful. 
I argue that, on the one hand, Rawls wants to avoid familiar human-rights justifications that 
appeal to a philosophical account of the moral status o f persons; however, this is exactly 
the cosmopolitan claim that Rawls’s theory cannot avoid. I argue that, on the other hand, 
his methodology lacks critical engagement with the actual claims of cultures and ultimately 
provides little reason for accepting the limited scope o f human rights.
139 See Eric Cavallero, “Popular Sovereignty and the Law o f Peoples,” in Legal Theory (2003), p. 191. See also 
Chris Brown “The Construction o f a ‘Realistic Utopia’: John Rawls and International Political Theory,” Review 
of International Studies 28, no. 1 (2002), pp. 5-21.
Is there any alternative to grounding human rights — an alternative that rests on 
cosmopolitan roots and that will enable us to find a consensus with regard to justifying 
human rights norms? In the next chapter, I will analyze Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach to explore this alternative. I will examine whether or not her approach allows us 
to identify not only shared human-rights norms, but also shared reasons for accepting those 




Capabilities Approach to Human Rights
Modem human rights core theories seem to be settling for concepts o f natural necessity, that is, 
necessity in the sense o f prescribing a minimum definition o f what it means to be human in any 
morally tolerable form o f society. Put another way, some modes o f treatment o f  human beings 
are so fundamental to the existence o f anything we would be willing to call a society that it 
makes better sense to treat an acceptance o f them as constitutive o f man and woman as social 
beings rather than as artificial conventions.
Jerome Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights1
3.1 Bringing “Human Nature” Back In
The constructive approach of grounding human rights that I will consider in this chapter is 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. In contrast to Rawls’s justificatory strategy, 
which aims both to ground human rights on the idea o f decency and to eschew the 
language of human nature or human dignity, the capabilities approach takes up an 
essentialist account o f grounding human rights on the notion that all human beings are 
alike, and argues that we can reach a deeply shared consensus by asking ourselves to focus 
on what is common to all human beings and what is truly indispensable to a human form 
of life. By using those commonalities, we can argue that all individuals must have at least 
some capabilities necessary for human functioning, and therefore, every society should aim 
to raise all o f its members above the threshold level o f each of these capabilities and to 
promote the establishment o f a constitutionally guaranteed social minimum based on the
1 Jerome Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly 20(2) (1998), pp. 201- 
234.
threshold level. These commonalities can be a standard of evaluation that can claim validity 
across cultures. With a view to the international provision o f a singular account o f moral 
norms that all nations of the world must respect and implement, Nussbaum argues that the 
capabilities approach can be an alternative to the language of human rights as people’s 
basic entitlements, and can provide the support for constitutional principles that citizens 
have a right to demand from their government.2
As I stated in the first chapter, m ost political theorists today are suspicious o f any appeal to 
the notion of human nature or human dignity as the common ground o f human rights 
among divergent cultures and traditions in the modern world.3 However, Nussbaum 
believes that her capabilities approach not only would allow us to understand why diverse 
cultures accept human rights, but also would ensure that international human rights 
standards would become more deeply informed by social reality. By looking at our own 
human life and other people’s lives, and by asking ourselves what are the grounding 
experiences that all human beings share, Nussbaum constructs a list o f human capabilities. 
The list can be seen as a limited moral Esperanto that can furnish grounds for agreement on 
the universality o f human rights.
Some would judge that any essentialist strategy both must be a form of 
fundamentalism and cannot be justified because of the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
However, Nussbaum argues five critical points: (1) The list o f central capabilities, rather 
than be grounded on any metaphysical conception, clearly represents a type o f political
2 I will use the following abbreviations in referring to Nussbaum’s writings:
“Aristotelian social democracy” (1990), hereafter ASD; “Human functioning and social justice” (1992), 
hereafter H FSJ  “Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach” (1993), hereafter N R V , “Human 
Capabilities, Female Human Beings” (1995), hereafter HCF; “Capabilities and Human Rights” (1997), 
hereafter CHR; “Political Animals: Luck, Love and Dignity” (1998), hereafter PA; “Capabilities, Human 
Rights and the Universal Declaration” (1999a), hereafter CH RU; “A Plea for Difficulty” (1999b), hereafter 
APD, “Women and Human Development: a Study in Human Capabilities” (2000a), hereafter WHI>, 
“Aristotle, Politics and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Ameson, Charlesworth and Mulgan” 
(2000b), hereafter APH C ; “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice” (2003a), 
hereafter CFE; “Political Liberalism and Respect: A Response to Linda Barclay” (2003b), hereafter PLR; 
Frontiers of justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006), hereafter FOJ.
See Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds) 
On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 111-134.
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liberalism in Rawls’s sense.4 (2) Despite explicitly relying upon an essentialist account of 
human nature, she defends her approach as still being “justification minimalism” in its 
avoidance of metaphysics. That is, the capability list is a freestanding view without reliance 
on any metaphysical doctrines, and can be the object o f an overlapping consensus among 
citizens with different comprehensive views. (3) The role and function o f capability is 
similar to Rawls’s “human rights proper,” though broader than Rawls’s, and can be the 
threshold of toleration to judge who is part o f the society of peoples and who is not. (4) 
Though closely related to human rights language, Nussbaum contends that the language of 
capabilities indeed presents a better understanding of what it means to lead a truly human 
life than the language o f rights. Analyzing rights in terms o f capabilities, as Nussbaum 
claims, allows us not only to declare a right but indeed to see more clearly what is involved 
in securing a right. In the end, (5) we can go beyond the aim o f reaching a consensus on 
human rights norms while offering divergent justifications, and we can take one step ahead 
to explore the deeply shared reasons that diverse cultures are able to accept as a grounding 
for human rights.
Although Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to human rights is less direct than the other 
consensus-based approaches, her scheme is worthy of consideration for its sensitivity to 
cultural diversity and for its critical examination of their practices. Moreover, as she claims 
that her account is a member of the family of political liberalism in its intentional 
avoidance of metaphysical doctrines, it is interesting to see whether or not her account can 
provide a better solution than Rawls’s scheme, as she herself proclaims.
This chapter is organized into four parts. In the first, I will provide an overview o f the 
capabilities approach. Because Nussbaum’s approach employs much o f the conceptual 
scheme and the mechanism from Amartya Sen’s capability approach, it is im portant to look 
at Sen’s theory before turning to Nussbaum’s. Accordingly, the explanation o f Sen’s theory
would be a departure point o f my analysis.5 In the second part, I will deal mainly with 
Nussbaum’s justification and her methodology, which are to address the challenges from 
cultural relativism and pluralism. I will look into mainly the transformation o f her 
justificatory strategy from Aristotelian social democracy to Rawlsian political liberalism. In 
the third section, I will provide a critical focus on the relationships between capabilities and 
human rights, the way to ground human rights on the idea o f capabilities, and her method 
of adjudicating between conflicts among human rights claims whenever they are in conflict 
with each other. In my concluding section, I will critically assess Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach in the light o f her justificatory strategy and her human rights scheme. My 
argument is four-fold: (1) Despite its attempts to favor many Rawlsian-inspired 
conceptions and manners of reasoning and despite its being at pains to prove that it is a 
member of the family of political liberalism, her capabilities approach is indeed a 
comprehensive approach rather than a political liberalism in Rawls’s sense. (2) The list of 
capabilities cannot be the object o f an overlapping consensus among divergent 
comprehensive views in a pluralistic world. (3) Nussbaum’s list o f capabilities indeed 
provides good guidance for us to interpret the list o f abstract rights that are to be 
implemented in laws and public policies; however, capabilities are not rights per se, but the 
content or object o f rights. Also, there are some institutional rights that do not translate 
well into the language of capabilities. (4) I will criticize her methodology, which privileges 
her own moral view as the basis for political justification. Following this, I will argue that
5 It is important to note that Amartya Sen takes up his own theory o f human rights, which is different from 
Nussbaum’s in some substantial ways. However, in this chapter, I will deal mainly with Nussbaum’s theory to 
look into the contrast between Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s human rights schemes. In terms o f Sen’s human 
rights theory, see Amartya Sen, ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11(1) (1982), pp.3-39; ‘Rights 
and Capabilities’, in Amartya Sen (ed), Resources, Values and Development. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); ‘Well-being, 
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’, The Journal of Philosophy 82(4) (1985), pp.169-221; ‘Rights as 
Goals (Austin Lecture)’, in S. Guest and A. Milne (eds.), Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden GMBH, 1985); ‘Legal Rights and Moral Rights: Old Questions 
and New Problems’, Ratio Juris 9(2) (1996), pp. 153-167; ‘Human Rights and Asian Values’, The New Republic 
33 July 14 and 21, (1997), pp.33-41; Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1999), and 
‘Elements o f a Theory o f Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 32(4) (2004), pp. 315-356.
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we should reevaluate the adequacy o f grounding human rights via human capabilities.
3.2 What Is the Capabilities Approach: A Theoretical Sketch
The most illuminating way o f understanding the capabilities approach is to consider it an 
account of the space within which we make comparisons between individuals and across 
nations about how well they are doing. In relation to the Human Development Report 
initiated by the United Nations Development Programme over several decades, Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum develop concepts that focus attention on people’s capabilities 
to do things. For these two scholars, human flourishing should be conceptualized in terms 
of an individual ability “to do” valuable acts and to achieve valuable states of beings. 
Evaluations o f development should be attentive to a policy’s influence on a person’s 
condition or state o f enablement, which, as a way to build what people really value, is more 
accurate than other perspectives that emerge from looking at a person’s subjective 
preferences or resources. Thus, in assessing a policy’s impact on individual well-being, 
rather than ask questions about what satisfies people’s preferences, the capabilities 
approach argues that public policy should be guided by the question of “what allows 
people to flourish?” Specifically, unlike current theories of justice that focus on achieving 
equality of income, resources, utility, primary goods, and so on, the capabilities approach 
argues that we should evaluate equality in the “space” o f an individual’s capability.6 
For Sen, human development is correlated with the idea o f human flourishing. Insofar as 
the world is deprived of development, the world is deprived of the basis for any type of 
human flourishing. Furthermore, development is closely correlated with freedom, and we 
have to analyze freedom itself so as to be able to understand at what level individuals in a 
society have the instrumental rights, opportunities, and entitlements that are indicative of 
their freedom. Thus, development cannot be seen merely as an enhancement of G N P (or
6 Amartya Sen, “Inequality Reexamined,” pp. 12-38.
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of personal incomes), industrialization, or technological advance. These are valuable 
accomplishments, but their value must depend on what they do to the lives and the 
freedoms o f the people involved. All valuable accomplishments have contingent 
importance, but they are not the defining characteristics o f development.7 Indeed, 
development must be understood as arising from human freedom, from the ability to have 
substantive freedom to achieve human flourishing from a variety of activities. Sen states,
The instrumental role o f freedom includes several distinct but interrelated components, 
such as economic facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency 
guarantees and protective security. These instrumental rights, opportunities and 
entitlements have strong interlinkages which can go in different directions. The process 
o f  development is crucially influenced by these interconnections.8
The ability to develop will be gauged by a person’s ability to attain those instrumental 
freedoms, because those freedoms will allow him or her to achieve the goals necessary for 
the expression of human dignity. Accordingly, the ends and means of development call for 
placing individual freedom at the center o f the stage.9 Sen observes,
The expansion o f freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means 
o f development. They can be called respectively the “constitutional role” and the 
“instrumental role” o f freedom in development. The constitutive role o f freedom 
relates to the importance o f substantive freedom in enriching human life. The 
importance o f substantive freedom includes elementary capabilities like being able to 
avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and 
premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and 
numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on —
Development, in this view, is the process o f expanding human freedoms, and the 
assessment o f development has to be informed by this consideration.10
Seen in this light, development will have to be assessed by which freedoms are denied or 
secured. Lack of freedom, that is, deprivation of either the “constitutive role” or the 
“instrumental role” of freedom, would indicate a deprivation o f development. 
Subsequently, Sen explains freedom in terms of functionings and capabilities available and
7 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 285.
8 Ibid., p. 53.
9 Ibid., p. 53. It seems that Sen attempts to make the idea o f freedom an all-purpose normative value. In 
terms o f critiques o f his idea o f freedom, see Joshua Cohen, “Review o f Sen’s Inequality Re-examined,” in 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 92(1994), pp. 275-88; G. A. Cohen, “Review: Amartya Sen’s Unequal World,” in New 
Deft Preview (1995), pp. 117-29; and Susan Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and Gender: What Counts, W ho’s 
Heard?” in Philosophy and Public Affairs\To\ 31(2003), pp. 280-316.
10 Ibid, p. 36.
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necessary for human flourishing. Sen’s approach focuses attention on understanding how 
an individual is free on the basis of his or her functionings, which are executable on the 
basis o f his or her capabilities (or freedoms). This point means that, if individuals are not 
deprived o f the capability to do “A,” neither their functionings nor their freedoms will have 
been deprived.
Functionings, according to Sen, are the valuable activities that make up people’s well-being 
and that include a healthy body, an educated mind, avoidable disease, safe and clean shelter, 
and adequate nourishment. Usually, functionings are related to income and goods but focus 
on what a person is able to do or to be. When A’s basic need for food is satisfied, for 
instance, A enjoys the functioning of being well-nourished. Therefore, A enjoys 
functioning means that A is able to put his or her desires or preferences in a particular 
order, and is able to realize his or her desires and preferences.
Correspondingly, capabilities are “the alternative combinations o f functioning that are 
feasible for an agent to achieve.”11 In other words, functionings are actualized, capabilities, and 
“capability” is a kind o f substantive freedom to pursue various functionings that are 
actually possible for people.12 Accordingly, it is plain that the distinction between achieved 
functionings and capabilities is between actual achievements and the freedoms from which 
people can choose. Whereas the combination o f functionings reflects a person’s actual 
achievements, capability represents the freedom to achieve something, or “the alternative 
functioning combinations from which this person can choose.”13
While two persons may have the same functioning vector, their capabilities may differ. For 
instance, a person who is fasting is in a state o f under-nutrition, which may seem very 
similar to the state of a starving person. But the fasting person can eat and chooses not to, 
whereas the starving person would eat if she could but cannot. So Sen contends (1) that
11 Ibid., p. 87.
12 Ibid., p. 75.
13 Ibid, p. 75.
current theories o f development follow from a conception o f well-being valuing either the 
“resources” people have, like income or even Rawls’s primary goods; and (2) that the 
theories are actually distorted and unable to correctly grasp people’s well-being, because 
individuals with the same resources vary greatly in their abilities to convert resources into 
valuable functionings.
Moreover, subjective welfarism’s measures of development that rely on meeting people’s 
expressed preferences are no better than resource-based approaches. Sen contends that 
mental states of satisfaction cannot be an adequate measure o f well-being because the 
choice o f what is valuable can be the product o f structures o f exploitation and 
discrimination. Exploited people may simply adjust their aspirations according to what they 
can realistically achieve by their “adaptive preferences.”14 Therefore, persons’ stated 
preferences do not always accurately reflect the person’s real needs, and the reports o f 
individual satisfaction are not always reliable indicators of real quality o f life. The measure 
of development that one determines simply by scrutinizing subjective preferences would 
fail to accurately grasp the well-being of people.
Accordingly, if we are to look at a political-economic comparison among peoples, the 
comparison can be made not on a simple preference scale or functioning scale, but on a 
capability scale, which shows how much freedom a person has to achieve in relation to his 
or her feasible functionings. In other words, capability deprivation means the lack o f a 
substantive freedom to achieve a necessary functioning. A person’s overall ability to do and 
achieve different things reflects the person’s overall capability to realize value or to function 
in valuable ways. Accordingly, assessing changes in people’s capabilities will allow us to 
ascertain whether a country’s development is actually increasing people’s options and
14 For instance, in a study about how widows assess their health and well-being, Sen found that women, 
especially poor women, have long been habituated to the absence o f  good health and adapted to their 
deprivation. Thus, they neither report dissatisfaction nor realistically expect their health will change in the 
future. See Amartya Sen, “Gender Inequality and Theories o f Justice,” in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan 
Glover (eds), Women, Culture and Development: A. study of Human Capabilities. (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 
259-273.
opportunities to achieve actual valuable achievements. Thus, in assessing a policy’s impact 
on individual well-being, evaluation should be attentive to the policy’s influence on a 
person’s condition or state o f enablement. If just social arrangements aim to equalize 
something, Sen argues, they should try to equalize people’s capabilities, diminishing 
differences in people’s real freedom to achieve valuable objectives.
3.3 Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities
Inspired by Sen’s capabilities approach,15 Martha Nussbaum takes up the argument that 
what is o f primary moral importance for development is the promotion o f capability for 
human flourishing. A person’s overall ability to do and achieve different things reflects the 
person’s overall capability to realize value or to function in valuable ways. Therefore, the 
deprivation of capabilities essentially diminishes the ability o f a human being to be free, to 
develop, and to flourish.
However, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach made some departures from Sen’s approach. If 
Sen has focused on the role o f capabilities in demarcating the “space” within which quality 
of life assessments are made, Nussbaum tries to go beyond the merely comparative use of 
the capability space, and tries to articulate an account o f how capabilities can provide a 
basis for “central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their 
governments.”16 In this regard, Nussbaum states,
The aim o f this project as a whole is to provide the philosophical underpinning for an 
account o f basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by 
the governments o f  all nations, as a bare minimum o f what respect for human dignity 
requires.17
Moreover, if Sen provides examples of what could be thought of as capabilities, basic or
15 Nussbaum originally developed her ideas on human capabilities independently from Sen, though their 
project became fused when they were working together in 1986 at the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (WIDER). They noticed that certain aspects o f Nussbaum’s Aristotelian thinking had a striking 
resemblance to Sen’s approach in development economics.
16FO/,p. 71.
17 FOJ, p. 70.
I 98
non-basic, Nussbaum provides us with an actual list that can be understood in terms of a 
social minimum. By reformulating the view of Aristotelian and Marxist interpretations of 
human flourishing together with the idea of a threshold level of each capability, she proposes a 
list o f human capabilities that constitutes what she calls the central capabilities o f each and 
every person, and argues that those capabilities should be “respected and implemented by 
governments of all nations.”18
For her, there are certain functionings that are particularly vital in a truly human life. Their 
presence or absence is understood as a sign of the presence or absence o f human life. 
Unlike Sen’s reluctance to endorse any account of central capabilities, Nussbaum insists 
that there would be no operational tool for the evaluation o f development if there were no 
objective criterion for judgment.19 Because not all human freedoms are equally valuable, 
and some freedoms limit others, we need a criterion for their evaluation. If  a theory of 
justice lacks an evaluative account of central capabilities to justify that some content must 
be given to the capabilities that people have reason to choose and value, the theory cannot 
say whether the society in question is just or unjust. Nussbaum reflects on this matter:
...any political project that is going to protect the equal worth o f  certain basic liberties 
for the poor, and to improve their living conditions, needs to say forthrightly that 
some freedoms are central for political purposes, and some are distinctly not. Some 
freedoms involve basic social entitlements, and others do not. Some lie at the heart o f  
a view o f political justice, and other do not. Among the ones that do not lie at the 
core, some are simply less important, but others may be positively bad.20
Moreover, Nussbaum agrees with Sen that the measure of development would be distorted 
by adaptive preference, because people “can be taught not to value certain functionings as 
constituents of their good living.”21 But she suggests that the elaboration of an objective list 
of capabilities is a solution to the question o f whether “adaptive selves” are adapting their 
preferences to an unjust status quo.
18 FOJ, p. 70.
19 CFE, p. 44.
20 CFE, p. 44.
21 PA, p. 175.
I 99
As a result, her list o f capabilities clearly unfolds a kind o f threshold22 that divides the line 
between merely human lives and truly human lives— a line along which governments 
should be examined. The idea o f a threshold means that the people in the nation state have 
to receive aid to achieve their capabilities. It is an objective set o f necessary conditions for a 
human being to be able to lead a complete life. In this regard, it can be understood as a 
social minimum for each society. People who have fallen below this threshold lack the 
social minimum required for their leading a complete life. Therefore, every nation-state has 
an obligation to provide capabilities for each person, and above-the-threshold people 
around the world have responsibilities to aid people who have fallen below this threshold.
The list contains the ten following capabilities:
1. Life
Being able to live to the end of a human life o f normal length, not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living
2. Bodily health
Being able to have good health, including reproductive health, to be adequately 
nourished, to have adequate shelter
3. Bodily integrity
Being able to move freely from place to place, to be secure against violent 
assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence, and having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction
4. Senses, imagination, and thought
Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason, and 
to do these things in a “truly human way,” a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic 
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought 
in connection with experiencing and producing expressive works and events of 
one’s own choice regarding religion, literature, music, and so forth. Being able 
to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees for freedom of expression 
with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom o f religious 
exercise. Being able to experience pleasure and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. Emotions
Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love 
those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, and to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. N ot having 
one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this
22 In terms o f the idea o f  threshold, it should be noted that there are two levels o f threshold in her approach. 
One is the threshold o f capability to function, below which a life will not be human at all; the other is a 
higher threshold, below which those characteristic functions are available. In a sense, we may judge this life as 
a life but not a “good” human life. For her, the latter threshold is the more important one when we turn to 
public policy.
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capability means supporting forms o f human association that can be shown to 
be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical reason
Being able to form a conception o f the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning o f one’s life (This entails protection for the 
liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation
A: Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern 
for other human beings, to engage in various forms o f social interaction, to be 
able to imagine the situation o f another.23 (Protecting this capability means 
protecting institutions that constitute such forms o f affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases o f self-respect and non-humiliation, being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails 
provisions o f non-discrimination on the basis o f race, sex, ethnicity, caste, 
religion, and national origin.
8. Other species
Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature.
9. Play
Being able to laugh, to play, and to enjoy recreational activities
10. Control over one’s environment
A. Political: Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern 
one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections o f free 
speech and association.
B. Material: Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek 
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted 
search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising 
practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition 
with other workers.24
Specifically, Nussbaum insists that the list does contain irreducibly “separate and 
indispensable components.” No one item on the list can be substituted for a large portion 
o f another, because all are to be treated as equally valuable. Just as human rights are 
commonly implemented at the national level, the list is represented as a universal cross- 
cultural norm of human capabilities. But what forms it takes will be heavily dependent 
upon the local and particular context. Therefore, the list of capabilities is vague so as to 
allow multiple realizations in different contexts.25 Furthermore, Nussbaum makes a
23 The updated version does not contain the passage “and to have compassion for that situation, to have the 
capability for both justice and friendship.”
24 Updated from FOJ, pp. 77-78.
25 For instance, Nussbaum argues that (1) the list is open-ended and subject to ongoing revision; (2) the list is
101
threefold distinction among these capabilities to depict the characteristics of the list of 
capabilities, and points out why it should be the focus of public policy. Basic capabilities are 
those that each person is born with, namely, the “innate equipment o f individuals that is 
the necessary basis for developing the moral advanced capabilities, and a ground of 
concern.”26 The internal capabilities are those that a person who has them can develop into 
functionings if he or she desires to develop them in this way. For instance, the capability 
for sexual pleasure is one such capability since its development depends mainly on the 
maturity of the person. A person who has not been deprived o f this internal capability is 
free to develop this capability for his or her own pleasure. Correspondingly, a woman who 
has not suffered genital mutilation would have the internal capability for sexual pleasure.27 
Finally, combined capabilities are those capabilities that are “internal capabilities combined with 
suitable external conditions for the exercise o f the function.”28 A person who has an 
internal capability of free speech, but lives in a society in which freedom of speech is 
forbidden, does not have the combined capability for self-expression.
For Nussbaum, the “central human capabilities” list is a list of combined capabilities. N ot 
only is it necessary that a person have the internal capabilities, but also the person’s social- 
political environment must allow for the free development o f those internal capabilities.
3.3.1 Why Capabilities, not Functioning
Following Sen’s lead, Nussbaum makes it clear that if we are to make policy on the basis of 
the capabilities approach, the aim o f the policy must be based on capability, not on
specified in a very abstract and general way, and allows for specifying in local contexts; (3) the list is a 
freestanding “partial moral conception” without any grounding in metaphysical ideas; (4) the list protects 
capability not functionings; (5) the list includes the major liberties that protect pluralism; and (6) the list 
follows the separation between justification and implementation. See PLR, p. 34.
26 See WHD, p. 85. It is plain that Sen’s use o f “basic capabilities” is different from Nussbaum’s. Whereas Sen 
uses the terminology o f basic capabilities to mean those most important capabilities necessary for leading a 
human life, Nussbaum’s basic capabilities are those capabilities that everyone is born with and that will 
become the basis for a person’s internal or combined capabilities. Accordingly, Sen’s basic capabilities are 
most closely related to Nussbaum’s combined capabilities, not to what she calls the basic capabilities.
27 Ibid.
28 t u : j
I 102
functioning. In other words, it is not on the actualization o f a given life style that we are to 
fix the social minimum, but on the choices people have in making their own lifestyles. 
People may choose different functioning vectors, and there is no correct functioning vector 
that must be imposed on people as a whole in a diverse world. Accordingly, it is the actual 
ability to choose those functionings that is the focus o f her capabilities approach. 
Nussbaum states,
Where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not functioning, is the appropriate 
political goal. This is because o f  the very great importance the approach attaches to 
practical reason, as a good that both suffuses all the other functions, making them 
human rather than animal, and figures itself as a central function on the list.29
As does Sen, Nussbaum argues that her approach, rather than support functioning 
satisfaction, opposes capability deprivation. The fact that a person fasts is a sign that the 
person could do otherwise. By contrast, it is silly to say that starving people under a 
stressful situation are choosing to fast. Therefore, the focus is on the freedom to choose a 
particular kind of life, rather than the life itself. Nussbaum points out,
We are aiming to make people able to live and act in certain concrete ways. Such an 
approach does not ignore the value o f choice, since what we aim at is to make them 
capable o f choosing to act in these ways, not simply to push them into so acting. This 
means (1) that we will define our goal in terms o f capabilities, not actual functionings, 
and (2) that one o f the capabilities we must most centrally consider in each area o f life 
is the capability of choosing.30
However, regarding self-respect and human dignity, Nussbaum would agree to license, on 
some occasions, the state to force functioning upon people and thereby to prevent them 
from doing things that jeopardize the people’s own capabilities. For instance, the state is 
entitled to force children to attend primary and second school even if they would rather 
not. Parents are entitled to force their children to eat nutritious food in order to foster the 
development o f their capabilities, because “functioning in childhood is necessary for 
capability in adulthood.”31 Besides, government can apply the coercion of functionings to
29 WHD, p. 87.
30 NFC, p. 153.
31 See WHD, p. 90; FOJ, p. 172.
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an adult, at least in cases where either “we force functionings to protect capabilities” or we 
seek to “protect equal worth o f capabilities.”32 Herein, the point is this: “the more crucial a 
function is to attaining and maintaining other capabilities, the more entided we may be to 
promote actual functioning in some cases, within limits set by an appropriate respect for 
citizens’ choices.”33 Then, suicide is prohibited since life is a prerequisite o f any functioning. 
Law requiring automobile users to wear seat-belts and motorcyclists to wear helmets is 
justified because governments should not allow individuals to bear the cost o f momentary 
carelessness.34 Moreover, Nussbaum insists that even voluntary female genital mutilation 
(FGM) might be banned without any exception because it involves a permanent removal 
o f the capability for sexual pleasure. She argues,
It seems plausible for governments to ban female genital mutilation, even when practiced 
without coercion: for, in addition to long term health risk, the practice involves the 
permanent removal o f the capability for most sexual pleasure, although individuals should 
o f course be free to choose not to have sexual pleasure if  they prefer not to.35
Some would charge that focusing on functioning rather than on capabilities per se 
contradicts the aim o f the capabilities approach to protect substantive freedoms and is a 
kind o f paternalism. Nussbaum is clear that her approach would raise legitimate concerns 
about paternalism, but she insists that health and bodily integrity are extremely important 
in relation to all the other capabilities.36 Therefore, there are some choices that she 
considers wrong, and sometimes, we need to set the value o f choice not so much in the 
choice itself but in the “goodness of the object of choice.”37 In this regard, paternalism can 
be plausible in regard to functionings, provided that they are deemed too important to 
allow people, even voluntarily, to give up. Nussbaum responds to this point:
32 WHD, p. 91
33 Ibid, p. 92
34 WHD, pp. 92-94.
35 WHD, p. 94
36 It seems that Nussbaum allows the restricting o f people’s freedoms to function according to people’s 
choice, thus going beyond John Stuart Mill’s non-harm principle.
37 See Severine Deneulin, “Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability 
Approach,” in Review of Political Economy, (14)(2002), pp. 497-518 at 510.
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...in that way, any bill o f  rights is “paternalistic,” vis-a-vis families, or groups, or practices, 
or even pieces o f legislation, that treat people with insufficient or unequal respect, if  
paternalism means simply telling people that they cannot behave in some way that they 
have traditionally behaved and want to behave. The Indian Constitution is in that sense 
“paternalistic,” when it tells people that it is from now on illegal to treat women as 
unequal in matters o f  property and civil capacity, or to discriminate against people on 
grounds o f  caste or sex. More generally, any system o f  law is “paternalistic,” keeping 
some people from doing some things that they want to do.38
Because some basic functionings are so important in relation to all other capabilities, there 
are some legitimate areas o f interference in a person’s capabilities. But there will rightly be 
disagreement about where that point is in each case, and Nussbaum suggests that deciding 
where the permitted interferences lie should be left to each nation.39
3.3.2 Methodology (I): the Aristotelian and Marxist Conceptions o f the 
Person
Because the capabilities approach is to safeguard every possible human capability if the 
safeguard is to be normative, the first problem that the capabilities approach encounters is 
how to determine which set of capabilities will be morally relevant and important. In spite 
of the transformation of her framework and method o f justification in many substantial 
ways, we can divide Nussbaum’s justificatory strategy into three steps for identifying the list 
of ten central capabilities: (1) She reaches the substantive account o f the capabilities by 
applying an “evaluative inquiry” modeled on Aristotelian practical reasoning. Nussbaum is 
especially drawn to Aristotle’s defense of “non-relative virtues” and his procedural 
combination of “theoretical power with sensitivity to the actual circumstances o f human 
life and choice in all their multiplicity, variety and mutability.”40 (2) The task of political 
justification involves applying a “framing method”41 initiated by John Rawls’s idea of 
political justification, and searching for a universal standard by comparing the capabilities
38 WHD, pp. 2-53.
39 Ibid, p. 95.
40 See N R V , p. 243.
41 WHD, p. 148.
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approach to other available approaches. And (3) Nussbaum tests her view against the views 
o f others by critically examining subjective preferences and by seeking empirically universal 
acceptability.42
To start with, let us recall that Nussbaum represents the ten central human capabilities as 
“the characteristic activities o f the human being” both essential to our humanity and 
thereby ethically relevant for political purposes. The intuitive assumption of the capabilities 
approach is to elaborate a set of criteria for a fulfilling human life on the basis o f the 
intuitive idea that “there are certain basic human needs and capacities that must be realized 
to a minimum degree if human beings are to live a decent life consonant with the idea of a 
life worthy o f human dignity.”43 For her, the features o f a truly human life to be discovered 
are “neither ahistorical nor a priori,” but are self-consciously representative of “a very 
general record o f broadly shared experiences o f human beings within history.”44 
Nussbaum combines Aristotle’s internal essentialism,45 which is “a historically grounded 
empirical essentialism taking its stand within human experience,”46 with Marx’s conception 
o f human life, which means a life has available in it “truly human functioning.” Using this 
combination, Nussbaum derives fundamental experiences that all humans share and that 
can be regarded as the activities common to every human being.47 
Subsequently, the Aristotelian-Marxist conception of the person is based on both 
identifying the basic characteristics of a human life, and from them, determining what
42 By contrast, Alison Jaggar divided her methodology into four parts: (1) The Aristotelian Approach, (2) The 
Narrative Approach, (3) The Morally Constrained Proceduralist, or Informed-Desire, Approach, and (4) The 
Non-Platonist Substantive-Good Approach. See Alison Jaggar, “Reasoning about Well-Being: Nussbaum’s 
Methods o f Justifying the Capabilities,” in Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 14 (2006), pp. 301-322.
43 See FOJ, p. 181.
44 See HCFHB, p. 74
45 Nussbaum uses different terms to refer to this methodology. Among these is her approach “internal 
essentialism” in H F S f  p. 208; her “Aristotelian approach” in JVRV, and her “Aristotelian Procedure,” or 
“Internal Criticism,” in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s “Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist 
Traditions,” in Michael Krauss (ed.) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame, IN: University o f  
Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 299-325. In terms o f the critique o f  her Aristotelian methodology, see Brooke 
Ackerly, Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
46 HFSJ, p. 208.
47 She observes, “The experience o f the body is culturally influenced, but the body itself, prior to such 
experience, provides limits and parameters that ensure a great deal o f overlap in what is going to be 
experienced.” See NR U, p. 263.
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functioning is prerequisite for the life one would call a good human life. Nussbaum 
declares,
.. .among the many actual features o f a characteristic fundamental form o f life, we select 
some that seem so normatively fundamental that a life without any possibility at all o f  
exercising one o f  them, at any level, is not a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity, 
even if  others are present. If enough o f them are impossible (as in the case o f a person in 
a persistent vegetative state), we may judge that the life is not a human life at all, any more. 
Then, having identified that (extreme) threshold, we seek a higher threshold, the level 
above which not just mere human life, but good life, become possible.48
Accordingly, by looking at our own human life and others’ human life, and by asking 
ourselves what are the grounding experiences that all human beings share, Nussbaum 
establishes a list of human experiences on which we all agree; thus, Nussbaum ascertains 
that the list is indispensable. Each o f the central human capabilities is conceived as 
fundamental to each human life, that is, a life that is lacking any one o f those capabilities 
will fall short o f being a “good” human life.
Moreover, unlike K ant’s philosophy, Nussbaum’s embraces a concept o f human dignity 
that is not based on rationality alone. Following Kant, she asserts that all human beings 
are ends in themselves, whose well-being should not be sacrificed for the sake o f an 
aggregated well-being. From Aristode, however, she adopts a view of humans whose 
dignity is a kind of animal dignity. Therefore, one should give up the Kantian assumption 
that rationality alone is the basis of people’s entidement to moral treatment. In this 
regard, Nussbaum points out,
The capabilities approach, by contrast, sees rationality and animality as thoroughly 
unified. Taking its cue from Aristotle’s notion o f the human being as a political animal, 
and from Marx’s idea that the human being is a creature “in need o f a plurality o f life- 
activities,” it sees the rational as simply one aspect o f  the animal, and, at that, not the 
only one that is pertinent to a notion o f  truly human functioning... The specifically 
human kind is indeed characterized, usually, by a kind o f rationality, but rationality is not 
idealized and set in opposition to animality, it is just garden-variety practical reasoning, 
which is one way animals have o f functioning.49
Thus, while determining what is truly indispensable to a human form o f life, we need to
48 FOJ, p. 181.
49 FOJ, p. 159.
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examine our self-understanding about questions of personal identity (e.g., what changes 
could I endure and still be me?) and those o f inclusion (e.g., what features must any 
creature have in order to be truly human?).50 In other words, we must be able to identify 
who or what a human being really is according to some criteria, though the criteria itself 
will be based on “forms of activity” that are specifically those of human creatures.
3.3.3 Methodology (II): From  Aristotelian Democracy to Rawlsian Political 
Liberalism
Before proceeding to a description o f the justificatory strategy of her capabilities approach, 
it is necessary to stress the transformation, in Nussbaum’s work, o f the nature o f the 
capabilities list into a conception of the good. In her earlier work, Nussbaum draws on 
Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between politics and human potentials to 
develop a conception of Aristotelian social democracy, and the list of human capabilities can 
provide the basis for a “thick vague theory of the good.” She insists that it can be an 
account of the “objective proper goal” o f government to bring all citizens up to a certain 
basic minimum level o f capability.51 In the late 1990s, however, Nussbaum adopted a 
procedure akin to Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium” to justify the list of capabilities in a 
political way, and she placed these capabilities in the framework of Rawlsian political 
liberalism.52
The reason for the justificatory strategy in the Rawlsian sense is to show respect for 
persons, to show respect for their comprehensive conceptions of the good, and to ensure
50 In her own words, “it matters a great deal what we ourselves think about our selfhood and our 
possibilities.” See ^4HN, p. 121.
51A SD , p. 203.
52 This shift is first mentioned in “The Good as Discipline, The Good as Freedom”, in D. Crocker & T. 
Linden (Eds), Ethics of Consumption: the good life, justice and global stewardship (Rowman & Little. Eld, 1998), pp. 
312-341. In terms o f this transformation, and the comparison between her Aristotelian social democracy and 
her Rawlsian political liberalism, see Severine Deneulin, “Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen 
and Nussbaum’s Capability Approach,” and Alison Jaggar, “Reasoning about Well-Being: Nussbaum’s 
Methods o f justifying the Capabilities,” in journal of Political philosophy Vol 14(2006), pp. 301-22.
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that “our considered convictions actually accord with the agreement on the list o f 
capabilities we make in the political domain.” Following Rawls, Nussbaum argues that the 
completion o f the justification cannot do without its stability, and stability refers to the 
capacity of a conception to generate its own support. The fact o f reasonable pluralism 
makes it clear that no comprehensive doctrines will be acceptable to all citizens. Thus, to 
show that a conception is stable, the capabilities approach needs to show that it was 
justified and acceptable in some way to citizens. Nussbaum points out,
.... it is part o f what justifies the conception: that it can over time be justified to people 
who hold different comprehensive conceptions o f  the good life. Justification thus 
involves an idea o f acceptability to all, or at least to the major conceptions o f values.
Acceptability is relevant to justification both for reason o f stability— a conception that 
is acceptable to all can be stable over time— and for reason o f respect.53
In this regard, the task of justification is “to put forward something that people from many 
different traditions, with many different fuller conceptions o f the good, can agree on, as 
the necessary basis for pursuing their good life,”54 and “can be endorsed for political 
purposes, ... by people who otherwise have very different views o f what a complete good 
life for a human being would be.”55
Therefore, the list o f capabilities can no longer be a single, though vague, conception of 
the good human life as “universal in the sense o f articulating a timeless ideal of well­
being,” but must be a list o f constitutional guarantees that is grounded in Rawlsian political 
liberalism upon which people who have different conceptions of the good life could agree. 
Nevertheless, Nussbaum states, in spite o f the roots o f a capability-based conception of 
well-being in Aristotelian ideals o f human flourishing, there is no necessary link between a 
government’s protection o f individual capabilities and comprehensive liberalism. Rather, 
Nussbaum shows that a list o f human capabilities can provide the basis for “fundamental 
political principles” or “specifically political goals” that remain independent of any
53 FOJ, p. 163.
54 SSJ, p. 40.
55 WHD, p. 74.
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“metaphysical grounding.”56
Subsequendy, Nussbaum models the justification o f her political principles on a Rawlsian 
method o f “reflective equilibrium” by involving a deliberative process in which individuals 
reason back and forth among (1) their considered judgments about particular instances, (2) 
the principles or rules that, they believe, govern these considered judgments, and (3) the 
theoretical considerations that they bear in accepting these judgments, principles, or rules, 
while revising these elements in an effort to achieve coherence among them. She states,
How do I argue for the ten capabilities? Like Rawls, I view my argument as essentially 
Socratic in character: I appeal to the interlocutor to ponder what is implicit in the notion 
o f human dignity and o f a life in accordance with it. I ask the interlocutor to consider 
that certain ways o f  life that human beings are forced to lead are not fully human, in the 
sense o f  their not being worthy o f the dignity o f the human being. I believe that this 
intuitive starting point offers definite, albeit highly general, guidance. Marx’s vivid 
descriptions o f forms o f labor that allow continued life, but not a fully human life, 
resonates the world over. The notion o f a life in accordance with human dignity is one 
o f the most fertile ideas used in worldwide constitutional jurisprudence. So, I argue in a 
very general and intuitive way, moving through various areas o f  life influenced by public 
policy, that the protection o f these ten entitlements is an essential requirement o f life 
with human dignity.57
Following the framing method o f the good by Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium,” we lay out 
the arguments for a given theoretical position (the capabilities approach), and hold it up 
against the “fixed point” in our moral intuitions to see how these intuitions are tested by 
the conception under examination. The procedure asks us to “cling to that which we can 
rationally defend, [and to] be willing to discover that this may or may not be identical with 
the view we held when we began the inquiry.”58 We should modify or reject the theoretical 
conception when it has failed to fit within our moral intuitions, and in the end we can 
achieve “consistency and fit in our judgments taken as a whole.”59 Because the search for 
“reflective equilibrium” is to be considered in the political domain, we must not only 
consider the views o f our fellow citizens, but also lay out rival conceptions and alternative
56 WHD, p. 5, p. 76.
57 OHW V, p. 197.
58 CH, p. 33.
59 WHD, p. 101.
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models to demonstrate “on what grounds ours might merge as more worthy o f choice.”60 
Despite stressing the similarity between Rawls’s political liberalism and hers, Nussbaum 
rejects Rawls’s methodology o f political constructivism in two substantial ways: (1) his 
methodology insists that the conception should be derived from ideas that are implicit in 
current political public culture,61 and (2) his methodology has a procedural-oriented claim 
that fair outcomes follow from a fair and impartial procedure.62
The reason for rejecting political liberalism’s dependence on ideas implicit in the public 
political culture, Nussbaum argues, is that Rawls wrongly states that the ideas o f mutual 
respect and the inviolability of persons are peculiarly Western. However, Nussbaum argues 
that many non-Western societies indeed have understandings o f dignity and equality that 
are more advanced than those o f Western societies, and “there seems no reason to think 
that any of the primary goods is particularly Western, nor that the power of forming and 
revising a plan of life expresses a distinctively Western sense of what is important.”63 Since 
this presupposition is proved to be wrong, people need only to draw on the ideas inherent 
in the global culture, whether their own culture currendy exhibits the ideas or not, because, 
she believes, the convergence can be found in that global culture.64 On the other hand, 
Nussbaum argues that political liberalism’s emphasis on ideas implicit in current public 
political culture is not the main characteristic o f political liberalism, but simply the 
derivative clue for us to ensure that such a conception can be stable for the right reasons. If 
the idea functions as a “module” that attaches itself to different comprehensive doctrines, a 
conception of justice can gain stability over time for the right reason. For Nussbaum, 
therefore, the core idea of Rawlsian political liberalism is thus:
If such a liberal (a) eschews reference to controversial metaphysical and epistemological
doctrine in the context o f articulating the basic principles o f  justice themselves [and] (b)
60 See WHD, p. 102.
61 See PLR, p. 27; FOJ, pp. 301-5.
62 FOJ, p. 82.
63 WHD, p. 67.
64 FOJ, p. 304.
does so for reason o f  mutual respect, in the light o f the fact o f reasonable disagreement, 
then the liberal is a political liberal.65
Accordingly, unlike the consensus-based approaches that simply appeal to the de facto 
overlapping consensus, her claim at this stage seems to be that there is a branch o f liberal 
thinking that exists within most of the important cultural and religious traditions and that 
can endorse all the central capabilities in the future, even though neither it, nor the values 
it embodies, are the objects of consensus now. This claim is very different from the claim 
that there is such an actual consensus already.66 She notes in this regard,
The capabilities approach is a form o f political liberalism: it relies on the idea that an 
overlapping consensus o f the reasonable comprehensive doctrines can emerge over time 
to support and sustain the political conception. To show this, and thus to justify the 
conception, we do not have to show that the consensus exists at present, but we do 
need to show that there is sufficient basis for it in the existing views o f  liberal 
constitutional democracies [and] that it is reasonable to think that over time such a 
consensus may emerge.67
Moreover, unlike Rawls’s constructivism in designing a procedure “that models certain key 
features o f fairness and impartiality, and relies on these procedures to generate an adequate 
just outcome,68 Nussbaum’s theory depends not on procedural justification for its 
principles but on an intuitive Aristotelian approach to outcomes— an account o f human 
entitlements acceptable in a minimally decent and just society— and on defining the 
political procedures in accordance with what promotes those outcomes.69 She clearly states,
The capabilities approach is like the criminal trial. That is, it starts from the outcome: 
with an intuitive grasp o f a particular content, as having a necessary connection to a life 
worthy o f human dignity. It then seeks political procedures (a constitution, various 
allocations o f  powers, a certain type o f economic system) that will achieve those results 
as nearly as possible, although it seems likely that such procedures will change over time 
and may also vary with the circumstances and history o f different nations. Justice is in 
the outcome, and the procedure is a good one to the extent that it promotes this 
outcome.70
65 PLR, p. 39.
66 Surely, in her Aristotelian social democracy, the list is presented as universally accepted, but now she argues that 
it still needs to gain acceptance from people because “no wide reflective equilibrium in the full Rawlsian sense 
has as yet been found.” See WHD, pp. 102-3.
67 FOJ, p. 388.
68 FOJ, p. 81.
69 FOJ, p. 275.
70 FOJ, p. 82.
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Rawlsian constructivism aims to design a procedure that models conditions o f fairness, and 
relies on the procedures to generate a just outcome; in contrast, Nussbaum argues that we 
should identify a correct outcome in advance, and then design a procedure that will achieve 
this result as closely as possible, or simply reject any procedure if it does not result in a 
correct outcome. In this regard, proceduralism in general and Rawls’s constructivism in 
particular simply put the cart before the horse. Moreover, any procedure may produce 
unjust outcomes due to the “adaptive selves” who, when participating in the process, 
simply adapt their desire to the unjust social circumstances. So it is odd to say “there is a 
correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, 
provided that the procedure has been properly followed.”71
Nevertheless, Nussbaum recognizes that the capabilities approach as a type o f political 
liberalism requires respect for the preferences of others, and refutes any suspicion that 
the capabilities approach would be “imposing something on people who surely have their 
own ideas of what is right and proper.” She provides a modified version o f preference- 
based procedural reasoning, which is what she calls the “informed-desire approach.” 72 It 
is a procedural approach with normative constraints for critically examining preferences 
and for eliminating those that are wrong. Nussbaum’s approach was initiated by Jean 
Hampton’s Kantian contractarianism, which is a procedure constrained by a Kantian 
conception o f human worth and a conception of a person’s legitimate interests.
Nussbaum argues that an informed-desire approach is necessary to ensure the stability 
of her capability list.73 However, Nussbaum warns that proceduralism is a fragile 
foundation for us to justify the list o f basic entidements because existing preferences 
may be mistaken when they are adapted to an unjust status quo. Thus, it can provide only
71 See John Rawls, TJ, p. 86.
72 Nussbaum called it an “informed-desire” or “a sensible informed-desire” approach. See WHD, p. 158, p. 
161. See Also Jean Hamption, Feminist Contractarianism, in Jean Hampton The Intrinsic Worth of Persons-. 
Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Daniel Farnham (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
pp. 1-38.
73 WHD, p. 152.
some “heuristic and ancillary” support for the substantive account of the good, and she 
expects that only “in the long term [can] consensus between informed desire and the 
substantive good” be achieved. However, she insists that, when the two approaches reach 
divergent conclusions, the substantive account of the good should always trump 
proceduralism.74 Herein, she points out,
First o f all, we may and should give desire a heuristic role, allowing people’s actual 
preferences to guide us in determining on which issues we might focus as salient....
Second, we may give desire a modest ancillary role in political justification, consulting 
informed desire as a cross-check on our independent moral argument. This role, in turn, 
is twofold. One aspect concerns the issue o f political stability: we cannot satisfy a 
conception without showing that it can be reasonably stable over time. Convergence 
between the best informed-desire accounts (which include moral elements) and my own 
purely moral conception would help justify that conception by giving us assurance that it 
can be stable. Second, we also look for this convergence for reason o f respect for 
persons: to be concerned about the possibility o f convergence between our moral 
conception and the best informed-desire conception (again, those whose procedures 
incorporate moral elements) shows that our conception is one that respects persons and 
their own ability to reach out for the good.75
Seen in this light, her list o f central capabilities is a non-Platonist substantive-good 
account. That is, it is neither a Platonism that gives preferences no part in the process of 
political justification but validates moral claims by simply appealing to some independent 
standard of value, nor a subjective welfarism that validates moral claims by simply 
appealing to existing desires. However, given that even the best informed-desire 
approaches do not remove adaptive preferences, the substantive account o f the good 
should always trump the informed-desire approach.76
In spite of these differences over the justificatory strategy, Nussbaum argues that her list 
of capabilities has a similar role to Rawls’s primary goods, which enable an individual to 
make any choice o f a way o f life possible, and can be endorsed for political purposes by 
people with very divergent comprehensive views. It is clear that Nussbaum includes on the 
list some of what Rawls calls “natural goods,” which are excluded as primary goods,
74 WHD, p. 165.
75 OHW V, p. 200.
76 OHW V, p. 201; and Alison Jaggar, “Reasoning about Well-Being: Nussbaum’s Methods o f Justifying the 
Capabilities”, p. 308.
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because it is very difficult to make society responsible for their distribution. Health, for 
instance, is a natural good, and Rawls argued that it is not reasonable to assume that 
government should be responsible for the health of its citizens because the determinants 
of the positive status are usually “luck-governed.”77 However, for Nussbaum, differences in 
health status are often socially caused, and governments can affect people’s health by 
distributing healthcare, which can influence who has good or bad health. Therefore, society 
can hope to guarantee the social basis of these natural goods, not the goods themselves. In 
other words, putting them on the capabilities list as a political goal can be very useful for 
the aspiration to the protection and achievement o f capabilities.
3.3.4 Methodology (III): Emerging Consensus by Cross-cultural Dialogue 
As a practical political project, the capabilities approach is not only a search for universal 
validation, but also a search for universal applicability. Therefore, in the third stage, 
Nussbaum tests her view in dialogue with non-Western activists or scholars, and she asks 
how the list fits within the context o f those peoples’ goals. Nussbaum indicates that this 
kind of consensus is necessary both for epistemological and for political reasons:
It seems to me very important that people from a wide variety o f cultures, coming 
together in conditions conducive to reflective criticism o f tradition, and free from 
intimidation and hierarchy, should agree that this list is a good one, one that they would 
choose. Finding such areas o f informed agreement is epistemically valuable in two ways: 
first, it points us to areas o f human expression that we might have neglected or 
underestimated. Second, it tells us that our intuitions about what would make a political 
consensus possible are on the right track.78
The task o f justification on this view, therefore, is to provide convincing evidence that 
people across the world would eventually agree on her list o f capabilities. She uses the 
“narrative method,”79 and many statistics, historical and sociological materials, and
77 WHD, p. 81.
78 WHD, p. 151.
79 Susan Okin has charged that the narrative method does not exemplify a sincere dialogue with poor women 
and that it, indeed, allows Nussbaum to project and impose her own view. In terms o f  the critiques o f  her 
narrative method, see Susan Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, W ho’s Heard?,” in
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examples from reports o f NGOs, to assert that her list of capabilities is based “both on 
the result of cross-cultural academic discussion and on discussions in women’s groups 
themselves designed to exemplify certain values of equal dignity, non-hierarchy, and non­
intimidation.’’80 She would like to show that the list represents the result o f cross-cultural 
discussion, and to show that the input of other voices has shaped its content in many ways. 
After dialogue with many Indian feminist activists, for instance, in the updated account of 
capabilities in Women and Human Development, she includes sexual orientation as a basis on 
which one could expect protection against discrimination. She states,
In earlier versions o f  the list I did not include it, judging that there was so little
consensus on this item, especially in India, that its inclusion might seem premature__
This year, however, the controversy over the dispute o f the feminist film Fire has led to 
much more discussion o f sexual orientation in the India media, and to the public 
recognition by feminists and other liberal thinkers o f the important links between these 
issues and women’s full equality. I therefore think it is no longer premature to add this 
item to a cross-cultural list that is expected to command an overlapping consensus.81
Thus, at this stage, she tries to justify her moral conception with empirical evidence, and to 
present the possibility o f searching for a de facto overlapping consensus on the part of 
people with very different views of human life.
3.4 Capability and Human Rights
Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach can ground a human rights view. The 
capabilities approach includes many “fundamental entitlements” that can be used as the 
underpinning for constitutional guarantees within a nation upon which these entitlements 
can be seen as side-constraints on what government may do.82 These entitlements can also 
be used as the underpinning for thinking about international justice, which is also stressed
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31(2003), pp. 280-316. Nussbaum responds that the narrative method is only a 
heuristic device rather than an independent approach with which to justify the capabilities. In terms of 
Nussbaum’s response, see “On Hearing Women’s Voices: A Reply to Susan Okin,” in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs Vol 32 (2004), pp. 193-205.
80 WHD, p. 151.
81 WHD, p. 80.
82 CHR, p. 300.
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in international human rights movements.83
For Nussbaum, human rights can be understood as capabilities in two different ways: (1) 
rights as “basic capabilities,” and (2) rights as “combined capabilities.” Nussbaum suggests 
that the best way of thinking about rights is to conceptualize human rights as combined 
capabilities that function in various ways. In terms of the first way, we use the term ‘human 
rights’ in this sense when we say that “A has a right to X” even when A’s society does not 
secure such a right to A. Human rights in this sense are the “especially urgent and morally 
justified claims” that every person has or could make “simply by virtue o f being human.84 
They “are thought to derive from some actual features of human persons, some untrained 
power in them that demands or calls for support from the world.”85 Thus, to declare a 
human right is to assert that A has a morally justified claim to have certain capabilities to 
function for the reason that A is a human being. By contrast, human rights as “combined 
capabilities” mean that they “are the goals o f public planning” in the sense that 
governments should provide and protect its citizens’ human rights by enabling citizens to 
have combined capabilities.86 In this sense, the combined capabilities are understood as the 
object of the human rights.
For instance, a right to life can be a basic capability in respect of being born a human being, 
or a combined capability in respect o f what is provided by government for the capability 
o f life to function.87 Furthermore, the right to shelter can be understood as a basic 
capability in virtue of being born a person that has a capability to shelter, or a combined 
capability in virtue of what is provided by the government for the capability to shelter to 
function.88
Conceptualizing the meaning of rights in terms of capabilities, Nussbaum defends her






assertion that the capabilities approach both is better than human rights discourse in 
solving many troublesome issues and can present a better understanding o f what it means 
to lead a truly human life than can the language of human rights.
First o f all, rights talk is vague and abstract, lacking “theoretical and conceptual clarity.”89 
Nussbaum argues, “Rights have been understood in many different ways, and difficult 
theoretical questions are frequently obscured by the use of rights language, which can give 
the illusion o f agreement where there is deep philosophical disagreement.”90 By thinking 
about rights in terms o f capabilities, we can grasp a clear meaning regarding the protection 
and implementation o f human rights. For instance, women in many nations have the 
“nominal right of political participation” without having this right in terms of capability, 
“for they are scheduled and threatened with violence should they leave the home.”91 In this 
regard, women have only dejure but not de facto rights o f participation. Conceptualizing the 
meaning of rights in terms of capabilities to function in various ways, regardless o f whether 
or not women have a right to political participation, depends on whether or not relevant 
capabilities to function are fully present. Moreover, securing a right to a person does not 
require only the absence of negative state action. A right protected depends on whether or 
not the “relevant capabilities to function are presented by right-holders,” rather than on 
whether or not state action is absent and on whether or not it is legally recognized.92 
Nussbaum argues,
Moreover, a focus on capabilities, although closely allied with the human rights approach, 
adds an important clarification to the idea o f human rights, for it informs us that our 
goal is not merely “negative liberty” or absence o f interfering state action— one very 
common understanding o f the notion o f rights— but, instead, the full ability o f people 
to be and to choose these very important things. Thus all capabilities have an economic 




91 FOJ, p. 287.
92 FOJ, p. 287.
93 CHR, p. 138.
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By measuring human rights protection in reference to capabilities and functionings, we can 
better understand and use the concept o f the obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill 
human rights, especially when individuals’ human rights are, in effect, protected only on 
paper.94 Also, because the capabilities approach directs attention to what people actually are 
able to do and to be, people are unable to function in accordance with the political rights 
without any economic and social guarantee; thus the interdependency between civil- 
political rights and economic rights is undoubtedly salient. Accordingly, the capabilities 
approach can go beyond the prolonged decades-long debate regarding the priority of first- 
generation and second-generation human rights.
Moreover, Nussbaum contends that the language o f human rights has been entangled in 
the charge of both being linked to one particular culture and yet masquerading as universal 
values. She contends that capabilities language can easily sweep away this charge because 
the capabilities language is not linked to any particular culture or tradition and because the 
capabilities language does not give the “appearance o f privileging a Western idea.” Thus, 
the capabilities approach can take a better position among philosophical disagreements and 
unburden itself of the charge of cultural imperialism.
In a nutshell, Nussbaum believes the analysis of people’s capabilities can help us conceive 
and receive international human rights standards as more than formal rights.
It is interesting here to compare Nussbaum’s and Rawls’s human rights schemes with each 
other. (l)While human rights are the minimal rights individuals must have if they are to 
engage in genuine social cooperation in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples, Nussbaum conceives 
human rights as those required for individuals who are to live a dignified life. Accordingly, 
it seems that the two scholars address different questions so that the nature and the scope 
of human rights differ from one theory to the other. Rawls is dealing mainly with the
94 In this way, Nussbaum argues, we can also get beyond the traditional liberal thinking in terms o f  the 
private-public distinction through which people ignore the actual inequality or capabilities deprivation within 
private spheres. See FOJ, pp. 290-291.
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problem regarding the rights that a well-ordered society must include and that enable all 
decent peoples to honor human rights; moreover, Rawls argues that the main role of 
human rights is to specify the justification for intervention regarding states’ responses to 
grave violations of human rights. Nussbaum, in contrast, is answering another question: 
what are the central human capabilities with which every society should establish a 
constitutionally guaranteed social minimum based on the threshold o f each o f these 
capabilities?95 (2) Like Rawls’s idea o f decency, a list of the ten central capabilities provides 
an account of the necessary conditions every society must afford if it is to be minimally 
just. Domestically, the job of a decent society is to give all citizens the capabilities to reach 
an appropriate threshold level. Internationally, we all have a collective duty to assist the 
people of the world with what they need. (3) In terms of the content o f human rights, 
Nussbaum does not accept the distinction between human rights and liberal rights that 
Rawls makes. She contends that Rawls is too cautious in his account of human rights, and 
her capabilities approach is able to reach a global overlapping consensus among many 
cultural and religious traditions.96
3.5 Critique
If my interpretation is sound, we realize that Nussbaum defends a list o f universal 
capabilities without metaphysical foundation, and appeals to an overlapping consensus 
among different traditions and cultures that can support stability for the right reason. In 
what follows, I will critically assess her capabilities approach. Although the capabilities 
approach was developed in considerable consultation with many peoples in multiple
95 Alyssa Bernstein therefore argues that the two approaches do not conflict with each other, and can be 
complementary for securing human rights, especially women’s rights. I will leave aside this issue for the 
moment, since the correlation between rights and capabilities is still unexamined. See See Alyssa Bernstein, 
“Nussbaum vs. Rawls: Should Feminist Human Rights Advocates Reject the Law o f Peoples and Endorse the 
Capabilities Approach?” in Peggy DesAutels and Rebecca Whisnant (eds) Global Concerns: Feminist Ethics and 
Social Theory (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
96 FOJ, pp. 298-305.
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contexts, and although the U ND P has been comparing the quality of life across countries 
through a focus on human capabilities, it is still an empirical question as to whether or not 
her list o f capabilities really has reached universal acceptability. However, I will leave aside 
this issue for the moment, and focus attention on her justification o f capabilities and on 
the relationship between capabilities and human rights.
3.5.1 Liberalism: Political or Comprehensive?
According to Nussbaum, the framework of Rawlsian political liberalism can be a possible 
way of settling disputes over different objects of value that concern the justification of the 
list o f capabilities. People can arrive at this “freestanding moral core o f a political 
conception relevant for political purposes,” without accepting any particular metaphysical 
view of the world or o f human nature. Such an overlapping consensus displays respect for 
diversity and for individual choice, because no one is being asked either to sacrifice his or 
her own comprehensive doctrine or to accept the political conception o f basic capabilities. 
In this regard, it is a type of political liberalism, not a comprehensive liberalism.
Recall that Rawlsian political liberalism has three features: First, it is limited in scope to the 
basic structure of a society, that is, limited in a society’s main political, social, and economic 
institutions. It is different from other moral conceptions that are more comprehensive and 
that include “conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals o f personal 
character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships.”97 
Second, it is a freestanding view, namely, it is presented without reliance on any 
comprehensive doctrine. Third, it is worked out from the fundamental ideas that can be 
seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. Thus, the capabilities 
approach— if it is a type of political liberalism— needs to affirm that its function is to 
apply to the basic structure o f a society for “political purposes only”: that its function is
97 PL, p. 13.
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not to apply to churches, families, and universities outside the basic structure. Furthermore, 
the capabilities approach should be a freestanding moral view presented independendy of 
any comprehensive doctrine, and can be the object of an overlapping consensus. Finally, 
the capabilities approach is worked out from the fundamental ideas that can be found as 
implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional democracy. Nussbaum has clearly 
rejected the third feature as the core definition of Rawlsian political liberalism; nevertheless, 
we should look into whether or not her reason can be justified.
To begin with, Nussbaum contrasts her political liberalism with the comprehensive 
liberalism o f Joseph Raz, Jurgen Habermas, and Susan Okin, among others. Nussbaum 
rejects comprehensive liberalism, because it fails to respect the plurality o f the conceptions 
of the good life and thus fails to sufficiently respect individual choices about values. For 
comprehensive liberalism, what is valuable about persons is that they can reflect on and 
revise their commitment and attachments. Thus, “autonomy” is a general good for all 
humans. For Nussbaum, however, the liberal view of autonomy is explicitly a secular 
comprehensive view o f what is valuable about persons, which would definitely not be 
accepted by many religious believers. However, political principles should not be built on 
any metaphysical or epistemological ethical foundation that divides citizens along lines of 
religion or philosophy. By contrast, a politically liberal state would respect “people who 
prefer a life within authoritarian religion, so long as certain basic opportunities and exit 
options are firmly guaranteed.” 98 In other words, a political liberal would protect a non- 
autonomous life i f  that life has been chosen autonomously. Thus, “respect for choice” in 
Nussbaum’s political-liberal position is not in terms o f a comprehensive-liberal idea of 
autonomy, but in terms of an idea o f “respect for diversity o f persons and their 
comprehensive conceptions.”99 That is what she calls a political conception of autonomy,
98 APHC, p. 129.
" A P H C , p. 129.
namely, “the idea of practical reason as a capability o f persons for political purposes.”100 
Therefore, she carefully refrains from asserting either that non-autonomous lives are not 
worth living or even that autonomy is a key element in the best comprehensive view of 
human flourishing, and she carefully protects the spaces within which Calvinists and other 
non-Milleans can plan lives according to their own lights.101 In this regard, her political- 
liberal position allows people to live non-autonomous lives i f  and only i f  that life has been 
chosen autonomously.
For instance, in the case of the conflict between female non-discrimination laws and 
freedom of religion, a comprehensive liberalism would say that a religion and its activities 
will be restricted if it is imposed on people against their will. Thus, the point at issue is 
whether the liberal government should intervene wherever there is discriminatory practice. 
However, for political-liberals like Nussbaum, this intervention relies on a particular 
comprehensive and metaphysical doctrine, and insists “that religions be feminist or liberal 
in all respects.” It would not only impose a particular way o f life on religious communities, 
but also violate the principle o f respect for persons. By contrast, a political liberal would 
not force anybody to adhere to a particular comprehensive doctrine, and would tolerate 
religious practice because it lies outside the political domain— the only domain to which 
the capabilities approach can apply.
However, Nussbaum presents an explicitly contradictory case evidently showing that the 
capabilities approach applies to domains beyond the basic structure of the society, and 
there seems to be no difference between comprehensive liberalism and her political-liberal 
position. Nussbaum contends that we should not accept that the rector o f Notre Dame 
University be a single man only, because this criterion discriminates against women and is 
not necessary to the “normal operation o f the enterprise.” Nussbaum states,
100 Nussbaum states, “I do not use the word ‘autonomy’ much; indeed I deliberatively avoid it. Instead, I 
speak o f  ‘practical reason’ and define the relevant capability as ‘Being able to form a conception o f  the good 
and to engage in critical reflection about the planning o f  one’s life’.” See PLR, p. 39.
101 A PD , p. 110.
One can argue that the priesthood lies within the core o f worship and should be 
protected on that account; the presidency o f  a university seems hard to defend on this 
basis, especially when it has been granted that female faculty and administrators are a 
valued part o f the institution.102
For Nussbaum, because universities practicing racial discrimination no longer enjoy tax- 
exemption, such gender discrimination should lead to the withdrawal o f a university’s tax- 
exemption, as well; otherwise the federal government would unwittingly endorse sex 
inequality.1"3 Flowever, if universities indeed lie outside the basic structure o f society, we 
should respect and recognize their religious life; thus, gender discrimination should not be 
a problem. If  government should not grant any exceptions in institutions ranging from law 
to religious universities, there seems to be no distinction between comprehensive liberalism 
and political liberalism.
Moreover, in the case of the prohibition o f FGM, the shaky foundation o f Nussbaum’s 
political liberalism is more obvious. In terms of the practice of FGM, her political-liberal 
position should leave it optional for those women who desire to practice it as part of their 
conception o f the good, provided that it has been chosen autonomously. Politically-liberal 
governments should ensure that the conditions o f capabilities are provided, but the choice 
is up to women themselves, even if the practice is harmful to those women who make this 
choice. Recall that Nussbaum requires state intervention regardless of whether they have 
been chosen autonomously, because the practice involves the permanent removal of the 
capability for most sexual pleasure. However, the permanent removal o f capabilities alone 
would not justify a ban o f FGM; otherwise, it would also require a ban on sterilization, 
which Nussbaum herself believes states should permit.104 She must provide further reasons 
to make a distinction between the two. The other reason for defending the assertion that 
even voluntary FGM should be banned105 is the desirability of establishing that FGM is
102 SSJ, p. 111.
103 WHD, pp. 228-229.
104 See WHD, p. 95.
105 In Sex and Social Justice, she gives eight reasons for her view: (1) FGM is carried out by force; (2) FGM is
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unjust. FGM threatens either “the equality or the well-being of the choosing individual” or 
“by contributing to social norms, they threaten the equality of a wider group of 
individuals.”106 Nussbaum cautions that those women who desire to practice FGM may be 
“adaptive selves” unwittingly adjusting their preferences to unjust social norms. If  FGM is 
a harmful social norm that really undermines gender equality, then political liberalism will 
ban it for reasons o f justice. Accordingly, there is a significant difference between FGM 
and sterilization. In this regard, she points out,
Female genital mutilation is unambiguously linked to customs of male domination. Even its 
official rationales, in terms o f purity and propriety, point to aspects o f  sex hierarchy....
Sex relations constructed by the practice are relations in which intercourse becomes a 
vehicle for one-sided male pleasure rather than mutuality o f  pleasure. By contrast, the 
ideal female body image purveyed in the American media has multiple and complex 
resonances, including those o f male domination, but also including those o f physical 
fitness, independence and boyish nonmaternity.
These differences help explain why there is no serious campaign to make ads for diet 
programs, or the pictures o f emaciated women in Vogue, illegal, whereas FGM is illegal 
in most o f the countries in which it occurs.107
However, if political liberalism is limited in scope to the basic structure o f a society, and 
does not apply directly to the internal life o f churches, universities, and families, and so on, 
then we should not ban FGM for the reason o f respect for persons. By contrast, if unjust 
practices are to be prohibited, then Nussbaum would favor society’s intervention in FGM, 
as she should also in other practices linked to male domination that involve Western beauty 
norms. In this regard, states can make paternalistic judgments about the value o f people’s 
way o f life in terms o f gender equality. Thus, way of life is no longer a choice up to 
individuals. However, as Clare Chambers persuasively points out, Nussbaum is facing a 
dilemma here: either she must extend paternalistic judgments to many other cases and
carried out on children below the age o f consent. (3) Women who undergo FGM are more likely than 
Western women to be uneducated and thus to lack conditions for autonomous choice. (4) FGM is often 
carried out in conditions that are dangerous to health. (5) FGM is irreversible. (6) FGM causes lifelong health 
problems. (7) FGM causes the loss o f a certain type o f  sexual functioning that many women would value 
highly. (8) FGM is unambiguously linked to customs o f male domination. See SSJ, pp. 123-4.
106 See Clare Chambers, “Are breast implants better than female genital mutilation? Autonomy, Gender 
Equality and Nussbaum’s political liberalism” in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Vol.
7 No. 3(2004), p. 16.
107 SSJ, p. 124.
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reject her idea o f respect for the capability of practical reason, or she must renounce the 
critique of FGM and accept a view o f complete state neutrality in maintaining her political- 
liberal position.108
In terms of the second feature of political liberalism, despite favoring Rawlsian-inspired 
conceptions and reasoning, it is plain that Nussbaum’s justification is actually more 
metaphysical than political. While Rawls defends his political conception of justice on 
political grounds alone, and permits the question o f truth to enter at the level of 
comprehensive doctrines, Nussbaum defends her list on the essentialist grounds, since her 
defense presupposes a universal human essence. It is quite difficult to argue that the 
justification of these human capabilities is both independent o f any comprehensive 
doctrine and silent about how people should lead their lives. Fabre and Miller comment on 
this point:
Nussbaum tells us that we should all have “opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
and for choice in matters o f reproduction” ... in the context o f her book, this 
particularly applies to women. Whether or not that claim is true, it is clear that it 
must involve denying, contrary to what many people think, that God has 
allocated women the task o f reproduction. To take the issue even further, if  (as 
one might reasonably surmise) having reproductive choice means, for Nussbaum, 
having access to reliable contraception (perhaps, even, to abortion), this particular 
capability presupposes a certain relationship between mind and body (and, in the 
case o f abortion, confers a status on the embryo) with which many people would 
take issue. More generally and fundamentally still, her account rests on the central 
assumption that individuals are autonomous beings, capable o f shaping their own 
destiny. This in turn rests on a set o f metaphysical presuppositions about what a 
person is, whether or not a person has free will, whether or not there is a God 
who determines the course o f her life, etc.109
Moreover, Nussbaum claims that the list, rather than suppose a single type of flourishing 
for the human being, specifies a single set of fundamental constitutional entidements that 
provide the underpinning for many different ways of life.110 However, the nature o f the list 
of capabilities is still ambiguous. For instance, we have seen that the capabilities approach 
is not neutral on how people should live and allows state interference “with a choice up to
108 Clare Chamber, “Are breast implants better than female genital mutilation”, p. 12.
109 Cecile Fabre and David Miller, “Justice and Culture: A Review o f Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum, and O ’Neill,” p. 
8 .
110 FOJ, p. 182.
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a point.” While Rawls’s primary goods are to provide the necessary means for the 
development o f citizens in the well-ordered society, it seems that these capabilities both are 
essential to any good human life and, thus, constitute the fundamental basis o f any human 
life. Moreover, the substitution o f one item for a larger portion o f another is not permitted 
because each item is equally valuable. Does it mean that a life that is lacking any one o f 
those capabilities is not a “good” human life? Or does it mean that a life that is lacking any 
one of those capabilities beneath the threshold level will fall short o f being a “human” life? 
Although she emphasizes the distinction between the justification and the implementation 
of the same norms for all nations,111 and although she suggests that the implementation of 
these capabilities must be left to the “internal politics” of each nation, she does not give an 
account of the process of cross-national comparison, which provides a procedural 
justification for deciding the appropriate level of specification o f a given capability in the 
local context. In this regard, the assertion that every society should subscribe to a single 
conception of the human good, even an abstract one, is arbitrary and implausible. Sabina 
Alkire comments herein:
If indeed the “local and particular” are to be given ongoing priority, then the capability 
approach would seem to require a sketch o f  the process by which the national “normative 
conception o f the human” is to be developed in local form, rather than a sketch o f the 
normative human conception (and its associated political institutions), such as she 
gives.112
Furthermore, the fact that we all have nutritional needs does not logically lead to the 
conclusion that we are equally entided to develop a certain threshold level of capabilities 
with respect to them. If  Nussbaum insists on the equality o f all persons, o f the sexes or 
even o f the species, then the idea of respect for person that she unfolds here will have to 
rely upon some comprehensive doctrine, and she will have to give up her commitment to 
political liberalism.
111 FO/, p. 260.
112 See Sabina Alkire, “Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction” (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 38.
Last but not least, Nussbaum has clearly rejected the third feature o f  political liberalism 
regarding the ideas implicit in the public political culture, and argues that it is not the core 
idea o f Rawlsian political liberalism but simply a derivative clue. I agree that the third 
feature is not the core idea, and I accept her definition;113 however, it seems to me that 
Nussbaum neglects what Rawls means when he says that “political liberalism applies the 
principle of toleration to philosophy itself,” and Nussbaum does not sincerely take into 
account the issue of stability when she develops the idea o f overlapping consensus 
outward to the global context.
Recall that the idea o f overlapping consensus works only within a framework of 
constitutional democracy. While working outward to the international stage, Rawls 
recognized that different well-ordered societies have their own basic structure, which reflects 
their own “public political culture,” and do not necessarily treat members o f a given society 
as free and equal. If Rawls insisted on the idea of citizens as free and equal, it would 
definitely contradict the liberal principle of legitimacy.
Nussbaum contends that Rawls wrongly believed that the idea o f mutual respect is 
peculiarly Western so that he was reluctant to apply the idea of a liberal overlapping 
consensus outward to the international arena. By contrast, in support o f the claim that her 
list o f ten central capabilities can be an object of a global overlapping consensus,
Nussbaum appeals to the aspirations and ideals of India, the views o f women struggling 
against injustice, and the fact that many different artworks and dramas around the world 
appeal to a shared sense of the tragic.1141 think that Rawls would agree with her argument 
that the idea o f overlapping consensus can be organized by way o f different public reasons
113 Indeed, if  we look into two other political liberals Rawls has identified (Judith Shklar and Charles 
Larmore), we will find that Nussbaum is right that the commonalities among their theories include the first 
two features without the third. But both o f those theories are elaborated mainly in the context o f Western 
society. When the capabilities approach works outward to the global context, the point at issue, therefore, is 
how to justify the ideal o f international political liberalism, and whether the idea o f  overlapping consensus can 
be applicable to the global context.
114 WHD, pp. 67-76.
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in other societies;115 however, it is quite irrelevant here because the ideas o f mutual respect 
are not currently shared in the global political culture.116 Nussbaum simply appeals to a 
branch of liberal thinking within most o f the important moral and religious traditions that 
can endorse all the central capabilities in the future, but she does not explain why they 
should be accepted, or whether it is not a modus vivendi. W ithout a constructive procedure 
by way of the idea o f public reason, it is difficult to ensure stability for the right reason. 
Fabre and Miller clearly state the point thus:
Suffice it to say that [Nussbaum and Sen] show, powerfully, that those traditions are not 
as homogenous as they are often taken to be by those who represent them as wholly 
alien to Western liberalism; but they [Nussbaum and Sen] fail to explain why the liberal 
strands that they discover are more representative o f those traditions than their illiberal 
components, or why illiberal protagonists o f  such traditions should move towards a 
moral liberal position.117
3.5.2 Capabilities: Rights or Goal?
For Nussbaum, the capabilities approach presents a better understanding o f what it means 
to lead a truly human life than the language of rights. Having a right means we have a 
justified claim to a certain level of capabilities to function.
However, the correlation between rights and capabilities is still ambiguous. While 
Nussbaum criticizes the resources-based approach as being unable to accurately grasp the 
well-being o f people, because individuals with the same resources may vary greatly in their 
abilities to convert resources into valuable functionings; she does not explain whether the 
protection o f equal capabilities requires equal rights. For instance, do we need to protect 
equal capabilities or equal rights of women for securing women’s de facto rights o f political 
participation? Does it mean that the protection of the equal right to vote for a candidate 
requires the guarantee of equal influence on the legislative process?
115 In “The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls highlights Muslim scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im’s work as 
a “perfect example o f overlapping consensus” within Islamic societies. I will take up An-Na’im’s work in 
chapter four.
116 See Linda Barclay, “What Kind o f  Liberal Is Martha Nussbaum?” In Sats-Nordic Journal of Philosophy Vol 4, 
No 2(2003), pp. 5-24.
117 See Cecile Fabre and David Miller, “Justice and Culture: A Review o f  Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum, and 
O’Neill,” p. 13.
Moreover, it would be misleading to assert the equivalence of rights and capabilities. As 
stated above, capabilities, either basic or combined, are the content or object o f the 
rights.118 However, in item 7 on her list, Nussbaum argues that the protection o f the 
capability of affiliation entails the provision of non-discrimination on the basis o f  race, sex, 
ethnicity, caste, religion, and national origin. But non-discrimination is a goal, not a 
capability, because it depends upon what many people actually choose to do, rather than on 
what they merely are free to choose to do. Living in a non-discriminatory society is not a 
matter under any one person’s control, but depends on the voluntary action o f other 
citizens. Therefore, non-discrimination is not something that can be treated as a capability 
of choosing; rather, it is a social condition on which a constitutional framework can 
provide institutional guarantees. In this regard, while we claim that the right against being 
treated discriminatorily is indeed individual, the capability o f proceeding without being 
discriminated against refers mainly to social conditions at large, not rights per se.u9 
Furthermore, the protection of the capability o f affiliation does not entail the provisions 
of non-discrimination on the basis o f race, sex, ethnicity, caste, religion, or national origin, 
because not every society treats its own members as free and equal. As stated in chapter 
two, the abstract idea of equal respect for persons can be elaborated in different societies.120 
If equal respect for persons entails equality of all o f the above-mentioned categories, again, 
Nussbaum will have to rely upon some comprehensive doctrine and give up her 
commitment to political liberalism.
Likewise, in terms of her item 6 regarding “practical reason,” Nussbaum argues that the 
capacity to form and to pursue a conception of the good entails protection for the liberty 
of conscience. However, as stated in chapter two, living in a non-liberal decent society like
118See Henry Richardson, “Some Limitations o f Nussbaum’s Capabilities,” in Quinnipiac Imw Review Vol. 19 
(2000), pp. 309-332; and Alyssa Bernstein, “Nussbaum vs. Rawls: Should Feminist Human Rights Advocates 
Reject the Law o f Peoples and Endorse the Capabilities Approach?”
119 Richardson, “Some Limitations o f Nussbaum’s Capabilities,” p. 312.
120 For instance, a decent hierarchical society does not treat its own members reasonably or justly as free and 
equal citizens.
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Ka^anistan involves a system o f social cooperation based upon a common- good 
conception of justice. In this society, what constitutes the best human life and how society 
should be structured are specified by the common-good conception o f justice, and it is 
normal that people would sincerely follow the guidance of others to pursue the common- 
good conception of the good; therefore, protection for the liberty of conscience is not an 
entailment either.
3.5.3 W hose Intuition? Which Capabilities?
In spite of responding to many critiques, and making some substantial changes in her 
justificatory framework, I think perhaps the weakest part of Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach is her methodology. Nussbaum cannot provide a convincing argument in answer 
to the following question: How do we know about what capabilities people and society 
prefer and would choose?
Recall that Nussbaum deploys three steps for identifying the list of ten central capabilities:
(1) Use Aristotelian practical reasoning to reach the substantive account o f the capabilities.
(2) Use Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium” to take up the task of political justification, and use 
an informed-desire procedural approach to critically examine subjective preferences. (3) 
Test the view against the views o f others, and search for an empirically universal 
acceptability.
In terms of her Aristotelian reasoning, Nussbaum asserts that by looking at our own 
human life and at others’, and by trying to identify the experiences that all human beings 
share, the list of human capabilities determined by her is both what we all agree on and what 
we ascertain to be indispensable. However, it is questionable whether we really do have 
common moral intuitions to support the list o f capabilities grounded by shared human 
experiences. Richard Rorty, for instance, contends that we do not see any evidence that 
people treat the other humanely, and he believes that historical legacies demonstrate instead
that our “deep beliefs” do not recognize the other properly at all.121 Moreover, how do we 
know that all basic human functionings were included? Who decides which capabilities 
would count? Which criteria? The situation in which Indian feminist activists defend a film 
that positively portrays lesbianism is enough for Nussbaum to justify her assertion 
regarding protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; in this case, 
it is clear that her Aristotelian reasoning privileges her own judgment. Susan Okin contends,
She [Nussbaum] wants and claims to take an approach that is respectful o f each 
person’s struggle for flourishing, that treats each person as an end and as a source o f  
agency and worth in her own right. But her highly intellectualized conception o f a 
fully human life and some o f  the capacities central to living it seem to derive far more 
from an Aristotelian ideal than from any deep or broad familiarity with the lives o f  
women in the less developed world. As for the more sophisticated, even fanciful, 
items on her list, they seem to draw more from the life o f  a highly educated, 
artistically inclined, self-consciously and voluntarily religious Western woman than 
from the lives o f the women to whom she spoke in India.122
Moreover, in the case of the prohibition o f FGM, Nussbaum contends that existing 
preferences may be corrupted when those women adapt to unjust social norms, and argues 
that those women who desire to practice FGM suffer from adaptive preferences. However, 
this argument may not only mute the voice o f those women who desire to practice FGM, 
but even suggest both that they are incapable of speaking for themselves and that only 
others “are capable o f naming and challenging patriarchal atrocities committed against 
Third World women.”123 But we need to distinguish between “taking the perspective of 
other people into account,” on the one hand, and “imaginatively taking their position, on 
the other.”124 We should not assume that the supporters of FGM are simply passive victims 
of their cultures in a way that justifies outside intervention. Moreover, we should not 
assume that we are already aware o f the most im portant problems and are experts on how
121 See Richard Rorty, “Human rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” in S. Shute & S. Hurley (Eds.) On
human rights: The Oxford Amnesty lectures (New York: Basic Books, 1993) pp. 111-134.
122 Susan Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who’s Heard?” In Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 31(2003), p. 296.
123 Alison Jaggar, “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue,” in Ethics &  
International Affairs, Vol 19(3)(2005), p. 69.
124 Iris Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought,” in Intersecting 
Voices (Princeton University Press 1997), pp. 38-59.
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those problems should be solved and who should be saved. The substantive account of 
goods is best tested by actual dialogue in which peoples’ needs, interests, and perspectives 
are clearly represented, and we should allow people to speak for themselves. They may be 
adaptive selves who are unwittingly adapting to an unjust status quo\ however, we need to 
listen receptively to their claims in order to understand their perspectives before criticizing 
them. Commenting on this topic, Seyla Benhabib declares,
Neither the concreteness nor the otherness o f the concrete other can be known in the 
absence o f  the voice o f the other. The viewpoint o f the concrete other emerges as 
distinct only as a result o f self-definition. It is the other who makes us aware o f both 
her concreteness and her otherness. Without engagement, confrontation, dialogue and 
even a struggle for recognition, in the Hegelian sense, we tend to constitute the 
otherness o f the other by projection and fantasy or ignore it in indifference.125
In this regard, it seems that actual dialogue is necessary to understand the concrete other in 
that we are forced to confront and listen to others directly.126 Without actual dialogue for 
the justification of her substantive account o f the goods, we are unable to ensure whether 
Nussbaum is not projecting her own ideas but simply rationalizing her own values.127 
Furthermore, Nussbaum employs the process o f reflective equilibrium to compare the 
capabilities approach with other available approaches. In Women and Human Development, she 
considers three ways o f comparing the quality o f life across nations: GNP per capita, total 
utility or preference-satisfaction, and the distribution o f resources within each locality. In 
Frontiers of Justice, the search for “reflective equilibrium” is an effort to compare the 
capabilities approach to Rawls’s and other philosophers’ social contractualisms. However, 
unless we can assert that the process of reflective equilibrium is inclusive, the dissenting or 
anomalous voice would simply be disregarded during the reflective process. Alison Jaggar 
fleshes out this idea:
Establishing a set o f intuitions or preferences ... shows only that the set is internally 
coherent. Unless the individual or groups creating the set has considered all available 
intuitions, it remains possible that anomalous intuitions may have been excluded or that
125 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: 
Roudedge, 1992), p. 168.
126 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990), p. 116.
127 Alison Jaggar, “Reasoning about Well-Being: Nussbaum’s Methods o f  Justifying the Capabilities,” p. 317.
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other equilibria, expressing alternative moral perspective, may exist. Since the reflective 
equilibrium approach offers no guidelines for preferring one o f  these possible 
alternative equilibria to the others, it does not dispel the specters o f  subjectivism, if the
coherent set o f  intuitions is held by an individual, or o f relativism, if  the set is held by a
• 128 community.
For instance, once we decide that a capability framework is the best as compared with other 
alternatives, can we choose again which capability framework is better, and delete or add in 
other items? If  A employs her own Aristotelian reasoning but disagrees with Nussbaum’s 
list, how do we determine whether A’s findings were compelling or whether her 
disagreement was mainly dependent upon her adaptive preference? Should it be rejected 
simply as wrong or as corrupt?
Seen in this light, without a procedural justification, her non-Platonist substantive-good 
account indeed privileges her own moral conception. It is true that even the best 
procedural justification does not remove adaptive preferences. However, without a 
procedural approach to bracket her substantive account of the good, it is difficult to avoid 
the criticism that she selects only intuitions with which she agrees and that she projects her 
prior prejudices on the other, especially those poor women in the developing world.129
Conclusion
Despite favoring many Rawlsian-inspired conceptions and reasoning, I argue that 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is indeed a comprehensive liberalism rather than a 
political liberalism, and that the list o f capabilities cannot be the object o f an overlapping 
consensus among divergent comprehensive views in a diverse world. She rejects 
contractarianism as procedural design for political justification; however, without a
128 Ibid, p. 315.
129 Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who’s Heard?” p. 297.
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procedural justification, not only does her methodology privilege her own moral view, but 
also it is disputable whether or not her list of capabilities really represents a broader cross- 
cultural consensus.
By contrast, Muslim scholar Abdullah An-Na’im advocates a global process o f internal 
discourse and cross-cultural dialogue to promote the legitimacy o f human rights. An-Na’im 
tries to demonstrate that, following his cross-cultural dialogue approach, it would confirm 
the view that non-liberal societies would agree on a set o f rights similar to those found in 
the UDHR. I will deal with An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue approach in the fourth 




“Cross-cultural Dialogue” Approach to Human Rights
Traditional ideas are not “roots” or “sources” that harbor the potential o f  modern human 
rights, a potential gradually ripened in history. It is the other way around in that the modern 
idea o f human rights characterizes that standpoint from which we can retrospectively 
discover humanitarian motives that facilitate a critical reconstruction o f aspects o f continuity 
between the present and the past.
Heiner Bielefeldt— “Western” versus “Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions?1
Introduction
In contrast to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach grounding human rights on the respects in 
which all human beings are alike, the final strategy o f justification that I shall consider is 
Muslim scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im’s “cross-cultural dialogue” approach, which aspires to 
ground the universal validity of human rights through intra- and cross-cultural dialogue.
As stated in chapter one, some scholars develop different kinds o f consensus-based 
approaches to grounding the universal validity of human rights and, simultaneously, to 
respecting cultural diversity. However, An-Na’im proposes a hermeneutic methodology and 
argues the following points: (1) The premise implicit in these approaches is wrong, and his 
approach can avoid their defects. An-Na’im describes his project as “an attempt to 
promote the cultural legitimacy of human rights within the Muslim context,” 2 and 
proposes a “cross-cultural dialogue” approach to improve mutual understanding and 
appreciation so that the differences in underlying justification can be bridged. (2) The
1 Heiner Bielefeldt, “Western’ Versus ‘Islamic’ Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique o f Cultural 
Essentialism in the Discussion o f  Human Rights,” in Political Theory Vol 28 (2000), pp. 90-121.
2 An-Na‘im, Abdullahi Ahmed, “Conclusion” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im (ed), Human Rights in Cross- 
cultural Perspectives: A. Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 427.
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tension between human rights and religion can be solved by his hermeneutic methodology. 
Some may argue that religion is essentially incompatible with human rights owing to the 
claim that the human rights idea is a secular view. However, for An-Na’im, there is no 
intrinsic contradiction between Islam and human rights, provided that the two are 
reconciled by his constructive methodology. (3) An-Na’im is convinced of the legitimacy 
of the “universal human rights” project initiated by the UN, but believes that it would be 
undermined if the project were forced to compete with a society’s value system. For him, 
religious views should not be pressed upon secular molds before they are granted 
legitimacy. Legitimacy can be achieved only through a sincere internal cultural dialogue of a 
society’s members. That is, the human rights principle needs Islamic legitimacy in an Islamic 
society.3 In so doing, An-Na’im offers a hermeneutic method for the radical reform of 
Sharia. An-Na’im believes that his method can allow Muslims to retain their cultural 
authenticity and, simultaneously, to adhere to international human rights standards.
The other reason for considering An-Na’im’s approach is that, if Rawls’s human rights 
scheme in his The Taw of Peoples is to be convincing in liberal and non-liberal societies alike, 
we should understand the justification and the content of the human rights scheme 
articulated from “non-liberal” societies, and should be able to sketch whether or not the 
human rights confirm the proposition that “something like Kazanistan is the best we can 
realistically and coherendy hope for.” 4 Rawls highlights An-Na’im’s work as a “perfect 
example of overlapping consensus” around constitutional democracy,5 though there are 
some explicit differences between Rawls and An-Na’im regarding the scope and rationale 
of human rights. Specifically, An-Na’im expects that the principle o f equal treatment 
before the law can be endorsed after the reinterpretation of Sharia by his reformed
3 Michael Freeman, “The Problem o f Secularism in Human Rights Theory,” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 
(26)(2004), pp. 375-400 at 378.
4 LPh, p. 78.
5 John Rawls, “The Idea o f  Public Reason Revisited” in The Taw of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), p. 151.
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methodology, and it is interesting to see how An-Na’im substantially refutes Rawls’s 
contention that Kazanistan is the best that we can hope for.
In this chapter, I will examine the “cross-cultural dialogue” approach proposed by An- 
N a’im. In the first section, I will take up the construction o f the “cross-cultural dialogue” 
approach, and evaluate whether or not it can go beyond the problems that most consensus- 
based approaches encounter. In the second section, I will explain An-Na’im’s hermeneutic 
methodology, and explore areas of contention between Islam and human rights, especially 
addressing the legal status o f women, the legal status o f non-Muslims, and the role o f 
criminal justice. In the end, I will critically examine his approach. My argument is thus: (1) 
An-Na’im indeed provides a critical methodology in his account o f cross-cultural dialogue, 
and rightly expands the analysis to encompass considerations about non-Western cultures. 
In virtue of the languages and principles of human rights that need to be contextualized, 
interpreted or translated for every particular circumstance, An-Na’im’s critical methodology 
is better than other consensus-based approaches in many substantial ways. However, (2) 
An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue is exclusive in that it requires a certain form and content of 
participation in internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, and in that it fails to provide 
a sufficient analysis of cultural members, especially o f the victim’s voice. In the end, his 
dialogue perspective does not involve a true cross-cultural exchange and, in fact, promotes 
a uni-directional approach to intellectual efforts rather than a multi-directional approach 
that might establish common ground.
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4.1 An-Na’im’s Cross-cultural Dialogue6
4.1.1 The “W hy” o f  Human Rights
An-Na’im accepts Maritain’s practical-consensus argument that agreement on human rights 
is a body o f beliefs for guiding action, rather than for justifying those beliefs; nevertheless, An- 
N a’im warns us that disagreement over the justification might translate into disagreements 
regarding the form, content, enforcement, and implementation o f human rights.7 In other 
words, if the justification o f human rights is not valid within all major cultural and religious 
traditions, the occasional invalidity would deeply affect the applicability of human rights 
norms to all human beings everywhere. In spite o f this early attempt to bracket the 
rationale for human rights in the drafting committee o f the UDHR, it seems that this 
practice of ignoring the underlying justification has brought about a number o f questions. 
Indeed, from An-Na’im’s point o f view, accepting this practical consensus on international 
human rights without paying attention to its underlying justification has harmed human 
rights implementation and enforcement. The harm is due to the lack of cultural legitimacy8 
in their respective cultures as the reason for the discrepancy between the formal acceptance 
of human rights principles and actual non-compliance with them. Therefore, the universal 
legitimacy o f international human rights laws in the cultures of the world is still 
unexamined.
Cultural legitimacy, according to An-Na’im, is “the quality or state of being in conformity
6 I will use the following abbreviations in referring to An-Na’im’s writings: “Problems o f  Universal Cultural 
Legitimacy for Human Rights” (1990), hereafter PCL; “Toward a Cross-cultural Approach” (1992a), 
hereafter TCCA, “Islam, Islamic law and the Dilemma o f Cultural Legitimacy for Universal Human Rights” 
(1992b), hereafter ID CL\ “Conclusion” (1992c), hereafter H R IQ  “Toward an Islamic Hermeneutics for 
Human Rights” (1995), hereafter TIH H R; “The Cultural Mediation o f  Human Rights: The Al-Arqam Case 
in Malaysia” (1999), hereafter CM HR; “Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate” (2000), 
hereafter BU, “The best o f Times and the Worst o f Times: Human Agency and Human Rights in Islamic 
Societies” (2004), hereafter HA.
1 IDCL, p. 29.
8 Thus, regarding international human rights norms, the more they coincide with recognized principles or 
rules, the more people will sincerely submit themselves to them.
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with recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of a given culture.”9 Thus, the 
cultural legitimacy of human rights means that human rights both are more or less in 
conformity with recognized principles and hence would enjoy internal cultural validity. 
People are more likely to observe norms if the people believe the norms to be sanctioned 
by their own cultural tradition. The more successful demonstration that a particular human 
right rests on rules or norms accepted by a wide range of cultural traditions, the more 
successful demonstration of cultural legitimacy will be.
In historical terms, the cultural legitimacy of human rights is lacking in various cultures 
because, An-Na’im contends, there is a lack o f articulation o f non-Western perspectives 
accessible to UN officials. The absence o f non-Western representatives led to the exclusion 
of those perspectives at the earliest stages of the conceptualization o f human rights. As a 
result, the present system of international human rights has been shaped largely by the 
values of the Western natural rights tradition, which has been “universalized” through 
colonial hegemonic processes and which has not yet adequately incorporated into itself 
non-Western views. Owing to colonial rule and foreign domination, most non-Western 
countries were unable to participate in the drafting processes and the adoption o f the 
UDHR. The UDHR adopted by the General Assembly, which consisted only of 48 UN 
members, was hardly representative o f the contemporary world community. Although 
some o f the non-Western representatives were involved, most o f them had been trained in 
Western countries and represented more intensively the Western cultural perspective than 
their own.10 Also, even though most non-Western countries achieved formal independence 
and were able to participate in the formulation o f subsequent international human rights, 
the emerging countries of Africa and Asia were already deemed to be bound by those 
earlier documents in addition to the subsequent instruments in which they participated
9 PCL, p. 336.
10 PCL, p. 350.
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from the very start. Thus, the majority of non-Western countries were incorporated into 
the process by which international human rights standards were determined and 
formulated.11 It is very difficult to see how non-Western representatives could have 
genuinely represented their respective cultural traditions. Given the historical context 
within which the present standards have been formulated, it was unavoidable that they were 
initially based on Western philosophical assumptions regarding human nature, society, and 
the notion of the good. Accordingly, An-Na’im cautions us that the normative universality 
of human rights should not be taken for granted. Rather, we may applaud and encourage 
the idea of the justification of human rights through multiple foundations; still, we need to 
comprehend both how diverse cultures justify them and what acceptable moral doctrines 
can be the common ground of universal human rights.
4.1.2 Why Cultural Legitimacy Matters?
Specifically, from An-Na’im’s point of view, culture is a primary force in the socialization 
of individuals and a major cause of the consciousness o f the community. It “stipulates the 
norms and values that contribute to people’s perception of their self-interest and the goals 
and methods of individual and collective struggles for power within a society and between 
societies.”12 In so doing, people are more likely to comply with normative propositions if 
they suppose them to be observed by their own cultural traditions.13 Because the current 
human rights framework is constructed by Western culture and is expressively incompatible 
with other non-Western cultures, if people in non-Western societies accept the particular 
formulation o f this concept, it might turn out to be a Trojan horse, introducing other
11IDCL, p. 35; PCL, p. 349.
12 TCCA, p. 23.
13 Likewise, Joseph Chan provides a uniquely Confucian defense o f the conviction that the Chinese will 
prefer and be more apt to comply with international human rights if  they can be grounded in less alien 
sources. See Joseph Chan “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China” in Joanne 
Bauer and Daniel A. Bell feds') The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights /Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 212-237.
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civilizations by stealth, and binding the non-Western people to an acceptance of those 
Western ways o f thinking and feeling. More often than not, those in power could easily use 
this argument as an excuse to argue that national sovereignty is demeaned by compliance 
with standards that are based on an alien value system.14 If Western people view their own 
conceptions and beliefs as universal, and attempt to internationally enforce them 
irrespective of local justifications, it is in effect a case o f ethnocentrism.15 By contrast, the 
more the human rights project initiated by the UN can show that a particular human right 
is based on a value or norm accepted by a wide range o f cultural traditions, the less that 
right will be open to the charge of ethnocentricity or cultural imperialism; and then, the 
discrepancy between theory and practice can be overcome.16
4.2 Neither Substantive Minimalism N or De Facto Overlapping 
Consensus
As stated in chapter one, in drawing attention to the charge o f ethnocentrism, some 
scholars may try to construct cross-cultural anthropological universals by searching for 
institutions, rules, or traditions that can be linked to human rights and by affirming the 
least common denominator that can be found among divergent cultures.17 
However, An-Na’im disagrees with this approach. The reasons for the inadequacy of this 
approach concern two premises implicit in this approach: that culture is fixed and given 
and that all members within a cultural or religious community hold identical views on the 
meanings and the implications of cultural norms and traditions.18 For An-Na’im, culture is
14 PCL, p. 332.
15 PCL, p. 350; IDCL, p. 24.
16 PCL, p. 343.
17 Alison Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (Newbury Park, London, N ew  Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1990).
18 Specifically, An-Na’im argues that this approach is inadequate, since “restricting international human rights 
to those accepted by prevailing perceptions o f the values and norms o f  the major cultural traditions o f the 
world would not only limit these rights and reduce their scope, but also exclude extremely vital rights.” See 
TCCA, p. 21.
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not permanently fixed but remains open to ongoing narrative development. All cultures 
have an element of ambivalence and contestability in the sense that prevailing practices and 
institutions are open to constant challenge and change. Thus, people in a community often 
hold different perceptions o f the norms of their community. Other perspectives challenge 
dominant interpretations and propose alternative views of the culture on particular issues. 
Furthermore, just quoting and citing selected general scriptural statements or cultural 
sources that are presented as compatible or incompatible with human rights norms in 
isolation from their current social reality is totally a-historical. Given that cultural norms are 
changeable and have evolved over time in order to provide for the changing needs and 
circumstances of the people, An-Na’im argues that we should analyze and discuss the 
cultural norms in terms of their manifestations and significance in current practice. Merely 
pointing out that particular teachings or texts are compatible or incompatible with the idea 
of human rights, would make little sense and dismiss what is really happening in the 
societies here and now, and what cultures and religions are actually doing in peoples’ lives.19 It 
also precludes the opportunity to “broaden and deepen cross-cultural consensus on a 
common core of human rights.”20 In other words, the focus on the texts rather than on the 
context puts the justification o f human rights in the wrong place. An-Na’im states,
The question is always about people’s understanding and practice o f their religion, not 
the religion itself as an abstract notion, and about human rights as a living and evolving 
body o f principles and rules, not as a theoretical concept.... Whether institutions and 
organizations are religious, political or diplomatic, the question about their relationship 
to human rights is always about how people negotiate power, justice and pragmatic self- 
interest, at home and abroad. Such negotiations always take place in specific historical 
contexts, and in response to the particular experiences o f  believers and unbelievers 
living together. Each religion or ideology is relevant to those who believe in it, but only 
in the specific meaning and context o f their daily lives and not in an abstract, 
decontextualized sense.21
In this regard, it is im portant to appreciate the potential for internal change within all
19 Cf: Onuma Yasuaki, “Towards an Inter-Civilizational Approach to Human Rights,” in Joanne Bauer & 
Daniel Bell (ed), The East Asia Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
103-123 at 121.
20 ID CL, p. 22.
21 H A , p. 3.
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cultures and living traditions, which are always constituted by the conflicts over 
interpretations. While living within each particular religious tradition, believers would share 
a first-order language o f commitments and beliefs about the sacred texts, but there are 
striking divergent interpretations within a tradition regarding the meanings o f those beliefs 
and commitments that those sacred commitments involve. Depending on the internal 
diversity o f religion itself, thus, it can be a potential advantage for believers to develop a 
second-order model o f discourse (human rights discourse) that conveys the primary beliefs and 
commitments in a language accessible to outsiders. Therefore, human rights would become 
more plausible when it can be shown that local religious tradition contains elements that 
support the rights.
Accordingly, the internal pluralism o f a tradition or a religion provides the context within 
which divergent religious communities can bring their first-order traditions o f belief and 
commitment into dialogue with the norms and practices o f international human rights.
The insiders’ task is to retrieve, articulate and apply the first-order religious concepts and 
norms in order to promote human rights. Therefore, human rights neither are norms and 
values found in all human societies, nor derive from conventional moralities within societies: 
human rights are and derive from a constructive reconciliation. That is to say, the first and 
foremost task of dialogue is to reconcile convictions about a religious tradition’s sacred 
creed with a commitment to human rights— it is not the first and foremost task simply to 
find the compatibility between current divergent religious beliefs and international human 
rights norms. Therefore, it is clear that An-Na’im disagrees with the argument about the 
consensus-based approach mentioned above: the argument that the consensus over human 
rights is “the area o f overlap already present or latent among” divergent cultures. After all, 
even if there were an agreement on human rights norms, whether or not there would be 
agreement on the precise interpretations and forms o f human rights would still be 
contentious. An-Na’im states in this regard,
When looking into specific cultural traditions, one may well find that a culture supports 
this concept as a human right, in the sense o f a right to which each person is entitled by 
virtue o f being human. Nevertheless, this “consensus” on the right as a matter o f  
principle does not extend to the precise content o f the right or provide criteria for 
determining whether a particular form o f treatment or punishment violates the right.22
Thus, in contrast to Rawls, who ignores the fact that defining human rights must involve a 
degree of abstraction that is consistent with some variations in interpretation and 
implementation, and in contrast to Nussbaum, who worries that “adaptive preferences” 
would limit the usefulness o f actual dialogical approaches, An-Na’im argues that internal 
and cross-cultural dialogue should play a positive role in grounding the intercultural validity 
of human rights and in broadening the cross-cultural consensus on an interpretation o f 
human rights.
4.2.1 Methodology23 (I): Two Presumptions
Before describing An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue approach, it should be mentioned that 
there are two presumptions behind his methodology.
First o f all, An-Na’im assumes that the best starting point for the cultural dialogue on 
human rights is the recognition that underlying values o f human rights are valid in different 
cultural patterns. Some cultures may lack an explicit conceptual scheme of human rights, 
but they still have internal moral resources to justify human rights norms on internal moral 
grounds.24 Therefore, the first thing for this constructive approach is to extrapolate the 
underlying values of the concept of human rights through a hermeneutic reading of 
existing international standards.25 Although the consensus on the content o f international
22 PCL, p. 355.
23 The methodology that An-Na’im proposes is based on his mentor Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, a founder o f  
the Republican Brothers in Sudan. Taha was executed as an apostate on January 18, 1985, because he 
opposed the Islamization program o f President Nimeiri. Taha’s ideas concern legal matters but are more a 
comprehensive vision o f the message o f Islam. It was after An-Na’im’s work that a legal objective was 
infused in them. See Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, The Second Message of Islam, trans. Abdullahi An-Na’im 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 2-19.
24 HRIC, p. 227.
25 TCCA, p. 432.
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human rights is still controversial and needs to be solved, An-Na’im suggests that the 
content of human rights articulated in the UDHR is a point of reference2*1 for dialogue. 
Furthermore, through the interpretative reading of existing international standards, An- 
N a’im claims that the core value and the core implication o f the UDHR and o f subsequent 
covenants refer to “the notion of the inherent dignity and integrity of every human being.” An-Na’im 
states,
The fundamental value underlying the Universal Declaration and covenants is the notion 
o f the inherent dignity and integrity o f every human being. All the civil and political 
rights as well as the economic, social and cultural rights recognized by the Universal 
Declaration and elaborated on in the covenants are the necessary implications or 
practical manifestations o f the inherent dignity and integrity o f the human person....
Equality is another implication o f  the inherent dignity and integrity o f the human being, 
which, in turn, requires nondiscrimination on grounds such as race, sex, religion, and 
national or social origin. Both notions are explicidy affirmed in the Universal 
Declaration and the two covenants.27
Obviously, it still begs the question regarding when the justification moves from a universal 
notion of inherent dignity to a universal human rights norm. Thus, An-Na’im argues that 
we should not only identify traditional cultural support for the underlying values in the 
conception of human rights, but also “make the connection.”28 He provides the historical 
and sociopolitical reasons that underlie this connection and that I will deal with in the next 
section.
Second, An-Na’im assumes that there is a common ground for any inter-cultural and 
cross-cultural dialogue, so to speak, the idea of reciprocity. This principle is clearly the 
reformulation of the Golden Rule,29 that is, the principle that one should treat other
26 He points out three reasons for which the current international human rights instrument is the point o f  
reference for dialogue: “it is not advisable to discard the existing international human rights standards for 
three reasons: we may never recover the gains so far achieved through these standards; they are needed as a 
framework for discourse; and they provide necessary protection to activists and scholars.” See TTCA, p 434.
27 PCL, p. 356.
28 CMHR, p. 158.
29 An-Na’im argued that “there is a common normative principle shared by all the major cultural traditions, 
which if  constructed in an enlightened manner, is capable o f  sustaining universal standards. That is the 
principle that one should treat other people as he or she wishes to be treated by them. This golden rule, 
referred to earlier as the principle o f reciprocity, is shared by all the major religious traditions o f  the world.” 
See Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Cultural Transformation and Normative Consensus on the Best Interests o f  the 
Child,” in International journal of Law and the Family, vol. 8 (1994), pp. 62-81. Also published in Philip Alston 
(ed), The Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights. (Oxford: UNICEF, Clarendon Press,
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people as he or she wishes to be treated by them.30 An-Na’im states,
...one should not tolerate for another person any treatment that one would not 
accept for oneself. Placing oneself in the position of the other person, one is able to see if  he 
or she would find the treatment to which the other person is subjected inhumane or 
seriously objectionable.31
Here, the idea of reciprocity assumes that moral respect as a symmetric relation between 
self and other, and the idea entails that the perspectives o f self and other are reversible. 
During the dialogical process, each of us should take the perspectives o f all the others in 
making our moral judgment. An-Na’im believes that people with different perspectives can 
abstract themselves from the particulars o f their fives and can, through dialogue, come to 
an agreement on the universality of human rights. Therefore, dialogue with respect to the 
universality of human rights proceeds by means o f a practical test o f the idea of 
reciprocity; in this way, we can examine cultural resources and can then reach authentic 
human rights that “a cultural tradition would claim for its own members and must 
therefore concede to members of other traditions if it is to expect reciprocal treatment 
from those others.”32
This principle in summary declares that, at the end of cross-cultural dialogue, “human 
rights are those that a person would claim for herself or himself and must therefore be 
conceded to all other human beings.”33
4.2.2 Methodology (II): Internal Discourse and Enlightened Interpretation
An-Na’im highlights the two-way dialogue to search for its justification. On the one hand, 
he encourages internal dialogue to establish enlightened interpretation of cultural norms by
1994), pp. 62-81.
30 There is a different way o f reformulating the Golden rule. For instance, Michael Ignatieff seeks to derive 
rights from the reality o f human suffering and justify a notion o f moral reciprocity: “that we posses the 
faculty o f  imagining the pain and degradation done to other human beings as if it were our own., is simply a
natural fact about us as a species Such a natural fact about human beings provides the grounds for an
entitlement to protection and right.” See Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, pp. 60-61.
31 PCL, p. 345.
32 WMU, p. 225.
33 PCL, p. 366.
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appealing to contemporary circumstances o f the society here and now. O n the other hand, 
once adequate cultural legitimacy o f human rights has been achieved within each culture, 
An-Na’im encourages cross-cultural dialogue so that people of different cultures exchange 
arguments on the justification, scope, and implementation of human rights. In the end, 
through both the process of internal dialogue to reach enlightened reinterpretations of 
cultural norms and the cross-cultural dialogue to exchange the meaning o f international 
human rights among cultures, the cultural legitimacy o f human rights will be enhanced in 
every culture.34
More specifically, in terms of the internal dialogue, the first step is that each person is to 
work from within his or her culture to bridge the gap between the present international 
human rights standards and the norms of the culture.35 That a particular interpretation of 
certain cultural norms may appear to be in fundamental conflict with existing international 
human rights standards does not mean that there is no way to articulate an alternative 
interpretation on which it may resolve the conflict.
For example, it is clear that many general Islamic tenets seem to emphasize the inherent 
dignity and integrity o f the human person, and to stress the equality of all human beings in 
the sight o f God. Simultaneously, there are many other specific texts establishing strict 
limitations on who is a human being, who is entitled to full dignity and integrity within the 
context of the Islamic society. Although there are prima-faciz incompatible views, if we 
assume that different cultures recognize the validity o f the notion of every human being’s 
inherent dignity, we should start an internal dialogue to establish enlightened 
interpretations of cultural norms by appealing to contemporary circumstances of the 
society.
Furthermore, as An-Na’im clearly points out, this enlightened interpretation is neither
34 Like Rawls, An-Na’im uses a method that illustrates the moral privilege o f the inter-cultural dialogical 
process over the cross-cultural dialogical process.
35 TCCA, p. 432.
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completely unrestrained nor does it occur in just any way. He does stress that we should 
follow the culturally approved norms and institutions o f that culture to trace the resources 
for enlightened interpretations, namely, the framework of interpretation.36 Otherwise, the 
interpretation will lose the coherence of a culture.
Moreover, while correctly grasping the framework o f interpretation, interpreters should 
explain what the cultural orientation is through which believers understand the religious 
doctrine in the current context, and then should reformulate and verify religious sources 
for the promotion of human rights. For An-Na’im, any interpretation should be premised 
upon a certain cultural orientation, which means “the conditioning of the existential or material 
circumstances of the person reading (or hearing) the Qur'an or another textual source.”37 Therefore, the 
task is to try to understand the orientation through which Muslims should understand the 
Qur'an in the modern context, and the orientation’s connection to the idea of human rights. 
An-Na’im puts it thus:
... there is not only one possible or valid understanding o f the Q ur’an, or conception o f  
Islam, since each is informed by individual or collective orientation o f Muslims as they 
address themselves to the Q ur’an with a view to deriving normative implications for 
human behavior. Consequently, a change in orientation o f Muslims will contribute to a 
transformation o f their understanding o f it, and hence o f their conception o f Islam 
itself.38
4.2.3 The Reality o f the Nation-state
An-Na’im tries to convince us that the cultural orientation, through which Muslims should 
understand the Qur'an in the modern context, is conducive to the active support of human 
rights principles. This conduciveness is because Muslims are living in a globally 
interdependent network. According to An-Na’im,
It is obvious that the orientation o f modern Muslims should be different from that o f  
earlier generations because o f the radical transformation o f the existential and material 
circumstances o f their life today in contrast to those o f  the past. For better or for worse,
Muslims now live in a globalized world o f political, economic and security inter-
36IHHR, p. 233.
37 Ibid.
38 IHHR, p. 233.
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dependence, and mutual social/cultural influence. Their conception o f Islam, and 
efforts to live by its percepts, must be conditioned by modern perceptions o f individual 
and collective self-interests in the context o f  this radically transformed world. Whatever 
vision Muslims may have for change or improvement in the present realities o f the 
world today must also be grounded in the circumstances and conditions o f this world. 
That is, their perceptions o f the range o f options available to them must take into 
account the facts o f  interdependence and mutual influence.39
But why must Muslims accept not only the idea of human rights but also the international 
human rights paradigm? An-Na’im argues that this acceptance should take root because the 
nation-state model is now a global reality and because the post-WWII human rights 
paradigm has presented itself as a vital component in protecting people against oppression 
by the nation state. For An-Na’im, there exists in the contemporary world a single structure 
that is spread across all cultures.40 This is the common structure of modernity, which has 
touched all societies, and the spread o f the idea o f human rights can be seen as the 
normative response to this social process. Accordingly, human rights are to be grounded 
not in metaphysical principles but in sociological facts, namely, the sociological fact of 
modernity. Herein, An-Na’im declares,
A particularly compelling concern in this regard.. .is the reality o f the state and its 
extensive power which profoundly affects every aspect o f  people’s private as well as 
public lives. Since those powers are supposed to be limited and regulated through a 
rights paradigm according to the European models o f  the post-colonial state in Africa, it 
follows that such paradigms should be applied to the independent African state as well.41
Seen in this light, An-Na’im’s theory is unlike Taylor’s, which places a greater focus on 
functionally equivalent practices than on functionally equivalent ideas'. An-Na’im argues that, 
given the concrete reality of the nation state, which is inescapably linked to the complex 
web of international relations, Muslims should recognize the nation-state model as the
39 TIHHR, p. 237.
40 Jack Donnelly also points out that the idea and the practice o f human rights are rooted in two specific 
changes o f modernity: the rise o f modern markets and modern states, and the rise o f political claims of 
equality and toleration. See Jack Donnelly, “The Social Construction o f International Human Rights,” in 
Dunne, Tim and Nicholas. J. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 71-102. See also J. Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights,” in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 24 (3) (1998), pp. 157-171.
41 See Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Introduction” in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed.) Cultural Transformation and Human 
Rights in Africa (Zed Books, 2002), p. 7.
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sociological fact o f modernity, and should realize their cultural orientation in this context.42 
If cultural orientation in the modern context should accept the human rights paradigm, 
then the problem lies in finding the resources to achieve Islamic legitimacy for the human 
rights, rather than in displaying full-on hostility toward them. So the internal-discourse 
approach would function to enhance supportive elements and to redress opposing 
elements so that the interpretation of human rights would be consistent with the integrity 
of Muslims’ cultural tradition. So long as such efforts are consistent with the fundamental 
faith o f Islam and Islamic authenticity, there is no reason to adopt norms and ideas that 
originated from other cultural traditions.43
Case Studies: Women and Non-Muslims:
All of the features of discrimination against Muslim women, discrimination against non- 
Muslims as well as the prohibition of torture in connection with hudud punishment are in 
ShariaH and have strongly influenced Muslim attitudes and policies even where Sharia is not 
the formal legal system.
According to conventional interpretation, the idea of moral reciprocity under Sharia applies 
neither to women nor to non-Muslims to the same extent as it applies to Muslim men. 
However, so long as Muslims hold these aspects of Sharia to be part o f Islamic tradition, 
we cannot expect any positive consequence for human rights in predominantly Muslim 
countries.45 In this regard, an interlocutor has to reinterpret the basic sources o f the Qurian 
and Sunna, in a way that would enable Muslims to remove the basis of discrimination 
against women and against non-Muslims from Sharia. An-Na’im points out,
...the only effective approach to achieve sufficient reform oi_Shari’a in relation to
42 However, his reasoning is somewhat ambivalent as to whether the search for a human-rights consensus in 
“An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue” approach is a common effort for humanity or just an international 
pressure.
43 PCL, p. 360.
44 TCCA, p. 35.
45 Ibid, p. 39.
universal human rights is to cite sources in the Qur'an and Sunna which are 
consistent and supportive o f  human rights as the basis o f the legally applicable 
principles and rules o f Islamic law today.46
For An-Na’im, any sacred source o f Islam has no meaning in the daily lives o f believers 
except through human understanding and behavior. Because the historical context o f the 
community and the personal experience of individual believers deeply influence human 
perception and behavior, it was inevitable that the views expressed in Shari’a would be 
contingent on the realities that existed in the Medina o f the seventh and eighth centuries, 
and would disregard some fundamental and eternal apocalyptic beliefs that existed in 
Mecca. Therefore, the view must emphasize certain texts in these original sources in a way 
that both conforms the interpretation to the historical circumstances and simultaneously 
de-emphasizes other texts. However, drastic changes in the cultural orientation regarding 
the modern conditions of individual and communal life should lead to a reconsideration 
of the meaning and the significance of divine messages. Accordingly, one must 
appreciate the differential impact of these factors on the cultural orientation of the 
Muslim community today. That is to say, if Sharia said something that related to the 
particular socioeconomic conditions of its time, then it might have to be formulated 
differently in today’s socioeconomic environment in order to meet its original intent. 
Specifically, if Sharia was justified in holding Muslim women and non-Muslims in a 
subordinate status because that was the norm  at that time, then modern Islamic law 
would not be so justified in keeping that position today and would find a different 
interpretation adapted to contemporary social and political circumstances.47 Therefore, 
certain aspects of Sharia should be seen as transitional, namely, having been the Islamic 
response to the concrete realities of life in the seventh- and eighth-century Muslim
46 CIN S, p. 228.
47 For a similar view, see Norani Otham, “Grounding Human Rights Arguments in Non-Western Culture: 
Shari’a and the Citizenship Rights o f Women in a Modern Islamic State,” in Joanne R. Bauer, and Daniel Bell 
(eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 169-192 
at 173-177.
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community in Medina, and Muslims can transform the meaning of Sharia according to 
modern times, provided that the transformation rests on the same fundamental sources 
of Islam48 (namely, the Q ur’an and Sunnd). In this regard, the internal pluralism of a 
tradition or a religion provides the context within which divergent religious communities 
can bring their first-order traditions o f belief and practice into dialogue with the norms of 
international human rights. For him, if we are to articulate human rights norms within 
cultural and religious doctrine, then we can expect to endorse a universal regime of 
human rights while affirming the values o f respect for religious integrity.
This internal dialogue can, An-Na’im argues, strengthen local commitment to values and 
practices that are embraced in the concept o f human rights. The dialogue can help cultural 
members to discover the content and the implications o f the inherent dignity of the 
human being within the cultural discourse in question. Also, one should avoid imposing 
external standards on cultural members. An-Na’im insists that one must specify human 
rights in terms that are internal to cultural orientation; otherwise, human rights would be 
rejected by societies that find them alien or in variance with the value system o f a people. 
Thus, the struggle to establish enlightened perceptions and interpretations o f cultural value 
should emphasize a society’s internal values rather than the society’s external ones. At this 
level o f dialogue, outsiders cannot settle the internal struggle but can support internal 
dissent, “provided they do so with sufficient sensitivity and due consideration for the 
legitimacy o f the objectives and methods o f the struggle within the framework of the 
particular culture.”49 Like Rawls, An-Na’im argues that the task will be counterproductive 
and unlikely to succeed in attaining change if the interpretation of human rights is an 
external imposition o f foreign values and moral standards.50 Insiders can understand the
48 For An-Na’im, the task o f interpretation should distinguish the chapters o f the Q ur’an revealed in Mecca 
from those revealed in Medina. He argues that the Mecca teachings are the universal message o f  Islam, but 
that the later Medina teachings reflect only the particular social and cultural circumstances o f the time.
49 TCCA, p. 37.
50 PCCL, p. 361.
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cultural meaning o f their own society’s practices, can express an idea in ways that are 
accessible to the insiders’ community, and possess undisputed standing for engaging in 
social criticism. In other words, reconciliation is available i f  and only i f  the proposed 
construction has to be valid and credible from the insider point o f view.51 
There is an interesting contrast here between Rawls’s overlapping consensus and An- 
N a’im’s approach. Like Rawls, An-Na’im clearly pays attention to the practical role that 
human rights norms play at the international level, and he starts his constructive 
approach from this premise. Moreover, it seems that An-Na’im shares with Rawls (i.e., 
the Rawls of The Taw of Peoples) the view that a major cause of human rights violations is 
both the lack of legitimacy o f international standards within the given political culture and 
the lack o f conformity between standards and cultural norms. Moreover, recall that in 
chapter two, Rawls argues that each citizen can accept “justice as fairness” as reasonable 
through a process o f “inserting it as a module into her own conception of the good.” 
Similarly, An-Na’im argues that Muslims can accept a human-rights principle from their 
own religious tradition, provided that it can be reformulated into their own religious 
reason. In this regard, An-Na’im clearly explicates this justificatory strategy which Rawls 
applauds and characterizes it as a “perfect example o f overlapping consensus”:52
The Q ur’an does not mention constitutionalism, but human rational thinking and 
experience have shown that constitutionalism is necessary for realizing the just and good 
society prescribed by the Q ur’an. An Islamic justification and support for constitutionalism 
is important and relevant for Muslims. Non-Muslims may have their own secular or other 
justifications. As long as all are agreed on the principle and specific rules o f  
constitutionalism, including complete equality and non-discrimination on grounds o f
51 This parallels Michael Walzer’s concept o f connected critics, who try to hermeneutically reformulate their 
traditions in the direction o f human rights while maintaining their integrity. See Michael Walzer, Interpretation 
and Social Criticism (Harvard University Press, 1989).
52 See TIPRR, p. 151. It should be noted that An-Na’im never claims that his approach is similar to Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus, but in two edited volumes, “Human Rights in Africa: Cross-cultural Perspective?’ (1990) and 
“Human Rights in Cross-cultural Perspectives: A  Quest for Consensui’(1992), he indeed mentioned that “the idea 
[overlapping consensus] is applied to the justification o f  universal human rights in different cultures by 
several authors from different perspectives.” Moreover, in “The Cultural Mediation o f  Human Rights: The 
Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia,” An-Na’im states, “In view o f  the inescapable local and cultural context o f  the 
practical protection o f  human rights, such an approach to developing and sustaining an overlapping 
consensus on a human set o f social values as the basis o f agreement on a conception and content o f human 
rights is the only way to achieve universality.” See An-Na’im, “The Cultural Mediation o f  Human Rights: The 
Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia,” in Bauer, Joanne R. and Daniel Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 147-168.
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gender or religion, each may have his or her own reasons for coming to that agreement.53
Moreover, let us recall that Rawls does not specify any right against (hscrimination by 
governments, because there is no shared idea o f a person as free and equal in the global 
public political culture, and a decent hierarchical society’s conception o f the person does 
not entail ideas similar to the liberal idea that persons have equal basic rights.54 Thus, if The 
Taw of Peoples included principles for respecting persons as free and equal citizens, then 
decent peoples would certainly not accept the principles. However, An-Na’im expects that, 
after Muslims reinterpret the Sharia, they can endorse the idea o f equal treatment before 
the law in a way that privileges neither men nor Muslims. Thus, it is interesting to see that 
An-Na’im endorses the notion of equal treatment before the law and substantially refutes 
Rawls’s argument that something like Kazanistan is the best we can hope for.55 
Correspondingly, starting from a non-liberal society in Rawls’s sense, there is no distinction 
between public political culture and background culture in An-Na’im’s approach. Any kind 
of dialogical consensus requires the engagement of comprehensive doctrines, and any 
consensus would no longer be a freestanding view. An-Na’im comments on this point:
It is not possible, or desirable, in my view to identify a set o f  neutrally formulated 
human rights. Any normative regime, which justifies a set o f  rights and provides or 
informs their content, must necessarily represent a commitment to a specific value 
system.56
In other words, any consensus on a list o f human rights cannot be freestanding because the 
content o f the list’s items depends entirely on what all cultures can live with. In spite of 
accepting human rights as rights that are due to all human beings by virtue of their 
inherent dignity and integrity, and are independent of any specific tradition; however, in the 
end, An-Na’im suggests that it is neither possible nor desirable to justify human rights in a
53 POL, p. 100.
54 LPb, p. 66.
55 LPb, p. 78.
56 PCCL, p. 360.
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“neutral” way or through a freestanding view, as Rawls envisions. By contextualizing human 
rights principles within a more complex metaphysical and religious framework, the idea of 
human rights is believed to be unavoidably sectarian.57
4.2.4 Methodology (III): Cross-cultural Dialogue
In terms o f cross-cultural dialogue, once peoples establish adequate cultural legitimacy for 
human rights standards within each tradition, the legitimacy encourages cross-cultural 
dialogue where peoples exchange insights and strategies of internal discourse. In other 
words, different cultures and religious traditions must undertake a similar process of 
enlightened construction to resolve the conflicts between their respective culture and 
universal human rights, and must sincerely appreciate and understand different 
justifications and interpretations o f human rights. This practice should take place with 
mutual respect and with the understanding that all cultures have something to learn from 
others. Any interlocutor must both recognize that any normative tradition is not 
hermetically sealed from another and appreciate different or incompatible interpretations. 
Thus, in the dialogical process, interlocutors should both argue their position and open 
their perspectives regarding normative traditions to possible change. Although the 
consensus is difficult to achieve, interlocutors should keep listening until they have reached 
a sufficient level of basic sympathetic understandings. The aim of this level o f dialogue, 
therefore, is to enhance mutual understanding and appreciation, not to reach the same 
justification. Interlocutors should reexamine their own terms in light o f the perspectives 
produced by interlocutors of other cultures, and should recognize the limits and the biases 
o f their own assumptions.
57 In terms o f this sectarian approach o f human rights, see— among others— Michael Perry, The idea of 
Human Tights: Four Inquiries (Oxford University Press, 1998); and Max Stackhouse, Creeds, Society and Human 
Rights: A. study in Three Cultures (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984).
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Case Study: Criminal Justice
As was stated above, An-Na’im warns us that disagreement regarding the justification 
might translate into disagreement regarding the form, the content, and the implementation 
of human rights. Even if people within respective cultures accept the idea o f the inherent 
dignity of human being and the idea of human rights, whether there is a global consensus 
on human rights remains an open question. For instance, people would accept the right to 
be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, as articulated by 
Article 5 of the UDHR; however, they may propose a completely different interpretation 
of this human right. For instance, it is still controversial as to whether or not corporal 
punishment and the death penalty are cruel forms o f punishment. In this regard, there is 
still disagreement on the question of how to identify common criteria by which these 
sanctions can be said to violate human rights.
Specifically, in the context of Muslim society, most Western human rights activists charge 
that the lawful sanction of Hudud punishments (e.g., the practice of amputation o f the right 
hand for theft) constitutes torture or ill-treatment according to Article 5. This charge 
reflects some Western secular interpretations of human rights that rest on a particular 
conception of the person and society (e.g., the separation between Church and State) and 
that insists on the public domain’s disregard o f religious law. This secular interpretation 
may even argue that the Hudud punishments are indicative o f the comprehensive 
backwardness of Islamic societies. However, for An-Na’im, it is always much easier to 
discuss others’ blind spots and wrongdoings than our own. But we need to think more 
carefully before we conceive the injustice o f non-Western cultural practices. For An-Na’im, 
religious belief is a rational argument for all Muslims in the public domain, and it is not 
possible for Muslims to claim that these punishments could constitute torture or ill- 
treatment, even though they may seem so from a secular point o f view. From the point of 
view o f a Muslim, humans should neither question the appropriateness attributable to a
God-decreed punishment, nor reconcile themselves to such questioning through internal or
cross-cultural dialogue. In this regard, An-Na’im states,
From the religious point o f view, human life does not end at death, but extends beyond 
that to the next life. In fact, religious sources strongly emphasize that the next life is the 
true and ultimate reality, to which this life is merely a prelude. In the next eternal life, 
every human being will stand judgment and suffer the consequences o f his or her 
actions in this life. A religiously sanctioned punishment, however, will absolve an 
offender from punishment in the next life because God does not punish twice for the 
same offense. Accordingly, a thief who suffers the religiously sanctioned punishment o f  
amputation o f the right hand in this life will not be liable to the much harsher 
punishment in the next life. To people who hold this belief, however severe the Q ur’anic 
punishment may appear to be, it is in fact extremely lenient and merciful in comparison 
to what the offender will suffer in the next life should the religious punishment not be 
enforced in this life.58
Here is an obvious example in which disagreements at the level of justification would 
translate into disagreements regarding the meanings o f human rights. Therefore, neither 
Islamic reinterpretations nor external pressures are likely to lead to the abolition of these 
punishments as a matter o f Islamic law. The only possible claim to make is that, by learning 
from other traditions (e.g., Jewish tradition) during the process of cross-cultural dialogue, 
Muslims might limit the application of Hudud punishments by emphasizing strict 
procedural safeguards, and by restricting the application o f these religious punishments to 
Muslim offenders.59
In this regard, it appears that An-Na’im’s “cross-cultural dialogue” approach can be 
recognized as a middle-ground discourse that neither rests content with a pragmatic 
consensus o f human rights norms, nor makes futile attempts to reach consensus on an 
underlying justification. On the one hand, An-Na’im accepts the plural-foundations thesis, 
namely, agreement on the list of international human rights norms but disagreement on its 
justification, but he warns us that it is a shaky foundation if we eschew any discussion 
regarding the norm s’ underlying justification because the disagreement on the underlying 
justification may likely translate into disagreements on the form and the content o f human 
rights. On the other hand, he never attempts to search for a consensus on the underlying
58 TCCA, p. 35.
59 Ibid., p. 34.
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justification o f human rights. Rather, An-Na’im argues that a consensus regarding the 
justification of human rights is possible only in a global process o f cross-cultural dialogue 
that promotes the universal legitimacy of human rights. Interlocutors should sensitively 
appreciate and respect the divergent interpretations of human rights within different 
cultures by appreciating and respecting the interpretations’ underlying justifications, and 
should avoid forcing their own standards onto other cultures. In an Islamic society, human 
rights norms need Islamic legitimacy by appealing to Islamic texts and principles of 
interpretation; in a Confucian society, the norms need Confucian legitimacy; and in Catholic 
society, the norms need Catholic legitimacy; and so on.
In a nutshell, his method is one both for improving the cultural legitimacy o f human rights 
and a method for broadening and deepening universal consensus on the formulation and 
public implementation of those rights.60 In the end, the justification and rationale of 
human rights should be the product of internal and cross-cultural dialogue.
4.3 Critique
Through internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue inspired by A n-Na’im ’s reformed 
methodology, it is acceptable for divergent traditions to justify human rights in their own 
terms and perspectives, and it is shown that the Western way of justification is but one of 
many possibilities. Furthermore, the methodology can also obtain widespread support for 
human rights from divergent cultures by means o f intercultural dialogue. Such dialogue 
shows not only that human rights principles reshape cultural norms and practices, but also 
that cultural norms and practices reshape the meaning and practice of human rights. 
However, An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue for the universal validity of human rights 
generates some conceptual tensions that should be addressed, and the exclusion of his 
dialogical form makes sincere inter- and cross-cultural dialogue hardly achievable. In what
60 HRIC, p. 432.
159
follows, I will take up the critique o f his approach and argue how the conceptual tensions 
raise difficulties for A n-Na’im’s approach to human rights.
Before proceeding, we should know that it is an empirical question as to whether or not the 
greatest obstacles to the enforcement of human rights are due to a lack of cultural 
legitimacy, because we often find representatives o f different cultures adopting the same 
apology for human rights violations; moreover, we can find similar material or social causes 
for those violations in very different societies. However, I will leave this empirical question 
aside for the moment, and focus my critique on the method and justification o f An-Na’im’s 
“cross-cultural dialogue” approach. My critique starts from his methodology because, while 
relating to the issues surrounding the interpretation and the application of human rights 
principles, we need to take into account how different cultures confront the question of 
“how these cultures and circumstances are themselves to be interpreted, and by whom.”61 
Therefore, my critique will focus on the questions regarding the forms, the procedures, and 
the outcomes of cross-cultural dialogue, especially the method o f interpretation (how) and 
the qualification o f the interpreter (who).
4.3.1 W hat Culture, W hose Authenticity?
Clearly, the foremost task of the “cross-cultural dialogue” perspective is (1) to reinterpret 
the sacred texts and doctrines in a way that achieves the goal o f an “enlightened 
construction” within Islamic authenticity, and (2) to point out the reconciliation between 
those enlightened interpretations and the international human rights standards.
However, what is “authentic” in a culture? An-Na’im points out that, given a complex and 
changing culture, no individual and no social group can be an authoritative spokesperson 
for the culture. Although there is the real danger that people might misuse human rights by 
selectively applying them as, for example, an instrument for ethnocentrism, people can use
61 Michael Freeman, “The Problem o f Secularism in Human Rights Theory,” p. 46.
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culture to defend or rationalize oppression. Accordingly, in order to put culture at the 
center o f inquiries, “we need to ask whose culture is being evoked, what the status o f the 
interpreter is, in whose name the argument is advanced, and who the primary beneficiaries 
o f the invocation o f culture are.”62
Recall the internal and cross-cultural dialogue that An-Na’im proposes with respect to the 
universality of human rights: the dialogue proceeds by means of the practical test o f  “the 
idea o f reciprocity.” The dialogue assumes that justifications of specific normative claims 
must be reciprocally non-rejectable. It requires people not only to adopt a standpoint of 
impartiality toward all particular experiences, but also to assent only to those principles and 
judgments that are consistent with that impartial standpoint. Moreover, sincere cultural 
dialogue based on the idea o f reciprocity is possible only if the participants interact under 
conditions that they can accept as fair. They must eschew any coercion and manipulation, 
and they must trust that the dialogue itself will be fair and open-minded. Furthermore, 
during the dialogical process, no one can exercise power over another, regardless of 
whether the power comes in the form o f physical coercion, economic threats, or cultural 
violence that may effectively silence one’s voice.63 Therefore, people cannot ignore the role 
of power while trying to justify human rights.
In this regard, it seems that An-Na’im overlooks the political and social context of 
interpretation. The debate about cultural authenticity takes place at the level o f texts and
62 Hilary Charlesworth, “Martha Nussbaum’s Feminist Internationalism,” in Ethics, Vol 111(2000), pp. 64 —78 
at 68.
63 For instance, in Iris Young’s communicative model o f  democracy, citizens try to understand through a 
more broadly defined process o f  communication, a process that includes greeting, rhetoric, storytelling as 
well as rational arguments. By incorporating greeting, rhetoric and storytelling into her account o f  political 
communication, she aims to eliminate the cultural and gender biases implicit in deliberative norms o f speech. 
She also aims to eliminate the requirement that citizens reason with each other in a way that abstracts from 
the differences in their social positions. See Iris Young, “Communication and the other: Beyond Deliberative 
Democracy,” in Seyla Benhabib(ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Bounds of the Political^.]. Princeton 
University Press, 1996), pp.120-136; Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), Ch 3; “Activist 
Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” in Political Theory 29(5)(2001), pp.670-690; Lynn Sanders, Against 
Deliberation, in Political Theory 25(3)(1997), pp.347-76; and Cheryl Hall, “Recognizing the Passion in 
Deliberation: Toward a More Democratic Theory o f Deliberative Democracy,” in Hypatia 22(4)(2007), pp.81- 
95.
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interpretations, but it is also about the distribution o f political and cultural power.64 
Whether human rights are seen as rights or can become rights is important in the evolution 
attributable to the social practices that support “the discoursed ascendancy of those 
values.”65 Such practices are intrinsically related to power and authority. In other words, it is 
crucial to know that developing a way o f adjudicating human rights norms will always be a. 
struggle for power. Xu offers several pertinent remarks on this subject:
Discourse has/is power. And discourse takes place in the context o f  complex 
interplay between group interests and public interests, between social groups and the 
state, and between the government and foreign powers, all underpinned by varying 
power relations among them and relative power resources available to them under 
particular historical circumstances. Power can be political, economic, military, cultural, 
or a combination thereof. Discourse interacts with such power relations and power 
resources by way o f reinforcing or co-opting or resisting them.66
In this regard, cross-cultural dialogue proceeding by means of the practical test o f  “the 
idea of reciprocity” is not operating in a power vacuum, and discussants accept arguments 
not simply by reason o f “the force o f the better argument,” but also by reason o f the force 
with which one argues. Whether or not the discourse of human rights gains acceptance in 
Muslim cultures hinges on whether or not Muslim cultures and other cultures interact with 
one another. When An-Na’im attempts to determine the criteria that Muslims may or may 
not accept into the discourse of human rights, An-Na’im cannot reasonably hope to do so 
by simply trying to identify the frameworks o f either interpretations or cultural orientations 
that apparently underlie cultural perceptions. Rather, the ongoing practices o f the existing 
discourse determine the criteria, and the criteria can do so by obtaining a consensus in the 
process of political struggle. In other words, the success of a liberal interpretation of 
Islamic tradition, as An-Na’im would have us believe, depends mainly on whether or not 
that interpretation would obtain support in the process o f political struggle. In a sense, it
64 See Ken Booth, “Human Wrongs and International Relations,” in International Affairs, Vol 71 (1995), pp. 
103-126 at 114.
65 Michael Freeman, “Universal Rights and Particular Cultures,” in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (eds) 
Human rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia  (Surrey: Curzon, 
2000), pp. 43-58.
Xiaoqun Xu, “Human Rights and the Discourse on Universality: A Chinese Historical Perspective,” in 
Lynda Bell, Andrew Nathan, and Ilan Peleg (eds) Negotiating Culture and Human Rights (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), pp. 217-241 at 232.
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would be economic and political factors (rather than cultural factors) that have much to do 
with the determination of Sharia. Put in another way, the conflict between human rights 
and Islam is political rather than scriptural.67
An-Na’im clearly understood the fact o f power struggle herein and realized that Islamic 
elites have mobilized a conservative reading o f the Q ur’an for political purposes. He states,
...dominant groups or classes within a society normally maintained perceptions and 
interpretations o f cultural values and norms that are supportive o f their own interests, 
proclaiming them to be the only valid view o f  that culture, thus there is an internal 
struggle for control over the cultural sources and symbols o f power within that society.68 
However, apart from stressing that outsiders should not settle this internal struggle,69 An-
N a’im did not analyze “how” this internal struggle happens and “who” resolves it.70 It may
be easy to leave the right of definition to those who are in power, and the interpretation is
easily open to abuse by power elites71.
4.3.2 Cultural Authenticity and The Right to Claim O ne’s Right
The second point of criticism refers to the distinction that An-Na’im made between 
internal discourse and external influences. An-Na’im insists that discussants should hear 
only insiders’ voices during internal cultural discourse. No doubt, it is true that the greater 
the degree of the contributor’s sensitivity to the internal logic and frame of reference of a 
culture, the greater the efficacy of the contributor’s participation in a dialogue. However, 
the distinction between internal and external dialogue is more difficult to sustain when we 
recognize the possibility of disagreement within as well as among moral communities.
67 Michael Freeman, “The Problem o f Secularism in Human Rights Theory,” p. 380.
68 TCCA, p. 36.
69 Ibid, p. 36.
70 Moreover, it is clear that the socio-political contexts o f Sharia implementation are various among different 
Islamic countries. However, like Rawls, it seems that An-Na’im conflates the concept o f culture with that o f  
state. From An-Na’im’s approach, under the simplistic umbrella o f  scriptural imperatives, Hudud punishment 
is essential to Sharia, and Sharia is represented as essential to every country where the majority perceives itself 
as Muslim, regardless o f  whether or not the country in question is an Islamic state.
71 That is the problem o f what Uma Narayan called “ selective labeling,” which “allows changes approved by 
socially dominant groups to appear consonant with the preservation o f  essential values or core practices o f a 
culture, while depicting changes that challenge the status quo as threats to that culture.” See Uma Narayan, 
“Undoing the Tacking Picture’ o f Culture,” in Sign: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (25)(2000), pp: 1083- 
1086. See also Zehra. Fabasakl Arat, “Forging A Global Culture o f Human Rights: Origins and Prospects o f  
the International Bill o f  Rights”, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 28(2006), pp 416- 437.
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The main argument with which An-Na’im opposes external criticism is that it will be 
perceived as cultural imperialism and will thus be fruitless. Because many past interventions 
that have invoked the name of human rights protection have been insulting and even 
disastrous, An-Na’im righdy argues that we should defend human rights discourse against 
charges of imperialism because the charge threatens the very soul of the enterprise. 
However, the distinction between insider and outsider, which in a way derives merely from 
the ideals o f cultural authenticity and cultural legitimacy, is too obscure and dangerous, 
because insiders who raise the same argument may well be attacked as heretics or be 
perceived as agents of an alien culture, as he himself has experienced.72 Hence, again, the 
distinction between internal and external dialogue in this way is open to abuse by 
established elites. The powerful elites could easily define the culture according to their 
understanding and suppress the cultural change (that A n-Na’im hopes to foster) by 
proclaiming that all dissenters cannot be part o f the culture and that they, therefore, cannot 
validly contribute to internal reform with undisputed standing.
Moreover, according to An-Na’im’s cultural-legitimacy project, the reconciliation between 
human rights and Islam cannot be acceptable to Muslims if the interpretations do not 
satisfy Islamic religious criteria. Any sacred source of Islam has no meaning in the daily 
lives o f believers except through human understanding and behavior here and now. This 
proposition means that no claim o f cultural authenticity can be justified if it fails to 
correspond to the current cultural orientation and is not shared by the majority o f the 
cultural members.
As stated in chapter two, however, the claim of cultural authenticity is premised upon the 
criterion of internal acceptance: namely, the members o f the society must consider the
72 An-Na’im mentioned that he was denounced as a heretic in Mauritius when he advocated “that the 
formulation o f Sharia should not be enacted by the state since Sharia discriminates against women,” and was 
named a persona non grata, since he was alleged to be an agent o f  American imperialism owing to his research 
project’s receipt o f  the Ford Foundation’s support. See An-Na’im, “Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the 
Universality Debate,” in Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International haw, 2000, p. 
100.
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present communal practices to be appropriate expressions o f the members’ own 
convictions. Accordingly, the argument for external respect presupposes internal 
acceptance.73 The more strongly a culture gains internal cultural coherence, the stronger the 
culture’s claim to external respect if it is unforced. Given that the claim o f cultural 
authenticity depends on the internal acceptance o f cultural members, it follows that most 
people who call into question the claim to cultural authenticity are not outsiders; rather, 
most o f these critics are insiders: members o f the culture.74 In other words, whenever there 
is a conflict of interpretation that occurs within the culture and that challenges the claim of 
cultural authenticity, the dissent and the confrontation are always the immanent critique from 
within the culture. Accordingly, the dissenters can be “authentic insiders.” Uma Narayan 
comments on this matter:
We arouse nervousness and resistance because we hold up to the culture the shame of  
what its traditions and cultural practices have so often done to its women, the deaths, the 
brutalities, and the more mundane and quotidian sufferings o f  women within “our”
culture, that “our” culture is complicit with We all need to recognize that critical
postures do not necessarily render one an “outsider” to what one criticizes, and that it is 
often precisely one’s status as one “inside” the culture one criticizes, and deeply affected by 
it, that gives one’s criticisms their motivation and urgency. We need to move away from a 
picture o f cultural contexts as sealed rooms, with a homogenous space “inside” them, 
inhabited by “authentic insiders.”75
Seen in this light, we can say that, the claim to human rights is a kind o f claim usually made 
in the context o f social conflicts in which a justification o f cultural authenticity is being 
called for. Whenever there is dissent and conflict that is internal to a culture, it is the actual 
context in which the claim to human rights may arise. It means that the claim to human 
rights is one way o f reconciliation in which the culture can regain internal acceptance and 
legitimacy.76 Every claim of cultural authenticity must take this kind o f dissent into account, 
and should ask whether or which specific rights can be justified in a particular way.
73 • >Rainer Forst, “The Basic Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception o f Human Rights,” p. 
38.
74 Ibid., p. 39.
75 Uma Narayan, “Contesting Culture: Westernization, Respect for Cultures, and Third-World Feminists,” in 
Linda Nicholson (ed), The Second Wave: A. Reader in Feminist Theory (NY: Taylor & Francis, Inc, 1997), pp. 396- 
414 at 401.
76 Forst, “The Basic Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception o f Human Rights,” p. 39.
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Moreover, since cultural authenticity depends on internal acceptance’s proceeding by means 
o f the test o f reciprocity, it means that all claims for concrete human rights during internal 
discourse are premised upon the basic right: “the right to claim one’s right.”77 That is, 
during dialogical processes, we must presuppose the communicative freedom of our 
dialogical partner to claim his or her rights, and to accept or oppose our claims. The right 
to claim one’s rights, thus, makes normative justification possible. It is not a specific, 
established and recognized right, but the foundation o f the justification o f concrete 
rights.78 Therefore, any claim o f human rights arises not in the context o f shared 
understandings about cultural orientations, but in the context o f dissent. Only in this way 
can we do justice to the idea o f human rights as a tool of social criticism. Because many of 
the people who make human-rights claims are serious dissenters within their own cultures, 
these claims constitute an immanent critique; and also, therefore, the practices o f human 
rights—within and across cultures— merit consideration neither solely in terms of the 
distinction between insider and outsider, nor in terms of whether the claims fit within the 
framework of interpretation, but in terms of the struggles and situations o f conflict in 
which human rights claims are raised.
Thus, the ideal of the cultural-dialogue approach must account for the internal-discourse 
process that enables cultural members to challenge the dominant discourse. W hen the 
dialogue proceeds by means o f the test o f the idea o f reciprocity, the insider-outsider 
distinction would hinder internal diversity and exclude many voices from public life.
77 Judith Shklar, “Positive Liberty, Negative Liberty in the United States,” in Stanley Hoffmann and Dennis F. 
Thompson (eds) Redeeming American Political Thought (University o f  Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 111-126.
78 Rainer Forst proposes “the right to justification,” which is similar to my argument here, and I was 
persuaded by his instructive argument. However, in the next chapter, I will construct a fear-based scheme o f  
human rights that draws much o f its substance from Judith Shklar’s ideas in which the nature and the 
rationale o f human rights differ from the corresponding ideas in Forst’s scheme. See Rainer Forst, “The Basic 
Right to Justification: Towards a Constructivist Conception o f Human Rights,” pp. 35-60. Similarily, inspired 
by Hannah Arendt, Seyla Benhabib defends the view that there is one fundamental moral right: the right to 
have rights, which is the enabling condition o f  exercise o f communicative freedom. See Seyla Benhabib, 
“Another Universalism: On the Unity and Diversity o f Human Rights,” the Presidential Address at the 130th 
meeting o f the American Philosophical Association, 2006, pp.1-43.
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4.3.3 The Inadequacy o f the Dialogical Premise
While An-Nai’m suggests that we should follow the framework of interpretation to secure 
cultural authenticity and stability, the cultural orientation that interlocutors already share 
bounds the scope o f criticism. But as Iris Young clearly indicates, the effort to shape 
arguments according to shared premises within a shared discursive framework would 
exclude the expression of disadvantaged persons’ needs, because interlocutors cannot easily 
hear disadvantaged persons’ voices. As we know, there are many invisible human rights 
violations. They may be invisible mainly owing to their cultural context, which treats these 
norms as culturally important or appropriate. These norms often make some people 
aberrant. And the norm-induced disadvantages from which they suffer affect their lives 
deeply and frequendy. Moreover, the assumptions undertaken by many institutional rules 
and social practices tend to enforce these norms in a way that harms some people 
unluckily.79 For instance, some people fail to fit within cultural norms simply because o f 
“their bodily capacities, group-specific socialized habits and comportments, or way of 
life.”80 In this regard, those cultural norms indeed make most disadvantaged persons more 
vulnerable than others. The chief origin of this unjust treatment is neither particular 
individuals’ prepossession nor public policies’ explicit exclusion o f disadvantaged persons 
from privileged spaces. Rather, the chief origin comprises the “widespread but relatively 
unnoticed assumptions embedded in institutional rules, the material infrastructure o f social 
action, and everyday habits of comportment.”81 In this regard, unfairly marginalized people 
are victims of individual actions and of structural injustice. Young states,
79 Iris Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social-connection Model,” in Social Philosophy and Policy, 
23(2006), pp. 102-130 at 95.
80 See Iris Young, “Taking the Basic Structure Seriously,” in Perspectives on Politics (4)(2006), pp.91-97
g  J
Ibid.,96. For instance, racism usually consists in structural processes that “normalize body aesthetic, 
determine that physical, dirty or servile work is most appropriate for members o f certain groups, produces 
and reproduces segregation o f members o f these racialized groups, and renders deviant the comportments 
and habits o f these segregated persons in relation to dominant norms o f respectability.” See Iris Young, 
“Structural Injustice and the Politics o f Difference,” in Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen(eds), 
Multiculturalism and Political Theoty(Oxioid University Press, 2007), p 67
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Structural injustice exists when social processes put large categories o f persons under a 
systematic threat o f domination or deprivation o f the means to develop and exercise 
their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a 
wide range o f opportunities for developing and exercising capacities.82
Therefore, it should be noted that society cannot undo unfair treatment without paying 
more attention to structural process. Thus, we should examine “hegemonic discourses, 
relations of power, and the distribution of benefits which assume a particular and 
restricted set of ruling norms,” even though cultural members would usually represent 
them as impartial. Accordingly, people who aim to redress human-rights violations should 
notice the structural process of “normalization” 84 before undertaking the redress. To 
correct human-rights violations, we need to expose structural social processes “which 
differently position people along social axes that generate status, power and opportunity for 
the development o f capacities or the acquisition o f goods.”85
A society that seeks cultural authenticity and stability and that relies largely on the 
framework of interpretation will perhaps unintentionally privilege mainstream perspectives 
and unintentionally ignore people who perceive themselves victims of structural injustice. 
Human-rights violations may be invisible to cultural members, especially to people who 
possess certain forms o f privilege here and now. Furthermore, if we treat shared
82See Iris Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social-connection Model,” p. 83. Seen in this light, 
race, class, sexuality and other categories can be seen as one such structure, and thinking o f race and gender 
as social structures is conducive to explain the operation and reproduction o f structural injustice. Fleshing 
out the idea o f gender as a social structure, for instance, Young argued that there are three axes o f  gender 
structures: a sexual division o f labor, normative heterosexuality, and gender hierarchical o f powers. See Iris 
Young, “Lived body vs. Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity,” in Iris Young, On Female 
Body Experience: Throwing like a Girl and Other Essays(Ox{otd University Press), pp. 12-27
83 Iris Young, “Ruling Norms and the Politics o f Difference: A Comment on Seyla Benhabib,” in The Yale 
Journal of Criticism, Vol 12 (1999), pp. 415-421.
84 For Young, normalization “consists in a set o f social processes that elevate the experience and capacities o f  
some social segments into standards used to judge everyone.” See Young, “Taking Basic Structure Seriously,” 
p.95.85Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,” p. 83; “Taking the Basic Structure 
Seriously,” pp. 94-96. For Young, there are at least two versions o f a politics o f difference, which she calls a 
politics o f cultural difference and a politics o f positional differences, and she claims that her theory belongs 
to the latter version. The aim o f a political o f positional difference is to notice existing “relations and 
processes o f exploitation, marginalization and normalization that keep many people in subordinate position.” 
In terms o f the distinction between the politics o f  cultural difference and her politics o f  positional difference, 
see Iris Young, “Structural Injustice and the Politics o f  Difference,” in Anthony Simon Laden and David 
Owen(eds), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Ox ford University Press, 2007), pp.60-89
168
understandings as the dialogical premise, we could unwittingly dismiss structural injustice 
that is the cause o f human-rights violations and unwittingly make the violations invisible 
through habituation and normalization in people’s daily practices of cultural life. Therefore, 
to expose human-rights violations, we need to make marginalized people and a 
marginalized structure visible, and to allow the invisible voices to be heard directly.86 We 
need to make ourselves attentive to the marginalized and to the patterns of exclusion and 
oppression within the culture in question.87 Seen in this light, deprivation and domination,88 
not shared understandings, should be the focus of attention in a sincere human rights 
dialogue.89 The main function o f the internal dialogue is not to search for consensus, but 
“is to expose and examine how the rules, relations, and their material consequences 
produce privileges for some people, and .. .limit the option of the other.”90 In other words, 
when we evaluate cultures, we should carefully attend to the heterogeneous interpretations 
within societies. We should pay attention to forms and processes o f exploitation and 
normalization that result in many people who consequently occupy inferior positions. 
When An-Na’im suggests that the scope o f criticism is bounded by the cultural orientation 
that interlocutors already share, structural causes o f resistance are invisible to his reformed 
methodology.
4.3.4 The Exclusion o f the Epistemological Assumption
As I stated, the claim for cultural authenticity depends on the plausibility that members of
86 Iris Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 50.
87 For instance, Indian Feminist Uma Narayan describes a traditional upbringing in which her mother told her 
never to question adult male authority and always to follow norms o f  female submissiveness, silence, and 
innocence. But she responds to her mother by declaring that “the shape your ‘silence’ took...is in part what 
has incited me to speech.” See Uma Narayan, “Contesting Culture: Westernization, Respect for Cultures, and 
Third-World Feminists,” p. 7.
gg
Iris Young sets out a challenge to the discussion o f justice as influenced by current theories o f  distributive 
justice, and argues that we should be attuned to forms o f  oppression. She identifies five faces o f  oppression: 
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, systematic violence, and cultural imperialism. See Iris Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990). Ch. 2.
89 Ibid, p. 258.
90 Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model”, p. 84.
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a culture willingly— not unwillingly— support the culture. There is an internal criterion of 
acceptance built into this defense o f cultural authenticity, and all cultural claims should be 
premised on “the right to claim one’s right.” Within such a culture, while a claim for 
cultural authenticity arises, cultural members cannot justify a particular form of cultural 
authenticity except by persuasion and argumentation in that context. Because cross-cultural 
dialogue is not a task for a single person within a single culture, the dialogue requires 
different kinds o f knowledge and, indeed, different kinds o f knowledge-creation processes. 
The dialogue requires a production o f knowledge that “must be collective, interactive, 
inter-subjective and networked.”91 Each cultural context should encourage its members to 
try to identify cultural components that the culture should preserve and those components 
that merit challenges. Cultural members must open up these questions to public 
deliberation and debate. An-Na’im’s suggestion that culturally savvy people should 
reinterpret Islamic tenets undoubtedly privileges the knowledge claims o f the religious 
elites and cannot satisfactorily reflect the people’s thoughts and actions. An-Na’im argues 
that the non-Western delegates who participated in the formulation and adoption of 
international human rights cannot be a genuine representation of popular perceptions and 
attitudes;92 I think that religious elites’ task o f reinterpreting Islamic tenets is insufficient. 
In this regard, the “cross-cultural dialogue” approach can adequately express neither 
dynamic cultural changes nor a genuine consensus o f the people here and now.
Furthermore, we cannot assume that a culture has met its aim o f cultural respect unless we 
have reliable knowledge concerning the character o f that culture, and “we cannot have 
reliable knowledge of cultures unless the voice o f the people is clearly heard.”93 Seen in this 
light, if cross-cultural dialogue requires a process o f knowledge creation that goes beyond 
the apocalyptic beliefs of religious elites, then we must try to identify who participates in
91 Michael Freeman, “Universal Rights and Particular Cultures,” p. 49.
92 BU, p. 428.
93 Freeman, “Universal Rights and Particular Cultures,” p. 49.
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this process and who speaks for the Islamic people, especially when a disagreement exists 
between a culture and an individual who has grown up in it. For me, because one cannot 
reach sincere dialogue until one truly understands the opinions o f the people, it is 
necessary that intercultural understandings develop through actual dialogical encounters, 
not through cultural interpretations by religious elites. Thus, a better “cross-cultural 
dialogue” approach consists in listening attentively to the voice of the people. Because it is 
difficult to avoid the religious elite’s prior prejudices, which would fundamentally close off 
any genuine dialogue,94 dialogical understanding demands that members o f different 
cultures actively engage each other in real dialogue. Even though elites’ enlightened 
interpretations o f religious texts aim at improving the conditions o f the least advantaged 
groups in society, a focus exclusively on these interpretations would necessarily exclude 
many unattainable insights regarding other important interpretations o f human-rights 
violations. Hence, a rigorous cross-cultural approach to human rights requires that the 
interpretations o f a culture stem not exclusively from elites but from the people themselves. 
In this regard, if the aim of An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue is to reach a reconciliation 
only with religious elites’ interpretation of a culture, then An-Na’im’s focus concerns not 
the influence that cultural context should have on human rights justification, but on a 
methodology that best facilitates the search for a Muslim society’s best possible acceptance 
o f international human rights law. In the end, his dialogue perspective does not involve a 
true cross-cultural exchange and, in fact, promotes a uni-directional approach to intellectual 
efforts rather than a multi-directional approach that might establish common ground.
94 Young amplifies a case: an opinion poll in Oregon shows that able-bodied people felt that being disabled 
was worse than death. But it is clear that disabled people would not agree, because able-bodied people 
imaginatively project their own prior prejudices about the disabled onto the disabled. See Iris Young, 




For the purpose of enhancing the cultural legitimacy of human rights, An-Na’im’s “cross- 
cultural dialogue” seeks to demonstrate that through internal cultural reconciliation and 
cross-cultural dialogue, we can find common ground on which to support human rights 
that are embodied in international human rights treaties and laws. However, if my 
interpretation is sound, An-Na’im’s cross-cultural dialogue is exclusive in that it (1) requires 
a certain form and content o f participation in internal and cross-cultural dialogue, and (2) 
neither qualifies the dialogical process with the above-mentioned conditions nor provides a 
sufficient analysis o f plural voices.
By contrast, I argue that a sincere cultural dialogue based on the idea o f reciprocity95 
requires at least three conditions:
(1) Participants within internal or cross-cultural dialogue should not exercise power 
over each other, whatever manner o f power manifests itself.
(2) The scope of criticism should not be limited by the framework of interpretation or 
the cultural orientation that cultural members already share. Deprivation and domination, 
not shared understandings, should be the focus of attention in a sincere human rights 
dialogue.
(3) Marginalized groups should have opportunities to have their perspectives heard, and 
these opportunities should run neither through the dominant cultures nor through the 
qualifications o f the insider-outsider distinction.
On the basis o f these conditions, chapter six defends a bottom-up cross-cultural dialogical 
approach that makes room for victimized and powerless people’s contributions to the 
crafting of both human-rights justifications and human rights interpretations.




The Historical-Practical Conception o f International Human 
Rights and its Ground in the Liberalism o f Fear
To designate a hell is not, o f course, to tell us anything about how to extract people from 
that hell, how to moderate hell’s flames. Still, it seems a good in itself to acknowledge, to 
have enlarged, one’s sense o f how much suffering is caused by human wickedness there is 
in the world we share with others. Someone who is perennially surprised that depravity 
exists, who continues to feel disillusioned (even incredulous) when confronted with 
evidence o f what humans are capable o f inflicting in the way o f  gruesome, hands-on 
cruelties upon other humans, has not reached moral or psychological adulthood. N o one 
after a certain age has the right to this kind o f innocence, o f superficiality, to this degree o f  
ignorance, or amnesia.
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others1
We say ‘never again,’ but somewhere someone is being tortured right now, and acute fear has 
again become the most common form o f social control. To this the horror o f modern 
warfare must be added as a reminder.
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”2
Introduction
If my interpretations of the approaches of John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Abdullahi An-Na’im are compelling, then we can find that, though their efforts indeed 
successfully dispose o f several predicaments confronted by most conventional human 
rights theories, each approach contains different deficiencies. In chapter two, I argued that 
in order to avoid recourse to any metaphysical or religious doctrines for his justification, 
Rawls introduced the idea of a political conception of human rights that appeals to the 
idea of decency as a reasonable standard that liberal and decent societies can share. 
Although it can include multiple foundations for a justification of human rights, Rawls’s
1 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003)
2 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism o f Fear”, in Stanley Hoffmann(ed), Political Thought and Political 
Thinkers^University o f Chicago Press, 1998).
approach to grounding human rights in a diverse world will lack adequate justification 
unless it presupposes a cosmopolitan moral ground, which Rawls initially intended to avoid. 
Moreover, his institutional conception o f human rights cannot acknowledge the suffering 
o f marginalized foreigners whose persecution cannot be recognized or redressed within a 
national boundary. In chapter three, I argued that Nussbaum used her capabilities approach 
to ground human rights in a minimal conception of human flourishing attached to any 
substantive conception of good and that she endeavored to prove the list of capabilities 
can be an object o f overlapping consensus regarding human rights principles in a pluralistic 
world. I argued that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is a comprehensive liberalism rather 
than a political liberalism in Rawls’s sense and that the capabilities list cannot be an object 
of overlapping consensus regarding human rights principles. In chapter four, I argued that 
An-Na’im indeed provides an essential hermeneutic methodology with his account of 
cross-cultural dialogue, and righdy expands the analysis to encompass considerations about 
Non-Western cultures. However, An-Na’im fails to provide a sufficient analysis o f plural 
voices in relation to the cross-cultural dialogical process. In the end, his dialogue 
perspective does not involve a true cross-cultural exchange and, in fact, promotes a uni­
directional approach to intellectual efforts rather than a multi-directional approach that 
might establish common ground.
In spite o f the theoretical incompleteness, there remain some important theoretical insights 
and justificatory strategies that deserve to be fleshed out and critically reformulated from 
their perspectives. In what follows, I start to take up the construction o f my own approach 
developed from their insights. I will try to preserve the im portant values contained in each 
of these approaches, while avoiding their defects.
Because human rights discourse takes place under politically charged conditions, which are, 
to say the very least, non-ideal discursive circumstances, my scheme addresses scenarios in 
which theory-making practices take place under this type o f circumstance. Inspired by
Judith Shklar’s liberalism o f fear and Iris Young’s critical theory, I will theorize two points: 
the conception o f human rights is taking (1) human beings as they are based on 
assumptions about the worst they can do; and (2) institutions as they might be with special 
regard to the prevention o f the abuse o f power.
Basically, my approach involves the following stages:
(1) To begin with, the foremost job in rethinking human rights is to detach the idea o f 
human rights from the natural rights tradition. I will expose the misconception that the 
idea of contemporary human rights is the rebirth or recurrence o f the Western natural 
rights tradition, and will argue that we should take the actual practices o f human rights as 
the basis for theorizing in relation to the conception. It would be foolish to deny a 
connection between the natural rights tradition and the modern idea o f human rights. But 
it is one thing to acknowledge that the tradition of human rights originated within Western 
philosophy, and it is quite another to equate the two. However, many human rights 
theorists treat human rights as simply a contemporary version of natural rights, which then 
burdens the contemporary debate with many o f the controversial notions associated with 
natural rights. Moreover, simply identifying the contemporary idea of human rights with 
natural rights is not helpful in dealing with the discrepancies between the underlying 
philosophical account and the international practice o f human rights. Accordingly, that 
view is a misleading description, and I should examine it before proceeding to my 
historical-practical conception o f human rights. I will argue that treating the international 
bill of human rights as merely the rebirth of the Western natural rights tradition, 
independent of either peoples’ expression of those rights or peoples’ practice o f those 
rights in international politics, inevitably results in the creation of serious obstacles to a 
sincere cultural-dialogue that might enhance human rights. Consequently, it leads to some 
unavoidably skeptical conclusions about the implementation and the enforcement of 
human rights. Seen in this light, the first and foremost step is to correct this misleading
view. Furthermore, I will argue that the idea o f human rights is not the modern version of 
the Western natural rights tradition, but an invention resulting from humanity’s common 
tragic-historical experiences o f the twentieth century. It means that the aim o f a human 
rights theory is to develop an international political theory rather than a theory about the 
rebirth o f natural rights in the contemporary era. Following my extended reflection on this 
subject, I will defend my assertion that human rights are to be grounded neither in 
metaphysical principles nor in traditional cultural values but in history. And it seems that a 
brief look at the origins of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights would be 
instructive.
(2) The second stage reflects my hypothesis that, if we clarify the misunderstandings and 
accept the historical-practical conception of human rights, then we can work out the nature, 
scope, and justification of human rights only by considering how the international arena 
would interpret and conceptualize human rights. It is the insight of Rawls that needs more 
elaboration here. Recall that Rawls indicated not only that the role o f human rights in 
international practice rests on a shared public basis o f action, but also that peoples’ 
violation of these rights is “equally condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and 
decent hierarchical peoples.” Rawls treats the role of human rights in international practice 
as determining the definitive nature o f the idea of human rights, and the question of 
human rights justification is separable from the question o f the nature and the content of 
these rights. People may agree about the roles o f these principles and, yet, disagree about 
the content. Moreover, members of liberal or decent societies would still justify human 
rights for their own reasons, without a commonly agreed-upon basis for their reasons. 
However, by analyzing the relationship between sovereignty and human rights after World 
War II, I will argue that respect for human rights principles should be deemed the premise 
for rather than the content of the Law o f Peoples. The respect-as-premise argument would 
provide a reasonable explanation as to why human rights principles can apply to oudaw
states even though they are not part o f the society o f peoples. And this argument would 
mean that only after the contemplation o f international practice can we proceed to 
illuminate how human rights are to be conceived. Following Rawls’s insight, I will flesh out 
the important role o f human rights in international politics as both defining standards of 
legitimate political actions and setting up the criteria for outside interference, and will stress 
the importance of the role o f human rights as a basis for theorizing a reasonable 
conception o f human rights.
(3) In the third stage, I argue that, if we theorize the conception o f human rights by first 
accepting human rights’ role in international practice, we need to justify human rights by 
establishing adequate grounds on which people can believe in the existence and the 
importance o f human rights. At this stage, like Nussbaum, I will argue that some deep 
intuitions play a fundamental role in the theory. However, unlike Nussbaum, I will lay much 
stress on the negative potential and the opaqueness o f personal dispositions. Inspired by 
the late Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, I will defend the view that the nature and the 
function of human rights in international practice can be grounded on her moral 
psychology o f personhood. Moral intuition of fear can be a cosmopolitan moral ground, 
and this point is where the Rawlsian scheme falls short. The dispersion and the 
predictability o f cruelty render the experience of fear so innermost that it constitutes a 
moral intuition upon which a human rights culture can be built. Accordingly, the reason for 
the remarkable role that human rights has played in the aftermath of World War II is the 
universality o f fear, the fact that fear touches all people around the world. The ideal of 
human rights after World War II is one o f the achievements of the liberalism o f fear. In 
this regard, human rights are not timeless principles, but a construct that responds to the 
exigencies of a particular type of social formation emerging on the world stage during a 
particular historical epoch. Although Shklar was primarily concerned with domestic cruelty 
and evils, and did not extensively apply her conception of liberalism to international society;
in the following, I will try to flesh out her political liberalism of fear to provide a 
psychological underpinning o f the idea o f human rights in international practice, and will 
examine the form and the scope of the political liberalism o f fear when this liberalism 
works outward to the international sphere, however sketchily.
(4) In the fourth and final stage, I argue that although human rights can be grounded in the 
liberalism o f fear, agreement on rights at this level is consistent with a certain range of 
dispute at the level o f interpretation and at the level of implementation. Recall that there 
are two levels of human rights justifications in question. One explains why any right ought 
to be recognized as a human right. The other explains which rights deserve to be 
recognized as human rights. We may furnish grounds for agreement and solve the latter 
question o f justification, but these will not be sufficient to deal with the former question 
regarding the content and the interpretation o f human rights principles. To address the 
former question rigorously, we need to take seriously the perspectives of non-Western 
cultures; only in this way can human rights be appropriate as global normative standards 
for a diverse world. Therefore, we need a sincere cross-cultural dialogue to provide a public 
basis for settling the problem of interpretation and implementation. In the next chapter, I 
will defend an approach ascribable to people who have no voice that is easily represented at 
the center o f political theorizing. Namely, I will create a bottom-up approach for the 
justification of human rights at the level of interpretation and implementation. I will seek 
an account o f human rights that has normative legitimacy from the perspectives of those 
marginalized and victimized people. I believe that my approach is descriptively more 
suitable to the moral reality of universal human rights than are other approaches and 
presents a normative grounding of human rights that is more compelling than are the 
corresponding groundings of other approaches.
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5.1 Taking Human Rights Practice Seriously
We found that the main problem by far o f the different approaches explored in my inquiry 
was the attempted reconciliation between the universality o f human rights and cultural 
diversity. The problem arises in conjunction with a common accusation: the international 
human rights regime exhibits a spirit o f ethnocentrism by imposing, successfully or not, a 
particular cultural view on others. For some critics, what we call universal human rights is 
essentially connected to the philosophical conception o f the Western natural rights 
tradition. Because the idea of human rights first emerged in the Western natural rights 
tradition, any unreflective application of the rights to non-Western societies is at least 
suspicious. Furthermore, such critics argue that the internationalization o f the human 
rights regime in the aftermath of WWII was really a cover for Western interventionism in 
the affairs o f the developing world; that the institutionalization has been a form of 
coercion by intellectual means, the use o f “soft power” par excellence.3 
As I noted in chapter one, in order to avoid the charge of ethnocentrism and cultural 
imperialism, theorists try to show that human rights are acceptable across a wide range of 
cultures. For these theorists, if human rights norms are no longer treated as exclusively and 
essentially arising from and supported by Western traditions, then we should no longer 
view them as the sole property of the West. As a result, the implementation and the 
enforcement of human rights would no longer be the output o f cultural imperialism. 
However, before we accept this view and go on to evaluate the international consensus of 
human rights, we should think twice about the accuracy o f this interpretation. For me, not 
only is this orthodox view misleading when it identifies the principle and the practice of 
international human rights with a rebirth of the Western natural rights tradition, but also all 
efforts to solve the discrepancies would be fruitless if originating from this misguided
Lynda S. Bell, Andrew J. Nathan, and Iian Re\cg(eds.)Negotiating Culture and Human 'Rights (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 5.
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premise. If we fail to grasp the real meanings o f human rights in international practice, we 
are not on the right track toward correcting these discrepancies. Therefore, we should look 
carefully at the accuracy of the orthodox view o f human rights from the very beginning. 
The orthodox account o f human rights4 deems contemporary human rights “the 
twentieth-century name for what has been traditionally known as natural rights.”5 Like the 
American “Declaration o f Independence,” which holds that people are “endowed by their 
creator” with certain rights, or like the French “Declaration o f the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen,” which in similar terms defines rights as “natural” and “sacred,” the twentieth- 
century versions are general rights that one would have in a pre-political “state o f nature” 
and that belong to people “naturally,” simply in virtue o f their humanity at all times and 
places.6 As Charles Beitz clearly points out,
Typically, they are thought to reside at a deep, perhaps even a fundamental, level o f our 
moral beliefs and to be discoverable by reason or rational intuition. Thus, human rights 
are sometimes said to be “natural” or to belong to persons “as such” or “simply in 
virtue o f their humanity.” On such views, international human rights— that is, the right 
of the declarations and covenants— derive their authority, to whatever extent they have 
authority, from these underlying values that constitute their foundation. The task o f the 
theorist o f international human rights doctrine is to describe or discover the objects 
properly called “human rights” and then to say which o f the entitlements alleged to be 
human rights in international doctrine pass muster.7
In this regard, once we understand the nature o f human rights, we would understand the
4 See Charles Beitz, “Human Rights as Common Concern,” in American Political Science Review, 95.2(2001), 269- 
282; What Human Rights Mean, in Daedalus, 132(2003), 36-46; “Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples,” in 
Deen Chatterjee (ed), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), pp.193-214. I integrate the arguments from these articles in order to analyze Beitz’s critique o f  
natural-rights theory.
5See Maurice Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights?” Daedalus 112(4) (Fall 1983), 1-17; Jack Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (Cornell University Press, 2003); Charles Taylor, “Human Rights: 
The Legal Culture,” in Paul Ricoeur (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Paris, UNESCO 1986), 49- 
57; John Finnis, Natural Haw and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 198, 210-213, and Peter 
Jones, Rights, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).
6 Beitz points out four noteworthy features in relation to this orthodox view o f  human rights. (1) Human
rights are pre-institutional. they are rights one would have in a pre-political “state o f nature.” (2) Human rights
belong to people in virtue o f their common humanity, the rights are grounded on characteristics that people 
might be said to possess when they are considered in abstraction from any social institution. (3) Human rights 
are timeless-, all human beings at all times and places would be justified in claiming them. And (4), in contrast to 
specific rights, human rights are general rights. See Charles Beitz, “What Human Rights Mean,” 41. Rather, for 
Joseph Raz, this “traditional approach of human rights” is characterized by another four features: (1) the 
approach aims to derive human rights from basic features o f human beings that are valuable in human life; (2) 
human rights are the most important moral rights; (3) it pays scant attention to the difference between 
something’s being valuable and somebody’s having a right to the thing; and (4) human rights tend to be
individualistic rather than social. See Raz, 2007, Human Rights without Foundations, p. 3-4.
Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples,” pp. 196.
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justification for the content o f international doctrines in that the justification o f  human 
rights is internal to the conception of human rights, which has its origin in the natural-rights 
tradition8. Moreover, the problem of human rights inflation can be solved if the content of 
human rights does not fit within the nature o f human rights. For instance, in contrast to 
substantive minimalisms defending a limited scope o f human rights, Maurice Cranston 
argued that the realm o f genuine human rights is narrower than what the international 
doctrine maintains because some rights o f the UDHR do not pass the test for 
justification.9
However, to identify human rights with the natural rights tradition represents “a kind 
of unwitting philosophical dogmatism.”10 The nature o f the Declaration is to express a list 
of constitutional standards against the threats by power.11 Changing social conditions give 
rise to new needs and new awareness about actual violations of human rights, and different 
power structures, struggles, and negotiations give rise to a new formulation o f  rights. 
Moreover, human rights belong to human beings not simply because human beings possess 
a common humanity but because human rights principles identify conditions that should 
be met by any social institution hoping to establish and to preserve its legitimacy in the eyes 
of people. In this scenario, people may still disagree about the relative priority of rights and 
whether or not the international community should intervene when an institution fails to 
meet the conditions. Seen in this light, the idea of human rights is not a property of persons
8 Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples,” pp. 197.
9 Cranston, “Are There Any Human Rights? , ” p. 1.
10 See Beitz, “What Human Rights Mean,” 38. Beitz points out three features that explain why the 
development o f international human rights does not fit the mold o f  natural rights: (1) natural rights are 
supposed to be pre-institutional, but many rights enumerated in human rights documents cannot be so 
conceived; (2) natural rights are supposed to belong to people “naturally”; however, human rights can be 
conceived as a category o f special rights that arises out o f people’s relationships as participants in a global 
political economy, not necessarily to be treated as general rights in L.A. Hart’s sense; and (3) natural rights are 
supposed to be timeless; however, few o f the human rights listed in the UDHR pass the test. Human rights 
are derived from societies that have at least some o f the features o f  modernization, for instance, modern 
legal systems, industries, economies, or bureaucracies.
11 Norberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
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but reason to treat persons in certain ways.,A2 The orthodox view o f human rights has not 
only concealed an accurate understanding of the idea of human rights in the contemporary 
world13 but also crafted related justifications in the wrong theoretical places. 14 
More often than not, the popular understanding of the history of the UDH R reinforces 
the image that the concept o f human rights is grounded in the Western natural-rights 
tradition and is incompatible with different cultures but masquerades as a universal concept. 
Because the concept is alien to many non-Western societies, the advocates o f human rights 
become nothing but the ambassadors o f the Western natural-rights tradition, and the 
politics of human rights is a favored project o f Western hegemony.15 It seems that the 
main reason for this illusion is the fact that: most people, regardless o f whether they are 
advocates or opponents of human rights, demonstrate a lack o f understanding o f the 
history of the drafting process and the development of human rights after W W II.16 The 
disregard o f the historical development of human rights not only misrepresents the real 
meaning of human rights in international politics, but also maintains the unwarranted 
accusation of ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism. Accordingly, the best strategy by 
which we can correct this misguided perception is to re-examine the history of the 
UDHR17 and to clarify what kinds o f claims are made by the UDHR.
12 Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Broadview, 2002), p. 67. See also John Charvet, “The 
Possibility o f a Cosmopolitan Ethical Order,” p.530.
13 In addition to the public role o f  international human rights, the important NGO-initiated functions o f  
human rights, including education, advocacy, standard-setting, monitoring, and enforcement, have done very 
important work in popularizing the idea o f  human rights and in drawing international attention to various 
violations.
14 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (University o f  
Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Best We Can Hope For?” 
in Journal of Political Philosophy 190 (2004), 190-213; Leif Wenar, 2005, The Nature o f  Human Rights, in Real 
World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions eds. Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge 
(Springer-Verlag N ew  York, LLC ), 285-294; and Joseph Raz, 2007, Human Rights without Foundations, pp. 3-4.
15 Tony Evans, “If Democracy, Then Human Rights?” in Third World Quarterly 22(4) (2001), 623-642.
16 Johannes Morsink clearly identifies the issue: “The lingering allegation o f ethnocentrism is in part caused 
by the fact that very few people seem to know what was said and done during the drafting process. This 
ignorance has led to numerous misconceptions about how the document was written and what it and its
various parts mean The two-year-long process o f drafting the Declaration was a very inclusive one.” See
Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, xiii.
17 Recently, there have appeared several reinterpretations o f  the history o f the UDHR, including Paul 
Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions (University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1998);
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Had only a few developing states and only a few non-state actors led the way in the 
promotion o f the idea of human rights, the project o f the declaration could not have 
succeeded, specifically after the resistance of the Great Powers derailed an attempt to 
entrench a strong human rights document in the UN charter.18
Though few in number,19 many developing states played a striking role in the drafting 
of both the UDHR and the two International Covenants.20 There is no evidence to prove 
that the states reached a consensus on a philosophical justification o f human rights 
originating from the natural-rights tradition, but the states agreed that the enormity of 
the holocaust provided the main impetus for the remarkable position that human rights 
should play in the international arena.21 In other words, the atrocities o f the Nazi regime 
shocked the world’s conscience and provided political impetus, though the pressure to 
promote, and the blueprint for, an international bill of rights were well developed long 
before the Nazi horrors were fully known.22 Consequently, it was the tragic memory of
Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (University o f  
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Random House, 2001); Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the 
Globalisation Era (University o f California Press, 2004); Zehra. Kabasakal Arat, “Forging A Global Culture of  
Human Rights: Origins and Prospects o f the International Bill o f Rights” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
28(2), 2006, pp. 416-437; and Susan Waltz, 2001, “Universalizing Human Rights: The Role o f  Small States in 
the Construction o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2002), 44-72; 
“Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History o f  the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights,” Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 23(3)(2002), 437-448; and “Universal Human Rights: The Contribution o f Muslim States,” in Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26(4) (2004), pp. 799-844.
18 Paul G. Lauren points out that, at the international conference in San Francisco in 1945, N G O s played 
critical roles in advocating the incorporation o f human rights principles into the U N  Charter. N G O  
consultants ranged from religious groups to international organizations. There were 300 official delegates and 
2,500 advisors present. “Never before in the history o f  the world had so many nations o f such various sizes 
been so widely represented at such a high-level international conference.” See Paul Gordon Lauren, The 
Evolution of international Human Rights: Visions, pp. 178-89.
19 At the time o f  the establishment o f the United Nations, a number o f developing countries and NG O s 
made an important attempt to entrench a strong human rights document in the UN Charter, though that 
attempt failed by the resistance o f the great powers. See Susan Waltz, “Universalizing Human Rights: The 
Role o f Small States in the Construction o f  the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights,” 45.
20 The participants included India, Pakistan, Brazil, the Philippines, Chile, and Colombia. They represented an 
important force in the alliance with several Western states that successfully thwarted attempts by South Africa 
and the Soviet-bloc countries to derail international human rights initiatives. See Christian Reus-Smit, 
“Human Rights and the Social Construction o f Sovereignty,” in Review of International Studies, 27(2001), p. 532.
21 It is not to say that people around the world were aware o f  the horror o f the Holocaust, but that there 
were many collective memories o f tragedy reminding people around the world o f  the need to protect human
rights.
22 Susan Waltz, “Universalizing Human Rights: The Role o f Small States in the Construction o f the Universal 
Declaration o f  Human Rights,” p. 438.
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WWII that let “so many delegations from so many different nations and cultural 
traditions come to an agreement about a universal moral code.”23 Normative universality 
o f human rights in this way is understood as a function of societies and people 
everywhere coming to share the same history.
Specifically, the UDHR was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, 
by a vote o f 48-0 with eight abstentions.
Eleanor Roosevelt, the American representative on the Commission on Human Rights, 
played a leading role in the drafting of the UDHR. The principal drafters were John P. 
Humphrey (Canadian) and Rene Cassin (French). Other important contributors to the 
drafts included Peng-Chun Chang (China), Charles Malik (Lebanon), Hernan Santa Cruz 
(Chile), and Alexei Pavlov (Russia). 24
During the drafting process, heated discussions arose concerning the philosophy of human 
rights. And it is reasonable to say that if people are going to agree on a certain set of rights, 
they must think first about what rights are, and about why rights exist in the first place. 
They may also ask whether rights come from God or from nature. For instance, Peng- 
Chun Chang, the Chinese delegate and a believer in Confucianism, proposed the 
importance of duty in the Confucian tradition, which prioritizes harmony, social order, and
23 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, p. 36.
24 Morsink identifies a preparatory phase followed by seven further drafting “stages.” In the preparatory 
phase, a “nuclear” committee received contributions from many N G O s on the question o f human rights, as 
well as some drafts o f human rights bills from a number o f Latin American states. The nuclear committee 
recommended that the Economic and Social Council “should at all time pay due regard to equitable 
geographical distribution,” and this principle was reflected in the appointments to the Commission on 
Human Rights responsible for developing the UDH R (the appointments included Australia, Belgium, 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (B.S.S.R), Chile, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, 
the Philippines Republic, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Uruguay, and Yugoslavia). “Western” 
states made up only about a third o f the votes for the universal Declaration, and Muslim states provided half 
as many votes to the final total as Western states (20 Latin American states and 13 non-Western countries 
voted for the UDHR). Moreover, as Morsink points out, “the members o f the Third Committee, who 
discussed every line o f  the draft over two months in the fall o f  1948, represented a wide variety o f cultures.” 
Besides Europeans and North Americans, there were six members from Asia (China, India, Pakistan, Burma, 
the Philippines, and Siam). Islamic culture was predominant in nine nations (Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen). Three countries had large Buddhist populations (Burma, 
China, and Siam). Four were from Africa (Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, and South Africa). Six o f  the European 
members belonged to the Communist bloc. See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Raghts: 
Origins, Drafting, and Intent, pp. 28-34.
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security above individual rights. Charles Malik, a follower o f the philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas, argued that we should agree on the nature o f the person before discussing human 
rights.25 Valentin Tepliakov, the official representative of the Soviet Union, argued that the 
rights o f individuals must be seen in relation to each individual’s obligations to the 
community because the individual cannot be divided from society.26 These and other 
people, from different traditions and nations, had considerable difficulty in agreeing on 
issues o f this kind. The more detail there was in a human rights view, the greater the 
opposition from people who held philosophical or religious views different from the 
expressed view.
In this situation, it was the French delegate Rene Cassin’s skill that made the 
Declaration eventually successful. As the editing writer o f the second draft,27 Rene Cassin 
committed himself to grounding human rights in a way that was substantive but also 
acceptable to all o f the philosophical and religious views that were represented around the 
table. For Cassin, the main challenge was to develop a document “that did not require the 
Commission to take sides on the nature of man and society, or to become immured in 
metaphysical controversies, notably the conflict among spiritual, rationalist, and materialist 
doctrines on the origin of human rights.”28
Furthermore, Cassin’s task was supported by the Committee on the Theoretical Bases of 
Human Rights, which had been established by UNESCO. Essentially a committee of 
philosophers, it was chaired by E.H. Carr of Cambridge and included among its members
25 For instance, Charles Malik summarized their difficulties when he noted that “we are raising the 
fundamental question, what is man?, ‘Is man merely an animal?’, ‘Is he merely an economic being?’” See Mary 
Ann Glendon, A  World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 39.
26 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
27 There are some controversies about the role o f Cassin within the drafting process. It is plain that Cassin 
introduced a number o f new elements to John Humphrey’s draft: a new preamble and a new categorization 
o f the various rights. However, it is not correct to say that he authored a whole new document. Morsink 
remarks that “Humphrey was right when he went public in his memoirs with something he had known all 
along, namely that ‘Cassin’s new text reproduced my own in most o f  its essentials and style’.” Because so 
much o f Cassin’s revised draft came direcdy from the original Humphrey draff, it makes no sense to say that 
Cassin ever made an independent draft o f the UDHR.
28 Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New: p. 68
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Richard McKeon of the University of Chicago, the prominent British political philosopher 
Harold Laski, and the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, whom I have already 
mentioned in the pervious chapters. The main concern of this committee was to consider 
how an agreement might be possible “among men who come from the four corners of the 
earth and who belong not only to different cultures and civilizations, but to different 
spiritual families and antagonistic schools of thought.”29 A central finding o f the 
committee was that many non-Western respondents affirmed their support o f human 
rights principles after it circulated a questionnaire to prominent scholars and cultural 
figures worldwide. The questionnaire functioned to identify their views on the extent, 
nature, and theoretical grounds of human rights. And eventually, the Committee came to 
the conclusion that, despite having neither a common justification nor a common 
expression o f the sources of human rights, different cultures’ human rights sources had a 
common substance. In its final report, the Committee concluded that people could achieve 
agreement across cultures concerning certain rights, even though the agreement would be 
“stated in terms of different philosophical principles and on the background o f divergent 
political and economic systems.”30 The report asserted,
Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members o f the United 
Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common. They believe that men and 
women all over the world have the right to live a life that is free from the haunting fear o f  
poverty and insecurity. They believe that they should have a more complete access to the 
heritage, in all its aspects and dimensions, o f the civilization so painfully built by human 
efforts. They believe that science and the arts should combine to serve alike peace and the 
well-being, spiritual as well as material, o f all men and women without discrimination o f  
any kind.31
Undoubtedly, many drafters were inspired by the Western natural rights tradition, and 
the language o f the UDHR looks very much like the assertion that human beings have 
natural rights. Article 1 of the UDHR, for instance, says that all human beings “are bom
29 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction” in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretation. Ed. UNESCO (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1949), pp. 10-12.
30 Ibid, p. 259.
31 Ibid, p. 77.
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free and equal in dignity and rights.” However, it seems that many drafters intentionally 
eschewed the expression o f their views in terms of natural rights, and tried to deny that the 
draft was an updated version o f the Western natural-rights doctrine.
Specifically, during the drafting process, a disagreement took place during a discussion of 
the phrase “by nature” in Article 1. The Belgian delegation suggested that they eliminate it, 
while the Brazilian amendment would have added that “all human beings are created in the 
image and likeness o f God.”32 Peng-Chun Chang reminded all delegations that the UDHR 
was designed to be universally applicable and that it might be best to permit each culture to 
supply its own account of the philosophical underpinnings of human rights. He stressed 
that Chinese culture indeed comprised a large proportion o f humanity and that Chinese 
people had traditions and ideas sharply different from those of the Christian West.33 
However, as the Chinese representative on the Human Rights Commission, he “had 
refrained from proposing those ideals for inclusion in the declaration.”34 Glendon 
comments on this issue regarding Chang:
His own country, he pointed out, comprised a large proportion o f  humanity, and its 
people had ideals and traditions different from those o f the Christian West. Chinese 
ideals included good manners, decorum, propriety, and consideration for others. Yet he, 
as the Chinese representative on the Human Rights Commission, had refrained from 
proposing those ideals for inclusion in the Declaration.. .Article 1 as it stood, Chang 
said, struck just the right note by calling upon all men to act toward one another in a 
spirit o f brotherhood. That was consistent with the Chinese belief in the importance o f  
considerate treatment o f others and also with the ideals o f eighteenth-century Western 
thought. The first line o f the article, therefore, should refer neither to nature nor to God.
Those who believed in God, he suggested, could still find the idea o f God in the strong 
assertions that all human beings are bom free and equal and endowed with reason and 
conscience.35
In this regard, the “deliberative silence” at the debate on philosophical justification was 
precisely a key factor that helped sustain the drafters’ universal belief in the document’s
32 Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New, p. 145.
33 . . .  .Tore Lindholm, Article 1, in A. Eide and G. Alfredsson (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A  
Common Standard of Achievement. (The Hague: Kluwer International Press, 1999), p. 57.
34 Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New, p. 146.
35 Ibid. , p. 146.
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core claims.36 In order to avoid the deadlock over the nature-or-God disagreement in 
Article 1, the draft claims only that all men ought to act toward one another “in a spirit of 
brotherhood,” which is consistent not only with Chinese belief but with Western thought, 
as well.37 Thus, through the deliberative silence, drafters successfully converged their beliefs 
regarding abstract principles and successfully left unresolved various metaphysical issues. 
Such agreements enable people who cannot reach agreements on metaphysical views to 
reach agreement on particular outcomes. And people who reject a particular agreement can 
accept the overall agreement-making process without having to renounce their most 
foundational ideals: “they lose a decision but not the world.”38
According to the Preamble of the UDHR and the discussion o f the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly in 1948, the system of human rights was a response to humanity’s 
painful collective experiences of WWII and to the subsequent world crises that, unfolding 
at that time, made mandatory a global consensus regarding the identification of and the 
subsequent implementation of universally applicable human rights. The Preamble of the 
UDHR refers to the two world wars as evidence o f the need for global norms and affirms 
human rights as the “foundation o f freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The practical 
rationale sketched in the Preamble also reflects the fact that it was not philosophical 
argumentation that led to the drafting of the UDHR; rather, it was the negative experience 
of war that gave rise to a hope to identify practical standards to which all nations could be 
held accountable.
36 As Cass Sunstein clearly points out, one o f the important social and legal phenomena during a process o f  
legal judgment is “the constructive use o f silence.” The constructive use o f silence about certain issues is a 
device for producing convergence between people in the face o f conflicting principles. See Cass Sunstein, 
“Agreements Without Theory,” in Stephen Macedo (ed), Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and 
Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 123-150, and Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What 
Constitutions Do (Oxford University Press, 2001).
37 Interestingly, Lindholm draws attention to the fact that “conscience” in Article 1 was included in 
accordance with a proposal from Chang. The Chinese equivalent o f the word implied “two-man-
mindedness” (f—), or “mindfulness o f the other person.” This implied meaning expresses the idea o f  
reciprocity and requires us to respect, or show concern for, other people. See Tom Lindholm, Article 1, p. 43.
38 Cass Sunstem, Designing Democracy, p. 60.
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By following an exchange o f ideas in this fashion, people can nourish a basis for “an 
agreement between minds”— in this case, concerning “beliefs for guidance in action” and 
not “the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world of man and 
knowledge.” Let us consider these quotes from Maritain in their fuller context:
“How” I asked, “can we imagine an agreement o f minds between men who are gathered 
together precisely in order to accomplish a common intellectual task, men who come from 
the four corners o f  the globe and who not only belong to different cultures and 
civilizations, but are o f antagonistic spiritual associations and schools o f  thought?...
Because, as I said at the beginning o f  my speech, the goal o f UNESCO is a practical goal, 
agreement between minds can be reached spontaneously, not on the basis o f common 
speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception 
of the world, o f man and o f knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for 
guidance in action. N o doubt, this is little enough, but it is the last resort to intellectual 
agreement. It is, nevertheless, enough to enable a great task to be undertaken, and it would 
do much to crystallize this body o f common practical convictions.39
Likewise, by drawing from the drafting process for Article 1 o f the UDHR, Tore 
Lindholm40 asserts that, the agreement on the UDHR rested on both a normative premise 
and a descriptive premise for the ongoing dialogue concerning human-rights justification. On 
the one hand, there was a proximate normative premise to justify universal rights: the 
principle that each “human being as human being is entided to freedom and to equal 
dignity,” though the concepts o f freedom and equal dignity remain unelaborated and “are 
left open to various interpretations and specifications, which may conflict among 
themselves, without affront to the Universal Declaration.”41 Also unelaborated was the 
reason for which such an entidement to freedom and dignity helps ground a system of 
rights. On the other hand, there was a consensus that a prescribed system o f human rights 
regarding equal dignity should rest not on an agreement about God, human nature, or 
reason, but on agreed-upon descriptions of the post-WWII world. Both normative 
premises and descriptive premises constitute the justification of human rights. In this
39 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction,” p. 10, emphasis added.
40 See Tore Lindholm, “Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f  Human Rights: The Case o f  
Liberalism and Marxism,” in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Dialogue Perspectives: A. 
Quest for Consensu/ ’ (Philadelphia: University o f Philadelphia University Press, 1992), pp. 387-426.
41 Tore Lindholm, “Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f Human Rights,” 395-6. Likewise, 
Eleanor Roosevelt explained that “Article 1 did not refer to specific rights because it was meant to explain 
why human beings have rights to begin with.” See Mary Ann Glendon, A  World Made New, p. 146.
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regard, Lindholm’s comments are helpful:
Only from the normative principle o f  inherent freedom and equal dignity in conjunction 
with the interpretation o f the contemporary and prospective world situation does a 
binding commitment to a global human rights system follow.42
Accordingly, based on the U DH R’s normative premise, any cultural tradition could 
support universal human rights, provided that the tradition not only supports the ideas of 
humans’ inherent freedom and human’s inherent dignity but appreciate the pertinent 
situation o f the “global circumstance o f rights,” as well.43
In this regard, human rights principles, as a practical guide in action, were a political 
construction for certain political purposes and operated as the standard in the specific 
international circumstances that held in the aftermath of WWII. Because the advancement 
of universal human rights depends on widespread support from a number o f states, 
organizations, and individuals around the world, one cannot claim that the draft was merely 
an updated version of natural-rights theory. The rights are not pre-institutional and 
timeless as the proponents of natural rights claim, but the rights constitute a particular 
choice that the post-WWII world made in reference to its collective memory o f recent 
tragedies.
The choice was not an overlapping consensus as many consensus-based theories had 
envisioned, but it looks like a constitutional consensus in Rawls’s sense, because the choice 
did not “reach down to a political conception covering principles for the whole o f the 
basic structure.”44 Rawls comments further on this distinction:
How constitutional consensus comes about: Suppose that at a certain time, because o f  
various historical events and contingencies, certain liberal principles o f justice are 
accepted as a mere modus vivendi, and are incorporated into existing political institutions.
This acceptance has come about, let us say, in much the same way as the acceptance o f  
the principle o f  toleration came about as a modus vivendi following the Reformation: at 
first reluctantly, but nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to endless
42 Tore Lindholm, “Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy o f Human Rights,” p. 397, emphasis 
added.
43 Ibid, p. 399.
44 PL, p .l58
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and destructive civil strife.45
It is possible for citizens first to appreciate the good those principles accomplish both 
for themselves and those they care for, as well as for society at large, and then to affirm 
them on this basis. Should incompatibility later be recognized between the principles o f  
justice and their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise these doctrines 
rather than reject those principles.46
In this regard, the UDHR, as a constitutional consensus, is accepted simply as 
principles and as the agreement in which different societies resolve disputes and make 
decisions— as “a general willingness to cooperate with others with a sense o f fairness and
j?47openness.
Thus, the consensus of the U DH R was realizable within richly diverse philosophical, 
religious, economic, social, and political contexts. Myriad cultural systems granted the 
U DHR a great deal o f support, which nevertheless included no determinate philosophical 
justifications o f human rights. It is a misrepresentation, therefore, to characterize the 
UDHR as a faithful mirror o f the Western natural-rights tradition. The U DH R bases its 
proclamation of human rights norms on the practical experiences of their violation. It is 
not accurate and certainly not fair to interpret international human rights doctrines as 
efforts merely to fill a conceptual space with natural rights in the Western political tradition. 
We should consider the role o f human rights in international practice substantively, and we 
should create the content of international doctrine by considering how the doctrine would 
best function in light o f this role.48 We should take the practice of human rights as a guide 
that can help us consider justification o f human rights and the scope o f human rights.49 In 
doing so, we should focus on the role that human rights play in contemporary political 
practice, rather than on the role that natural rights play in the development o f Western 
political thought. This is not to say that contemporary practice is beyond reproach because
45 PL, p. 159
46 Ibid, p. 160
47 Ibid, p. 160.
48 Charles Beitz, Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples, p. 202.
49 See Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global Civil Society and the Society of Democratic States(London: 
Routledge, 2002).
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we can see the suspicion that current human rights trends are products o f cultural 
imperialism. But the political role o f human rights in contemporary practice provides a 
guide for thinking about the meaning of human rights today. We can consider this role-as- 
guide an opportunity for— not an obstacle to— theoretical construction.50 And we should 
follow An-Na’im’s lead in acknowledging that politicians’ and philosophers’ actual 
agreement regarding human rights laws or documents is not the same as a reasonable 
agreement in this same regard; after all, in order for the justification o f human rights to be 
reasonable, there must be additional argumentation. Moreover, we should carefully 
distinguish between empirical claims of universality, in which a consensus on human rights 
could serve as supporting evidence for such a claim, and normative notions of universal 
validity, in which the same consensus would be of no justificatory significance. My point 
here is simply to show the misconception regarding human rights justification from the 
orthodox view and to urge people who care about this matter to leave this issue aside and 
to accept a practical conception of human rights. The experience of reaching a consensus 
on the UDHR indeed provides a pragmatic grounding for the practical conception o f 
human rights. It can allow us more space “to extrapolate from what political leaders have 
actually accepted to what all individuals could reasonably accept.”51 Moreover, we would do well 
to accept Maritain’s insight regarding the benefits and the drawbacks o f discerning 
seemingly inconsequential metaphysical or ideological alliances among delegates to a 
drafting committee: in the end, it is possible to provide a shared basis o f justification that is 
cross-culturally verifiable. In the next section, I will defend the view that the grounding of 
human rights can find strength from the moral intuition o f fear provided by Shklar’s 
political liberalism.
It seems that, to solve the discrepancies between the philosophical account o f human
50 Leif Wenar, “The Nature o f Human Rights,” in Andreas FoUesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds) Real World 




rights and the international practice o f human rights, one needs an accurate grasp of the 
ethical and political significance o f human rights in the contemporary world from the very 
start. We should take the right steps to correct this discrepancy. In this regard, like Rawls, 
we might first look at the public role implicit in the global public culture in order to 
determine the role that human rights play in the world o f politics, and we might second 
“treat it as definitive of the idea o f human rights.”52 We can work out the nature, the 
content, and the justification of human rights only by reflecting on international actors’ 
practical interpretations o f the doctrine. Beitz sheds light on the topic:
Theory has to begin somewhere. We begin with the observation that there is an 
international practice o f human rights, and we ask some distinctively theoretical questions: 
what kinds o f things are these human rights, why should we believe in them, and what 
follows if we do?53
Here, I will begin examining political human-rights documents such as the UDHR and the 
various conventions that, therein, have widely served as a point of reference. By undertaking 
this examination, I intend to flesh out the historical-practical conceptions of human rights.
5.2 Human Rights, Political Legitimacy, and Membership in 
International Society
Rethinking human rights in a way that distances them from the natural-rights tradition 
makes them more consistent with the contemporary discourse and practice of human 
rights. If  we search for the idea of human rights implicit in public political culture by 
making use o f ideas present in global political institutions and in the public tradition of 
their interpretations, we can say that there are two prominent roles that human rights have 
played in international practice.54 One role is “to deny that government or individuals have
52 Charles Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples,” p. 197.
53 Charles Beitz, “What Human Rights Means,” p. 45.
54 Human rights principles have played more than these two roles in international society. James Nickel 
ascribes at least fourteen political roles to the principles, including monitoring, enforcement, education, and 
intervention. However, I will argue that these two roles shape human rights norms into a powerful set o f
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the authority to act in certain ways,” and the other role is “to assert that they have an 
affirmative duty to act in certain other ways.”55
First of all, the principle of human rights is the criterion of political legitimacy in international society'. 
Human rights identify the most basic conditions that any society’s institutions should meet 
if we are to consider them legitimate. Human rights are effective constraints on the power 
o f states. It would constrain the action or the inaction o f institutional political actors 
within a universal ethical framework. In this regard, they operate in both domestic politics 
and international politics. Domestically, human rights are standards of practical guidance 
for the assessment o f all political societies in the treatment of their members. It is a 
necessary condition o f the institutions in all societies. Persons can appeal to these 
principles in assessing the regime that governs their territory. Internationally, human rights 
principles condition the membership o f sovereign states within international society, 
regardless of whether the states have legally committed themselves to respect and secure 
these rights. That is, they would be applicable to all societies whether or not they are 
supported locally.
In this regard, I accept Rawls’s insights when he argued that respect for human rights is the 
toleration threshold for judging who is a part o f the Society of Peoples and who is not. 
Rawls is also correct to argue that there is no global basic structure functioning as a fair 
scheme o f worldwide cooperation among citizens o f the world. There is a state system in 
which peoples (states), not individuals, are regarded as free and equal. Apparently, the 
installation o f the UN is thoroughly dependent on the basic political and social 
organizations in the respective national states. Also, the UN human rights instruments that
international ethics, in that these norms can and should serve as the basis o f  international society. If  we can 
justify these two roles, we can derive other roles from the two. See James, Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly 
Implemented by Intervention?” in Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A  Realistic 
Utopia? (London: Blackwell Publishing Company, 2006), p. 270.
55 Thomas Scanlon, “Human Rights as a Neutral Concern,” in Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean, (eds), 
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles and Applications (Lexington, MA & Toronto: Lexington Books 
1979), p. 85.
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are designed to protect individual rights still identify the state as the agent when human- 
rights violations occur.56 There is plenty of evidence to affirm that the state is capable of 
providing more protection to the people than is available in a failed and disintegrated 
state.57 Furthermore, even if transnational advocacy networks have been emerging around 
the world since WWII, their strategies have, for the most part,58 remained focused on 
national controversies and have targeted chiefly the state.59 The strategies still operate under 
the assumption that the ultimate locus o f decision-making is the state, and the aspiration 
of transnational activism is to push governments to reconsider some o f their decisions’ 
harmful or unjust effects.
However, Rawls would be wrong if he treated human rights principles and state 
sovereignty as separate, mutually contradictory regimes that obscure the justificatory role 
of human rights principles in the constitution o f the modern international order. 
Specifically, the idea o f sovereignty,60 defined as supreme legitimate authority within a territory,61 is 
an inter-subjective organizing norm, a norm that licenses the arrangement o f power and
36See also Onora O ’Neill, “Agents o f justice,” in Thomas Pogge (ed), Global Justice. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2001), pp. 188-203.
57 See Michael, Ignatieff, 2001 by Amy Gutmann (ed) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, NJ 
Princeton University Press). Likewise, Brian Turner argues that human rights abuse is characteristically a 
product o f  state tyranny, dictatorship, and state failure as illustrated by civil war and anarchy. Accordingly, a 
viable state is an important guarantor o f  rights. See Brian Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (University 
Park, PA: The Penn State University Press, 2006), Ch. 1.
58 O f course, there are some new threats to human rights that come from other sources, for instance, many 
multi-national corporations. See Alison Brysk, Human Rights and Private Wrongs: Constructing Global Civil Society 
(Routledge, 2005).
59 For instance, Thomas Risse and his colleagues created “the boomerang theory” to show how international 
human rights norms substantially affect domestic state practices. See Thomas Risse, Rupp, and Sikkink (eds), 
The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 1999). See also Jenson, Jane and Martin 
Papillon “Challenging the Citizenship Regime: The James Bay Cree and Transnational Action,” Politics and 
Society (2000), 28(2), pp. 245-64; and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocay 
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998).
60 We should note that the debate over the relationship between human rights and sovereignty is very 
complicated, and my analysis here is too simple to support an in-depth examination o f  the debate. But my 
point here is simply to refute Rawls’s argument regarding the relationship, and I am persuaded herein by the 
analysis o f Daniel Philpott and will adopt the definitions o f his argument. See Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty: 
An Introduction and Brief History,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), pp. 353-69; Daniel 
Philpott, “Westphalia and Authority in International Society,” Political Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1999), pp. 566-89; 
and Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Entyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
Edition, 2003), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/falll 999/entries/sovereignty
61 See Daniel Philpott, “Westphalia and Authority in International Society,” p. 567.
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authority into territorially-demarcated, autonomous political units. As a social norm,62 the 
idea o f sovereignty emerged not in a moral vacuum, but out o f a complex process o f 
dialogical action and consent, and required a certain relationship between the state and the 
constituency— a relationship wherein the state is seen as governing, whether the 
constituency is territorial or societal.63 Accordingly, sovereignty is a system o f mutual 
recognition among states in which there are a set o f shared norms that define the basic, 
constitutional authority o f member polities. It is what Reus-Smit called “constitutional 
structure,” or it is Daniel Philpott’s constitution of international society64 that is enabling 
of state action or inaction. As Daniel Philpott explicidy puts it,
A constitution o f international society is a set o f norms, mutually agreed upon by 
polities who are members o f the society, that define the holders o f authority and their 
prerogatives, specifically in answer to three questions: who are the legitimate polities?
What are the rules for becoming one o f these polities? And, what are the basic 
prerogatives o f  these polities?65
Here, the norm  of sovereignty has never been “absolute”66 in the sense that it would allow 
abstract states to do whatever they want. Conversely, it has always been subject to
62 A norm is a standard o f  appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. Regulative norms order and 
constrain behavior. Constitutive norms create new actors, interests, or categories o f  action and limit the range 
of choice and constrain actors. For instance, Kenneth Abbott argues, “Norms and understandings are 
generated, disseminated and internalized through the efforts and discourse o f diverse actors. Even as states 
and other actors create norms and institutions to further their interests and values, those norms and 
institutions are redefining those interests and values, perhaps even the identities o f the actors themselves.” 
See Kenneth, Abbott, “International Relation Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” m American Journal of International Taw, N o . 2 (1999), p. 368.
63 Samuel, Barkin, “The Evolution o f  the Constitution o f Sovereignty and the Emergence o f  Human Rights 
Norms,” in Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol 27, N o  2 (1998), p. 230.
64 Following Bull, the definition o f international society here is “a group o f  states (or more generally, a group 
of independent political communities) which...has established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct o f their relations, and recognize their common interests in maintaining these 
arrangements. See H. Bull and A. Watson, 1984, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1984). See also H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A  study of Order in World 'Politics', and Chris 
Brown, “International Theory and International Society: The Viability o f  the Middle Way,” in Review of 
International Studies, 21(1995), pp. 183-96.
65 Daniel Philpott, “Westphalia and Authority in International Society,” p. 567.
66 For Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty means unconditional human authority over all matters. Moreover, it 
seems that it is contradictory to say that sovereignty is non-absolute if it is also supreme. However, the 
argument here is not that the character or extent o f  sovereignty must always be supreme, but that because 
sovereign authority consists, at least in part, o f mutual recognition, one cannot practice sovereign powers 
unless one is surrounded by a community o f states that recognizes these powers. Therefore, the scope o f  
matters over which a holder o f authority is sovereign is always constrained by a set o f  shared norms in that it 
constitutes polities and endows them with their basic prerogatives. See Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State,” in American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), pp. 384-96.
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normative constraints. It can function only when granted some basis o f legitimacy, though 
the understanding o f the legitimate basis o f sovereignty changes over time. In other words, 
sovereignty as an operational norm  always follows some form  of legitimacy o f sovereignty 
as a principle, and it was organized by different conceptions o f legitimate statehood and 
rightful state action in different historical contexts. It is only in the post-WWII era that 
legitimate statehood has been tied mainly to the protection o f inalienable human rights.67 
Hence, the protection of international human rights can be seen as an evolution o f the 
constitution o f sovereignty in the contemporary era.68 It is useful to consider Reus-Smit’s 
observations regarding this matter:
Treating these [human rights and sovereignty] as separate, mutually contradictory regimes 
obscures the justificatory role that human rights principles have performed in the 
constitution o f the modern sovereign order.... In the twentieth century, sovereignty has 
been increasingly justified in terms o f  the state’s role as guarantor o f  certain basic human 
rights and freedoms, supplanting the politically impotent legitimating principle o f  divine 
rights.69
We can say that, since WWII, sovereignty has been increasingly justified in terms o f the 
state’s role as a guarantor of certain human rights and that legitimate statehood has been 
more explicidy tied to the protection of basic human rights.70 The way in which a state
67 See Tim Dunne, “The Rules o f games are Changing: Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis After 9 /1 1 ”, in 
International Politics, Vol. 44, (2007), pp. 269-286 at 271.
68 See Samuel, Barkin, “The Evolution o f the Constitution o f Sovereignty and the Emergence o f  Human 
Rights Norms,” p. 229.
69 Christian Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction o f  Sovereignty,” p. 520.
70 Recently, the realist-liberalist-constructivist debate about transnational norms and about their effect on 
domestic policy has become fierce, if  not acrimonious, in international-relations theory. From a realist’s 
position, states are the principal actors in international politics. International rules and institutions have litde 
independent effect on state behavior; they are mere artifacts o f underlying interests and power relationships. 
The national interest is to maximize power or security. Moral principles are espoused merely to justify 
decisions already taken on the basis o f interest-maximizing criteria. Therefore, states’ dominant strategy is to 
maximize their own power capabilities. Whether a state will comply with international law or not depends on 
the state’s calculation regarding the effects o f compliance on national interests. Hence, international human- 
rights norms emerge only when they are embraced and espoused by hegemonic powers. Alternatively, 
liberalists argue that the domestic sources of state preferences are the determinants o f  outcomes in 
international politics, and liberalists stress the “two-level games.” For instance, Andrew Moravcsik asserts that, 
upon the definition that states are self-interested and rational actors, the primary factor that results in states’ 
commitment to international human-rights norms is neither power (i.e., the realists’ claim) nor transnational 
socialization deriving from the transformative power o f normative discourse (i.e., the constructivists’ “logic 
o f appropriateness”). By estimating sovereignty costs, states usually treat international human-rights regimes 
as means by which the states can “lock in” their preferred domestic politics in the face o f future political 
uncertainty. In other words, any decision by an individual government to support a binding international 
human-rights enforcement regime depends on whether or not, from the perspective o f  the state, the benefits
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behaves toward its own citizens became, in R.J. Vincent’s words, “a legitimate subject of 
international scrutiny and censure.”71 Human rights norms have become a part o f the 
international institutional structure, and this structure compels states to respect the norms. 
The human rights regime is not replacing sovereignty; rather, human rights norms and 
sovereignty are “two normative elements o f a single, distinctly modern discourse about 
legitimate statehood and rightful state action,” a discourse that “seeks to justify territorial 
particularism on the grounds of ethical universalism.”72
Moreover, since WWII, human-rights principles have constituted a condition for the 
membership o f sovereign states within international society. Particularly during the collapse 
of colonialism, the efforts of developing states skillfully promoted the right to self- 
determination as the basic human right that would successfully undermine and de- 
legitimize European colonial powers and that would, consequently, result in the 
proliferation of post-colonial states in Asia and Africa. Members o f international society 
presented the right to self-determination as “a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all 
fundamental human rights.”73 In a sense, human-rights norms have been a basic feature of 
the politics of membership in international society. The performance o f human rights is
of reduced domestic political uncertainty outweigh the benefits o f reduced sovereignty. However, 
constructivists would disagree with both o f the positions and would highlight the independent role o f  norms 
and o f non-governmental organizations in influencing domestic and international policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, they would stress the importance o f the norms and the ideals. For constructivists, realists can 
neither account for how normative change occurs within the hegemony, nor understand that international 
norm formation is necessarily “hegemonic socialization.” Besides, beliefs about appropriate behavior give the 
world structure. In terms o f this debate, I accept the constructivist position that any explanation o f  the rise 
of human rights regimes must take into account the political power o f norms and ideas and the increasingly 
transnational way in which those ideas are carried and diffused. See Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Politics, 
International Relation Theory and Human Rights,” in PS (1998), pp. 517-521; Thomas Risse and Kathryn 
Sikkink, “The socialization o f international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction;” in 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 1999), pp. 
1-38; Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins o f Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 
in International Organisations 54 (2) (2000), pp. 217-252; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, Norms and 
International Relations Theory. In International Organisation 52(4)(1998), pp. 887-917; and Kenneth Abbott, 
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 
in American Journal of International Taw, April No. 2 (1999), pp. 361-378.
71 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 152.
72 Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction o f  Sovereignty, p. 520.
73 Reus-Smit points out that Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in the UN were the first (1950) states to articulate 
the connection between human rights and the right to self-determination. The two states eventually pushed 
other UN members to pass General Assembly Resolution 637, stating “the right o f peoples and nations to 
self-determination.. .is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment o f all fundamental human rights. See ibid., p. 535.
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constitutive of the right to self-determination. When states gain membership in the club of 
sovereign states, they acquire enhanced social agency, along with new political and legal 
entitlements. Conversely, denial o f membership is an unambiguous type of 
disempowerment. In this regard, if membership is a necessary condition for power in 
international relations, then there is an intrinsic connection between the struggle for 
membership and the struggle for political legitimacy. The progressive development o f 
human rights instruments have evolved into the standards of political legitimacy, and have 
conditioned the membership of sovereign states in international society.74 It is clear from 
reading the UN charter that there is no necessary conflict between the cardinal rules of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in Article 2 and the human rights standards set out in 
Articles 55 and 56.
Thus, we should not consider human rights and sovereignty to be simply separate, 
incompatible regimes in international society, because the structure of international society 
is not simply what preexisting states construct for their own purposes. Indeed, “it is the 
institutional structure of international society that constitutes the actors.”75 In this regard, 
Philpott states,
Most international constitutions define polities with internal realms, where the 
inhabitants, or at least some o f  them, in turn define the character o f their 
constitutional authority— e.g., monarchical, communist, social democratic, and so on.
The modern state, as it emerged after Westphalia, is such a polity. But it is the 
international constitution which first defines this polity as an entity with the authority 
to determine further its own constitutional authority. It is the international constitution 
which defines the very meaning o f internal and external realms. An international 
constitution is more than simply a derivative o f  the collected constitutions o f its 
individual polities. It is the framework that makes them individual polities. This is what 
emerged at Westphalia.76
74 There have been many terrible violations o f human rights by countries whose right to self-determination 
has not been called into question, and it may challenge the argument here that the fulfillment o f  human rights 
is constitutive o f the right to self-determination. But the principle that the fulfillment o f  human rights is 
constitutive o f the right to self-determination is compatible with conflict, competition and anomaly o f the 
principle itself. “They do not eliminate conflict, but structure who fights it, and on what terms.” See Daniel 
Philpott, “Westphalia and Authority in International Society,” p. 577. I am indebted to professor John 
Charvet for pointing out the discrepancy between this norm and practice.
75 Andrew Hurrell, “Global Inequality and International Institutions,” in Metaphilosophy, vol (32) (2001), p. 38.
76 See Daniel Philpott, “Westphalia and Authority in International Society,” p. 567.
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Here, unlike Rawls, we should deem respect for human rights principles the premise for 
rather than the content o f the construction of a law o f peoples. Only by constructing shared 
international rules can we determine the criteria for identifying a “people” and the rules for 
governing the relationship between a people and individuals. This is the case even if a given 
society treats individuals as members o f a decent hierarchical society rather than as free and 
equal citizens in a constitutional liberal society. When Rawls highlights the importance of 
bounded political communities and self-determination in practice, he is already committed 
to the idea of an international society that he seems to assume.77 Contributing to this 
argument, Thomas Pogge states that, while a society or world can contain divergent 
conceptions o f the good, its basic political structure “can be structured... in only one 
way.”78 While Rawls wants to leave room for certain kinds of non-liberal societies 
structured in a variety of ways, the constitution o f international society cannot itself be 
structured in a variety of ways. It must constrain the actions of political agents within a 
universal ethical framework. Thus, considerable restrictions characterize the room that 
Rawls wants to preserve by his constructive approach “for the people’s self-determination 
and for some kind of loose or confederative form o f a Society o f Peoples.”79 Certain 
forms o f resistance to the universal human rights principle seem to constitute not 
resistance to a universal ethical framework o f a normatively governed international society 
but competing notions concerning the content o f rights.80 Furthermore, human rights 
principles, because they would constrain the actions o f political agents within a universal 
ethical framework, can equally apply to outlaw states, even though they are not part o f  the
77 See Andrew Hurrell, “Global Inequality and International Institutions,” p. 39.
78 Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law o f  Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3( 1994), pp. 
195-224. See also Thomas McCarthy On the Idea o f a Reasonable Law of Peoples, in James Bohman and 
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds) Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, VIA: MIT Press, 
1997), pp. 201-217 at 215, Tan Kok-Chor, “Liberal Toleration in Rawls’s Law o f Peoples,” in Ethicsv 108, 
(1998), pp. 276-295 at 283, and Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law o f  Peoples to a 
Cosmopolitan Law o f Persons,” in Political TheoyVol 28(2000), pp. 640-674 at 649.
19 LPb, p. 61.




Second, human rights serve as the standard by which outside agents can justify their interference in the 
internal affairs of states, but the forms of inteference can vary. According to Charles Beitz, “to say 
something is a human right is to say that social institutions that fail to protect the right are 
defective,” the implication being that “international efforts to aid or promote reform are 
legitimate and in some cases may be morally required.”81 The ideal o f human rights as “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” applies to all societies 
and permits outside agents to try to bring a non-complying state into conformity with 
these common standards.
Thus, human rights violations may serve to justify interference in the internal affairs of 
other states. It means that the concern of the implementation of human rights can justify 
interferences o f some kind.82 By contrast, the fulfillment o f human rights is sufficient to 
exclude justified and forceful interventions by other peoples. Where, then, should we draw 
the line between respect for the self-determination o f peoples and respect for the 
inviolability o f global human-rights norms? When should a country act to protect another 
country’s citizens from their government, and when should this type o f action be 
forbidden?
Following Rawls’s criterion of decency, I argue that sovereignty is not a necessary property 
of government, but a consequence of a government’s being well-ordered. Well- 
orderedness means that: (1) a country does not aggress against others or its own people; 
and (2) a government represents and is accountable to its citizens. If  any society conforms 
to these two conditions, then it is immune to interference even if the society is not liberal: 
we should respect its right to self-determination. If each society governs itself, it should be 
treated as a member in good standing in the society of peoples as long as it does not
81 See Charles Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law o f Peoples,” p. 210; and Zehra Arat, “Forging A Global 
Culture o f  Human Rights” p. 428.
82 See Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without Foundations,” p. 9.
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oppress its own people. This proposition means that a society seeking to avoid outside 
interference must guarantee some basic human rights and must satisfy the basic needs of 
everyone. These basic human rights are guarantees o f subsistence and personal security. 
Furthermore, as I indicated in chapter two, some political rights are a corollary of the basic 
human rights to freedom from mental and physical abuse.83 Each well-ordered society must 
guarantee many other political rights that, being peculiar to the society, will flesh out the 
basic rights. In this regard, a decent society protects not only basic human rights to 
subsistence and personal security, but the right o f the society’s members to choose, change, 
and govern public institutions, even though not in the same ways as is practiced in a given 
liberal democracy. Therefore, a decent society is the one that provides the minimal 
conditions within which a government acts on behalf of its people. It includes the minimal 
criterion of legitimacy, which contains participation, representation, and accountability. 
Conversely, if a society systematically violates basic human rights, and if some citizens have 
too little power to influence or to engage with their government, then this society is neither 
well-ordered nor immune to interference: other states have reason to interfere therein to 
protect basic human rights. Therefore, the more rights a country acknowledges for its 
citizens, the less interference is justified from abroad. More often than not, persons can 
appeal to these principles when formulating a moral justification o f intervention in the 
political affairs o f other countries. The argument may pivot on various external agents’ 
commitment of resources required for effective interference. The resources usually 
constitute peaceful means; in extreme circumstances, military intervention may be the last 
resort to securing basic human rights.84 In this regard, violations o f human rights can
83 In terms o f the content o f basic human rights, in chapter six, I will argue that the justification and the 
interpretation o f the content shall be left to the members o f  specific cultures, even if we accept Rawls’s 
criterion o f decency here.
84 In December 2001, the UN-appointed International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) issued “The Responsibility to Protect,” a report examining the “right o f  humanitarian intervention.” 
According to the report, there are five conditions under which intervention is not only justified but also 
required. (1) there must be a just cause, which is the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its people from
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justify not only diplomatic and economic sanctions, but military interventions, as well.85 
However, I disagree with Rawls’s very narrow interpretation of interference. Rawls insists 
that liberal societies should never interfere with decent societies if they respect human rights, 
follow the rule o f law, and grant citizens enough evidence that their government is 
legitimate and follows a common-good idea of justice. A problem with this line of thought 
is that Rawls linked the respect for human rights principles to the use o f force and treated 
human rights as though their main role was to specify the justification for intervention 
regarding states’ responses to grave violations of human rights. Rawls faces problems that, 
although interpretation and implementation o f human rights are at the level of national or 
regional policy; nevertheless, we should ponder whether external agents should never 
interfere with some non-liberal societies regarding such matters, even if we accept Rawls’s 
idea of decency as the minimal standard for international legitimacy. We should promote 
cross-cultural dialogue that helps resolve conflicts between liberal societies and non-liberal 
societies regarding their respective justifications and interpretations of human rights. Each 
state has a moral duty to guarantee the rights and statuses o f its citizens and to ensure that 
other states comply with their own duty of guarantee. Rather than push other states to
mass terror, genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, or forced expulsion. (2) the intervening military force must 
have the right intention, in particular, to prevent those forms o f violent oppression. (3) military intervention has 
to be the last resort, undertaken only after other means have been attempted to prevent catastrophe. (4) the 
force used is to be the minimalforce necessary to secure human protection. (5) there has to be a reasonable chance of 
halting the oppression, and the expected ill consequences o f  the military action have to be less than that o f not 
intervening militarily.
85 Besides, concerns about human rights abuses have motivated and shaped the work o f  a growing number o f  
NGOs devoted to standard-setting and monitoring o f domestic governments’ performance, to advocacy of 
political change, and so forth. Since 1945, many N G O s and transnational advocacy networks have played a 
key role in the establishment o f  international human rights norms. They are the pioneers o f  the protection 
and promotion o f international human rights. For example, Risse and Sikkink point out that, during the 
1970s, the apartheid o f  South Africa bolstered the international human rights network and the activist 
orientation o f international organizations. See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics, p. 21. Furthermore, the Soviet Union signed the human rights 
provisions in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and interpreted them as empty rhetorical commitments; but the 
provisions became important weapons in the struggle o f  human rights activists in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic. Human-rights activism inside and outside these states 
indeed played a key role in robbing the communist regimes o f  their legitimacy and in, eventually, making the 
revolution o f 1989 possible. See Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki affect: International Norms, Human Rights, and 
the Demise of Communism (Princeton University Press, 2001); and Mary Kaldor, “Transnational Civil Society,” in 
T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1999).
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accept the same package of liberal rights, each state has a moral duty to ensure other states 
comply with their duties to provide these basic human rights. Accordingly, we should adopt 
a broad interpretation of interference and explain that, i f  not linked to the use of force, basic 
human rights are suitable guideposts for the foreign policy o f liberal states, and to 
encourage and persuade governments to comply with human rights norms.86 This foreign 
policy would not violate people’s right to self-determination. Furthermore, there is some 
reason to think that foreign involvement in a violating state could be a more effective 
influence on the state’s public opinion than the struggles of the state’s weak citizens. The 
least powerful citizens in a state have the least direct political access and the m ost indirect 
representation in a consultation hierarchy. Even with the best intentions, such a system will 
not as effectively or as efficiendy transmit the complaints of marginalized citizens as it 
would the complaints of privileged citizens. Foreign diplomats or transnational actors may 
well have more access to the top levels o f the hierarchy, and more opportunity to explain 
the complaints.
Last but not least, it is clear that Rawls’s model with closed and well-guarded borders is 
unable to deal with many problems in the current situation, and would not, in itself, be an 
adequate foundation for our approach to international relations, though Rawls believes that 
“cooperative institutions that have unjustified distributional effects” would need to be 
corrected.87 If  we take the idea o f a global basic structure seriously, it is clear that 
globalization involves dramatic increases in economic, ecological, and social 
interdependence, which deeply affects the ways in which societies are organized 
domestically and which can powerfully constrain their ability to determine the distribution 
of what they produce.88 Thus, our practical interactions across borders often involve norms
86 James Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?” p. 271.
87 See LPb, p. 115.
88 For instance, consider the destabilizing activities o f transnational corporations, the capricious movement of  
financial capital, the dismantling o f the social welfare state, environmental degradation, refugee crises, the 
global sex trade, and transnational organized crime. See Andrew Linklater, “The Evolving Spheres of
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and rules that do not derive from relations among nations; and many structural injustices, 
by involving people widely dispersed across the globe, are not limited to processes within a 
given nation-state. In contrast to Rawls’s position, our position should have a broad 
explanation of interference. Because human rights principles are part o f the universal 
ethical framework for international society, in the next chapter, I will defend the assertion 
that political responsibility for human rights requires us to heed the cries of victims and to 
do our best to prevent and alleviate cruelty wherever it may be found.
5.3 Another Political Liberalism: Human Rights and the Liberalism 
of Fear89
In contrast to the orthodox view of human rights deeming the task o f justification to be 
one internal to the conception o f human rights per se, a view starting from the role of 
human rights in international practices will enable us to theorize a conception of human 
rights only if we account for human-rights practices, justify the resulting abstraction, and 
delineate its scope. In the following, I will use my constructive approach to deal with the 
issue of human rights justification. In addition to the above-mentioned historical 
justification of the UDHR, the universality of fear has contributed gready to the 
remarkable role that human rights has played in the post-WWII era, appealing to people 
around the world and serving as a firm grounding for universal human rights. It is a moral 
intuition o f fear that mediates between human rights and political legitimacy and that 
provides a cosmopolitan moral ground for the justification of human rights.
The late Judith Shklar90 is another scholar whose work is that o f a “political liberal.”91 Like
International Justice,” in International Affairs, 75 (3)(1999), pp. 473^4-82.
89 Jan-Werner Muller refers to the liberalism o f fear as “cold war liberalism” and portrays Isaiah Berlin’s, 
Raymond Aron’s, and Karl Popper’s versions o f liberalism as examples o f the liberalism of fear, because they 
all prioritize the avoidance o f cruelty. See Jan-Werner Muller, “Fear and Freedom: On Cold War Liberalism,” 
in European Journal of Political Theory, 7(1) (2007), pp. 45-64.
90 I will use the following abbreviations in referring to Shklar’s writings: “Liberalism o f  Fear,” 1989, hereafter 
LFa\ “Liberalism o f  Fear,” 1998, hereafter LFb, “Political Theory and the Rule o f  Law,”,1998, hereafter PT,
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Rawls, she contends that liberalism should be deemed not “a philosophy of life such as has 
traditionally been provided by various forms o f revealed religion and other comprehensive 
Weltanschauung,,” 92 but a political conception that provides the most effective protection 
against the greatest threat to individual freedom, namely, the cruelty and fear produced by 
the intentional abuse of political power. Likewise, and in contrast to other versions of 
liberalism that either provide a positive doctrine about how people are to conduct their 
lives or focus on the possible achievement o f human perfection,93 Shklar contends that the 
overriding aim o f liberalism is to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the 
exercise o f personal freedom. Aside from this general doctrine, liberalism has no particular 
positive doctrine. Shklar states,
N o form o f liberalism has any business telling the citizenry to pursue happiness or 
even to define that wholly elusive condition. It is for each one o f us to seek it or 
reject it in favor o f  duty or salvation or passivity, for example. Liberalism must restrict 
itself to politics and to proposals to restrain potential abuses o f power in order to lift 
the burden o f  fear and favor from the shoulders o f adult women and men, who can 
then conduct their lives in accordance with their own beliefs and preferences, as long 
as they do not prevent others from doing so as well.94
However, unlike Rawls’s political liberalism, Shklar’s liberalism is not about searching either 
for abstract principles acceptable to all or for an overlapping consensus o f all reasonable 
individuals that would regulate the basic structure o f society. Rather, Shklar’s liberalism 
rests on the concepts of emotion and memory. Furthermore, unlike Nussbaum, Shklar 
does not begin with a utopian vision o f what can be achieved that reflects either a belief in 
the potential of human nature or the necessity of moral progress. Shklar bases her 
rejection of these visions on the premise that the world cannot solve the discrepancy
“Ordinary Vice,” 1984, hereafter OV\ “Face o f Injustice,” 1990, hereafter FOI; “Injustice, Injury and 
Inequality: An Introduction,” 1986, hereafter III; “Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle,” 1998, hereafter SHC; 
“Positive Liberty, Negative Liberty in the United States, 1998,” hereafter, PLN L.
91 Indeed, Rawls himself has identified Judith Shklar and Charles Larmore as political liberals, though he 
identifies many substantial differences between his theory and their theories. See PLbm. 133.
92 LFk  3.
93 For instance, Shklar mentioned both the liberalism of natural rights and the liberalism o f personal 
development. However, as John Dunn observed, differences between the liberalism o f  fear and other 
varieties o f liberalism are in the “grounds which lend force to” one common goal and “the means which can 
be trusted for reaching it.” It would be wrong to assume that the liberalism o f fear radically challenges other 
forms o f liberalism. John Dunn, “Hope Over Fear,” in Bernard Yack (ed) liberalism Without J//»j-/o»(Chicago, 
The University o f Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 45-54 at 46.
94 LFb, p. 13.
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between liberal political theory and liberal political practice by simply looking at an account 
o f “what we ought to be and do.”95 Following Montaigne’s line of reason, she begins “with 
what is to be avoided.” 96 “What liberalism requires,” she wrote, “is the possibility of 
making the evil of cruelty and fear the basic norm  of its political practices and 
prescriptions.”97 And the liberalism o f fear entails “a ramble through a moral minefield, not 
a march toward a destination.”98 Thus, in contrast to Nussbaum’s corresponding ideas, the 
political liberalism o f fear focuses mainly on avoidance rather than on fulfillment, on evil 
rather than on good, on injustice rather than on justice.
Rawls’s political liberalism functions to provide a solution to the problem of stability 
generated by reasonable pluralism; Shklar’s political liberalism has no quarrel with the truth 
of value pluralism: focusing on the avoidance o f evils rather than on the pursuit o f goods, 
the problem of value incompatibility — according to Shklar— has no relevance for the 
liberalism o f fear. Specifically, Shklar identifies with what Isaiah Berlin calls a plurality of 
values and with what she calls “the permanent possibility of inescapable conflict between 
values.”99 However, Shklar does endorse the idea that it is highly intolerant and unrealistic 
to expect people to agree on a certain summum bonum toward which they should all strive. In 
fact, such a society would be inevitably illiberal, since a recognized common end would 
justify coercion to make everybody attain that end. Therefore, a liberal society must— by 
definition as well as on the practical grounds o f accommodating varied beliefs— operate 
without any expressed or assumed summum bonum. By contrast, political liberalism shall put 
first the summum malum, “which all of us know and would avoid if only we could.” Shklar 
comments further on this point:
... the liberalism o f fear in fact does not rest on a theory o f  moral pluralism. It does not, to
95 F01, p. 16.
96 OV, p. 5.
97 LF, p. 30.
98 OV, pp. 6, 9
99 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, edited by Henry Hardy 
(London, John Murray, 1990), p. 80.
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be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive, but it 
certainly does begin with a summum malum, which all o f  us know and would avoid if  only 
we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself. To that 
extent the liberalism o f fear makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan claim, as it 
historically always has done.100
For Shklar, the whole idea of fear as the fundamental starting point o f liberalism reflects
the view that liberalism, as a political doctrine, cannot rest on a universally accepted 
positive idea because we are inherently diverse. It is not only unrealistic to expect that a 
diverse society would agree on a positive idea (e.g., a common lifestyle), but also reasonable 
to assume that, if a large segment of society aspires to a positive idea, the society will be 
more likely to accept public oppression against people who do not have the same 
aspiration. In this regard, the political liberalism o f fear rests on neither the
incommensurability of our notions o f the good nor the irreducible diversity of our 
understandings o f social reality. Being physiological, the experience of fear is
omnipresent101 and, consequently, can serve as a universal grounding for liberal thought. 
That human beings possess a natural fear o f suffering is not a proposition that everyone 
needs to agree upon in order for it to be true: it is simply a social fact that exists 
everywhere.102 Shklar suggests that, once one not only acknowledges the continued 
“prevalence o f racism, xenophobia, and systematic governmental brutality” in all areas of
LFb, pp. 10-11.
101 LFb, p. 11.
102 Some theorists make similar arguments. As Barrington Moore has indicated, although traditions differ 
considerably in their account o f what ends people should pursue and in their account o f  good, there are 
things that all cultures rank as “miserable.” For example, no culture welcomes on itself poverty, starvation, 
flooding, or lack o f adequate shelter, and no one wants to be tortured, abused, and segregated. That is to say, 
there are some human sufferings that all cultures deem to be bad. Ken Booth makes a similar claim when he 
argues, “People find it easier to agree upon what constitute wrongs elsewhere than they do rights” Similarly, 
Mary Midgley argues that “whatever doubts there may be about minor moral questions and whatever respect 
each culture may owe its neighbors, there are some things that should not be done to anybody anywhere.” See 
Barrington Moore, 1972, Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them, 
Boston, Beacon Press; Ken Booth, 1999, Three Tyrannies, in T. Dunne and N. Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in 
Global Politics-. 31-70, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Mary Midgley, Towards an ethic o f  global 
responsibility, in T. Dunne and N. Wheeler (eds) Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1999), pp. 160-174. Avishai Margalit, too, argues that it is easier to identify humiliating 
behavior than to identify respectful behavior, just as it is easier to identify illness than health. Both health and 
honor are concepts involving defense. Disease and humiliation are concepts involving attack. It is easier to 
identify attack situations than defense situations, since the former are based on a clear contrast between the 
attacker and the attacked, while the latter can exist even without an identifiable attacker. See Avishai Margalit, 
The Decent Society (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 5. See also Alan Dershowitz, Rights from 
Wrongs: A. Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights (New York: Basic Books, 2004), and Richard Rorty, Contingency, 
Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 192,198.
I 208
the globe but also tries to prevent and reduce such cruelty, one becomes a supporter o f the 
liberalism o f fear.103 In this regard, Shklar’s universal foundation for liberalism rests not on 
an abstract moral principle, but on historical experiences.
For Shklar, fear is a universal state of mind that all human beings want to avoid; all human 
beings naturally seek a political order that would eliminate or mitigate the perceived causes 
of the fear. Therefore, fear has been and will continue to be our chief inform ant when we 
think about the m ost suitable governance of men and women. Shklar adds,
It is a mental as well as a physical reaction, and it is common to animals as well as to 
human beings. To be alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage in many cases, 
since alarm often preserves us from danger. The fear we fear is o f  pain inflicted by 
others to kill and maim us, not the natural and healthy fear that merely warns us o f  
avoidable pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but 
for our fellow citizens as well. We fear a society of fearful people.104
In this regard, fear is an emotion that can be an epistemologicalfoundation on which we can 
conceive the foundations and the limits of the political world. Informed by cruelty and the 
fear it inspires, we then seek to advance a conception of political action that centers on future 
dangers to be feared and on avoidance, namely, on damage control.106
Shklar urges us to identify cruelty as the greatest evil.107 To make this identification is, first, 
to understand the main task of political liberalism as one of avoiding public cruelty, most 
of all because it creates fear. People pay attention to human insecurity and suffering 
because cruelty remains the fundamental threat to freedom and because human beings 
perceive cruelty to be the paramount human vice.108
Specifically, the reason for putting cruelty at the head o f the list o f greatest evil concerns 
the perception that cruelty destroys freedom while being “at odds not only with religion
103 LFa, p. 37.
104 See LFb, p. 11, emphasis added.
105 It means that “fear’ gives us the intuitive knowledge that which is the greatest evil and so provides an 
epistemological foundation for liberalism. I am indebted to professor John Charvet for pointing out the 
distinction between epistemological and emotional foundation o f liberalism.
106 See Jan-Werner Muller, “Fear and Freedom: On Cold War liberalism,” p. 48.
107 Cruelty, according to Shklar, is “deliberate infliction o f  physical and secondarily emotional, pain upon a 
weaker person or group by stronger ones in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible, o f the latter.”
OV, p. 29.
108 O V , p. 2.
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but with normal politics as well.”109 Cruelty, for Shklar, is a psychic impulse that finds an 
outlet in concentrations of state power and in substantial social inequality. Societies’ 
acceptance of these outcomes reflects societies’ belief that cruelty is the “underlying 
psychological and moral medium that makes vice all but unavoidable.”110 Moreover, cruelty 
is an ordinary vice, one that “we can live neither with nor without.” 111 But “ordinary” does 
not necessarily mean “innate,” since Shklar refrains from identifying what human “nature” 
is. If  “ordinary” means socially conditioned, then some social actions might enhance it, but 
other might diminish it. One critical actor herein is the government. Because humanity has 
never eliminated, and will never eliminate, fear, and because history shows that sources of 
power over and again tend to invoke fear; thus, fear is the factor that encourages people 
not only to agree on having a government, but also to limit this government.112 Following 
Montaigne, Shklar abhors the Machiavellian project and argues that the subjects are the 
true victims because they are the ones who suffer cruelty. Moreover, Hobbes’s Leviathan is 
in a way no better. Though Hobbes recognizes one particular act of cruelty, “violent 
death,” as the worst evil in the natural state, his sovereign does not seem to be under 
constraint to avoid other cruel acts directed at people who enter the social contract and 
who, thereby, cede their power to him. In other words, whereas Hobbes bases peace on 
society’s commitment to a social contract that requires society’s submission to the state, 
Shklar argues that the state, itself, is a potential threat to peace. Accordingly, further checks 
have to be made on the sovereign, whether through the separation o f powers into two 
parts, as advocated by Locke, or into three parts, as advocated by Montesquieu, who—  
along with Montaigne— is the other hero of Shklar’s political theory. People can grow 
fearful o f and resentful toward a government that either acts arbitrarily or fails to fulfill
109 By “normal politics,” Shklar means unchecked exercise o f power over other people, a Machiavellian prince 
seeking what is best for the preservation o f his power while persuading the people o f  the necessity o f  
decisions taken for this end. See LFb, p. 9.
110 OV, p. 242.
111 OV, p. 3.
112 FT, 22-23.
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agreed-upon expectations of it. A government that voids one of its commitments curtails 
the reasons for the people’s trust that the government will stay true to its other 
commitments. The greater the governmental misuse o f trust, the more fearful people 
might feel. And a government that recognizes this relationship is more likely to accept a 
moral obligation to avoid fear-inflicting acts. Therefore, the Hobbesian fear-inducing war 
of everybody against everybody makes people seek a protective government: in turn, a 
protective government— despite its capacity to wield great power— might impose on itself 
limits regarding government acts of fear-inducing cruelty. Seen in this light, the 
prioritization o f cruelty justifies a conception of the origins of liberal government and 
helps curtail governments’ misuse o f power. Government must submit to constant checks 
that help weaken its tendencies toward misuse of power. Only through these checks can a 
society hope to generate the conditions necessary for the realization o f true individual 
freedom. Shklar’s precise remarks on this theme are insightful:
The liberalism o f  fear.. .worries about the excesses o f official agents at every level o f  
government, and it assumes that these are apt to burden the poor and weak most heavily.
The history o f  the poor compared to that o f the various elites makes that obvious 
enough. The assumption, amply justified by every page o f political history, is that some 
agents o f government will behave lawlessly and brutally in small or big ways most o f the 
time unless they are prevented from doing so.113
Furthermore, cruelty has a second face, one that appears in the public domains. As people 
struggle with their own fears, they inevitably inflict pain on the weaker. The line between 
the weak and the powerful, the victims and the victimizers, never stops shifting: each party 
can, at certain times, occupy the position of the victimizer and, at other times, occupy the 
position of the victim. In this sense, Shklar is skeptical about any possibility o f ruling out 
cruelty if power relations endure. Fear thus is an emotion linked with the presence o f 
power. It stems from the cruelty created by power.
Accordingly, the cruelty with which the liberalism o f fear is principally concerned is public
113 LFb, p. 10.
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cruelty, which refers to “arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts o f force 
and .. .habitual and pervasive acts o f cruelty and torture performed by military, paramilitary, 
and police agents in any regime.”114 Because efforts to allay fears have often chipped away 
at individuals’ formerly government-protected freedoms, the political liberalism o f fear is 
the best means by which society can protect personal freedom from the tyranny of abusive 
governments and from the injustice of gross inequality. In this sense, cruelty both invokes 
fear and is a reaction to fear.115 As Shklar points out,
Liberalism’s deepest grounding is . . .in the conviction..., born in horror, that cruelty is 
an absolute evil, an offense against God or humanity. It is out o f that tradition that the 
political liberalism o f  fear arose and continues amid the terror o f  our time to have 
relevance.116
Like Rawls in relation to his theory, Shklar claims that her political liberalism o f fear 
demands a separation between the “personal and the public.” The prevention o f cruelty 
requires a distinction between public and private. It also requires specific capacities among 
citizens. The impetus for this claim is the desire to ensure that, by means o f struggle and 
protest, formal mechanisms of accountability are in fact recognized, practiced and made 
better. Therefore, only by ensuring such a separation can a conception o f justice “remove 
the fear of burden and favor from the shoulders of adult men and women” and “compel 
political power not to overstep its intended authority and invade the private realm.” Again, 
let us turn to Shklar’s own words:
The important point for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn, as that it be 
drawn, and that it must under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten. The limits o f  
coercion begin, though they do not end, with a prohibition upon invading the private 
realm, which originally was a matter o f religious faith, but which has changed and will go 
on changing as objects o f beliefs and the sense o f privacy alter in response to the 
technological and military character o f  governments and the productive relationships that 
prevail. It is a shifting line, but not an erasable one, and it leaves liberals free to espouse a 
very large range o f philosophical and religious beliefs.117
1)4 LFk  p. 11.
115 It means a circle o f vice: namely, cruelty causes physical pain, which causes fear, and fear causes cruelty 
whenever struggle with their own fears, people inevitably inflict pain on the weaker. See Corey Robin, Fear, p. 
149.
116 LFb, p. 5.
117 L F b , p6-7
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In contrast to Rawls’s political liberalism, Shklar does not premise the start o f her theory 
on ideals regarding, for instance, the conception of moral person or social cooperation. 
Rather, as a non-utopian oudook, her liberalism of fear is sensitive to political realities and 
takes the distinction between the weak and the powerful as the basic social fact and therefore sets 
for itself the task of guarding against invasions o f freedom and the intimidation o f the 
defenseless. Herein, Shklar makes the following remarks:
For this liberalism the basic units o f  political life are not discursive and reflecting 
persons, nor friends and enemies, nor patriotic soldier-citizens, nor energetic litigants, 
but the weak and the powerful. And the freedom it wishes to secure is freedom from the 
abuse o f  power and intimidation o f  the defenseless that this difference invites. This 
apprehension should not be mistaken for the obsessive ideologies which concentrate 
solely on the notion o f totalitarianism. This is a shorthand for only the extremity o f  
institutionalized violence and almost implies that anything less radically destructive 
need not concern us at all. The liberalism o f fear, on the contrary, regards abuses o f  
public power in all regimes with equal trepidation.118
For Shklar, state violence undermines the personal capacities of a victim or the targeted 
population to resist. Therefore, sense o f injustice is the key to understand these 
phenomena. “Unless we really know what the motives of social agents are,” we cannot 
hope to develop effective protections against undesirable results.119 Thus, the political 
liberalism of fear is “more a recipe for survival than a project for the perfectibility of 
mankind.” 120 It is a “liberalism without illusions” that is fearful o f ambitious programs 
advanced by people who feel absolutely certain in their convictions, and that focuses on 
establishing and defending “limits on all kinds of suffering that come from political 
wickedness and wrongdoing.”121 Thus, the liberalism o f fear is a way o f ranking humanity’s 
negative inclination or vices rather than a celebration o f progress and rationality, and the 
purpose of a political conception of justice is to protect citizens from the negative 
potential o f humankind— that is, “the ineradicable willingness of humans to inflict
118 Ibid., p. 9 emphasis added.
119 SHC, p. 89.
120 OV, p. 4.
j2i
George Kateb, “Foreword,” in Stanley Floffmann (ed), 'Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago, 
University o f Chicago Press 1998), p. xvi.
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unspeakable pain and misery upon one another.”122 In this regard, she belongs to the party 
o f memory rather than the party o f hope,123 because the political liberalism of fear is a 
negative political morality, its task focuses mainly on “damage control.”124 
Accordingly, the task of avoiding cruelty is necessarily political. When cruelty becomes 
systematic, the resulting fear makes political institutions necessary. The lives o f the 
oppressed do not matter under a regime predicated upon the violent suppression o f 
political opposition. The necessary constitution consists o f formal institutional 
mechanisms that secure the accountability of the state. Without these, the tremendous 
resources of the state can strengthen abuse targeting weaker constituents.
Seen in this light, it is the reason for avoidance of cruelty that makes “rights” instruments 
necessary. For Shklar, the call for rights is both a response to dangers in specific political 
situations and a plea for “institutions o f correction” to “protect the most feeble from 
abuses.”125 When governments or other political actors are prone to commit violations, it 
becomes the business of any political society to protect rights.126
A direct result o f the first principle of avoiding cruelty is the idea of rights, in that rights 
are useful instruments for persons who struggle against abuses of power. Shklar elucidates 
this point:
Rights are demands first and foremost out o f  fear o f  cruelty and injury from agents o f
governments, but also from private magnates. The former must always inspire the
122 Ibid.
123 Shklar borrows this category from Emerson’s essay “The Conservative” to name John Adams a member 
o f the party o f memory and to name Thomas Jefferson a member o f the party o f hope. See Judith Shklar, 
“Politics and Intellect,” in Stanley Hoffmann (ed), Political Thought and PoliticalThinkers, (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 94-104.
124 Ibid., p. 9.
125 III, p. 25; PT, p. 25
126 Likewise, Thomas Scanlon explicitly argues that individuals are being harmed either for political reasons or 
by government agents. As Scanlon puts it, “To condemn torture as a gross violation o f human rights is not 
simply to deplore pain, suffering, cruelty and degradation. These things are great evils but the condemnation 
of torture involves the invocation o f human rights because torture...is a political act— political in being 
carried out by agents o f the state and political in its aims, which are typically to crush opposition through the 
spread o f fear. The recognition o f human rights against the use o f  torture reflects the judgment that the 
temptation to rule in this manner is a recurrent threat and that the power to use torture is a power whose real 
potential for misuse is so clear as to render it indefensible.” As I have indicated in chapter two, Scanlon’s 
paper inspired Rawls’s human rights theory. See Thomas Scanlon, “Human Rights as a Neutral Concern,” p. 
86 .
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greatest fears because o f their actual or possible military competence, but fear attaches 
itself to other threatening persons as well. In either case, rights are asserted against 
power abused.127
In other words, the concept of rights becomes accepted as a response to governmental 
cruelty, and something which is experienced as a rights-violation is much more likely to be 
experienced as cruel or humiliating. We can clearly find the symbiotic relationship between 
the liberalism o f fear and the liberalism o f natural rights. However, in contrast to the 
liberalism of natural rights, which relies on “historical ignorance,” Shklar’s scheme o f fear- 
inspired rights here is based on “a strongly developed historical memory,” 128 because 
history always tells us that the function of rights is, in part, a response to different kinds of 
cruelty and suffering and that we should guard against abuses of power.129 We call them 
“rights” because they express “the fear of actual or threatened danger to all, but especially 
to the most feeble and helpless among us.”130 Rather than be grounded in a self-evident 
premise dictated by God or by Nature, “right” is grounded in a social and political reality in 
which individuals call for protection against abuses o f power.131Described in another way, 
rights are not natural or divine truths but useful weapons directed against failures of justice:
If we take the failure o f justice as our starting point, rights will not seem quite so 
destructive and atomistic. The stories and histories that remind us o f injustice may 
throw some persuasive light on rights as the appeals o f  the injured and outraged to their 
all too indifferent fellow citizens or even to humanity in general.132
By representing a means of diminishing public cruelty and the fear it inspires, the rights of 
individuals represent an ongoing process.133 Shklar comments on the absence o f linear 
finality in this regard:
The fear o f fear does not require any further justification, because it is irreducible. It can 
be both the beginning and an end o f  political institutions such as rights. The first right is to be 
protected against the fear o f cruelty. People have rights as a shield against this greatest o f
127 III, p. 25.
128 LFb , p. 9.
129 III, p. 25.
130 Ibid., p. 25.
131 LFb: 9.
132 III, p. 25
m  LFb, p. 19.
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public vices. This is the evil, the threat to be avoided at all costs—  This is not the 
liberalism o f natural rights, but it underwrites rights as the politically indispensable 
dispersion o f  power, which alone can check the reign o f fear and cruelty.134
In Shklar’s fear-oriented notion of rights, rights have to be understood as “primarily freely 
expressed protests and refusals, not as received shares.” 135 Demands for rights are not 
individual appeals of rational beings for one’s own fair share o f whatever is available, but as 
expressions o f compassion for and by people who suffer. N ot only can it defend the claim 
for right against the critique o f atomism since it is grounded in social and political reality, 
but also remind us of the way rights have been historically developed.
5.4 The Liberalism o f Fear and the Epistemological Foundation o f 
the UDHR
If my interpretation regarding Shklar’s theory is sound, the argument from Shklar’s 
liberalism of fear (1) can suitably provide the epistemological foundation for a theory of 
human rights, (2) can be the basic rationale of the UDHR, (3) and can be the basic 
rationale o f the sequential development of an international human rights regime. To move 
from “is” to “ought” can be grounded in the moral intuition o f fear insofar as it can be an 
epistemological grounding for human rights justification. Moreover, in line with Lindholm’s 
ideas, I assert that the UDHR is based on both a normative premise and a descriptive premise 
for the justification. However, in contrast to Lindholm’s ideas, I assert that the normative 
premise in the UDHR can be grounded in the idea of respectfor persons, understood as 
requiring basic rights for all as the necessary condition of the dignity o f persons in face of 
cruelty and fear. Also, I assert that the idea o f respect for persons does not entail a 
comprehensive moral philosophy that might vary in relation to diverse cultures. The idea
134 OV, pp. 237-8 emphasis added
135 See III, p. 32.
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of respect neither leads to nor derives from a metaphysical idea o f a fixed, universal good 
or any comprehensive doctrine. I argue that universal agreement regarding the UDH R 
derives chiefly from humanity’s memory of the World Wars and from the Holocaust, in 
particular. Acting as a practical obstacle to any repetition o f these government-led horrors, 
agreed-upon human rights would provide individuals protection against government 
oppression. Before 1945, international law regulated mainly the relations between states, 
confirming the parameters o f the Westphalian order. After 1945, the fear o f anarchy and 
the fear of war contributed to the establishment o f the United Nations.136 Furthermore, 
the memory o f the enormity of the Holocaust has come to provide the main impetus for 
the privileged position that the human rights regime currently enjoys in the international 
arena. In this climate, it was possible to link constraints on war with prevention o f human 
rights violations. The Preamble of the UDH R claims that “disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind,” and the UDHR drafters’ “moral outrage” at the Nazi regime and the Holocaust 
lay “behind the acceptance of the entire range o f rights” in the UDHR.137 By viscerally 
negating so many widely accepted but disparate human rights views, the Nazi system and 
the Holocaust strengthened the world’s ability to apply to all humanity a set o f human 
rights. Nariman comments on the historical roots o f  the document’s human rights:138
The ruthless trampling on human rights by the Axis Powers, the holocaust in the gas 
chambers o f Auschwitz and Dachau, and the use o f the Atom Bomb on the defenseless 
[cities] o f Hiroshima [and Nagasaki] helped hasten a consensus on the universality o f  
human rights and the need for their international declaration, recognition and 
protection.139
136 See Stanley Hoffmann, “Thoughts on Fear in Global Society,” in Social Research, 71 (4) (2004), pp. 1-14.
137 Ignatieff states, “The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights is written in full awareness o f Auschwitz 
and dawning awareness o f  Kolyma. A consciousness o f European barbarism is built into the very language o f  
the Declaration’s preamble: ‘whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience o f mankind...’.” See Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights as Politics 
and Idolatry,” p. 65.
138 Moreover, John Glover has given an illuminating account o f the Nazi’s strategies o f distancing and 
depersonalizing victims, the ways in which Nazis used “hostile stereotypes” o f their victims and humiliated 
them: “This stripping o f  protective dignity breached a moral barrier, making it easier to go the whole way in 
atrocity.” See John Glover, Humanity: A. Moral History of the Twentieth Century (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 
327.
139 See Fali Nariman, “The Universality o f  Human Rights,” in The Review of the International Commission of Jurists
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Facing terrifying tragedies, the framers of the UDHR articulated a set o f enforceable 
codes of conduct: prohibitions against slavery, genocide, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, 
and deprivation and demands for aid for victims, and so on. The drafters with different 
comprehensive doctrines likely devoted themselves to different conceptions o f the good, 
but perhaps by acknowledging that cruelty could devastate all these goods, the drafters 
united in their condemnation of the greatest evil. Though the practice o f human rights 
cannot form the content o f a way of life, they are time-tested means to protect every 
individual against the summum malum. The threats to humanity reside in modern structures 
of power, ranging from states and international regulatory bodies to financial institutions 
and multinational corporations; these threats have combined with historical memories to 
create the conditions that make for widespread recognition of shared human vulnerability 
and o f a shared reason for adopting a human rights regime. In this regard, freedom from 
fear is a desirable goal that is shared globally. In other words, people share the trait of 
fearfulness and respond to this problem by searching for a shared solution— the solution 
of human rights. The rights are not norms that can be found in all cultural traditions or 
religious doctrines, but are a choice that people make: the choice of identifying these norms 
and o f assigning to them universal applicability.140 Moreover, the justification o f this choice 
rests neither on clear-cut philosophical or religious world-views nor on a view from 
nowhere, but on historical experiences, especially those of catastrophes. The experiences, 
being so horrifying, have given rise to two perhaps inextricable assertions: “This particular 
individual has the right to be free from this violence” and “All individuals have the right to 
be free from this violence.”
50(1993), pp. 8-22 at 12.
140 Sissela Bok points out that, “as the media disseminate images worldwide o f atrocities from places such as 
Tiananmen Square, Kurdistan, Burma, Croatia, or Somalia, it becomes ever more difficult to maintain that the 
victims are somehow so culturally different from the viewing public that their plight cannot be evaluated 
from the outside.” See Sissela Bok, Common Values (University o f Missouri Press, 2002), p. 61.
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Therefore, the universal applicability of human rights stems not from our ability to find a 
universal philosophical foundation for the rights, but from moral force and practical 
resonance among people from all types of human societies around the world.141 The rights 
are specific manifestations of these people’s shared tragic experiences and of the people’s 
search for a solution to their own political and social problems. Booth acknowledges these 
roots to the current human rights regime:
Universality o f human rights is supposed to be invalid because there is no universal 
ethical community. But there is: the ethical community o f  oppressed women, the ethical 
community o f the under-class; the ethical community o f the hungry.. .and on and on.
Universal human rights are solidly embedded in multiple networks o f  cross-cutting 
universal ethical communities.142
Because cruelty and fear are ubiquitous, all societies find it easier to recognize and to agree
upon what constitutes summum malum elsewhere, and human rights offer societies a
recognized vocabulary in which they can frame political and social wrongs.143 It is not a
simple result of Westernization or cultural imperialism. Rather, it is due in large measure to
the grave violations of human rights that have occurred in remarkably similar forms all
over the world, generating rights-awareness in the affected people.144 Human rights have
“gone global” not because they serve the interests o f the powerful, but because they “go
local,” where they embed themselves in the “soil of cultures and worldviews independent
of the West” and provide people with a useful weapon against unjust states and oppressive
141 See Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as Human Rights in the 
International Community,” in Peter Van Ness (ed) Debating Human Rights (Routledge Press 1999), pp. 167-183.
142 Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” in Dunne, Tim and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global 
Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 1999), pp. 31-70.
143 Coomaraswamy, “Reinventing International Law,” p. 170. Likewise, Alan Dershowitz argues, “It is more 
realistic to try to build a theory o f rights on the agreed-upon wrongs o f the past that we want to avoid 
repeating, than to try to build a theory o f  rights on idealized conceptions o f  the perfect society about which 
we will never agree.” See Alan Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs: A. Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights (New  
York: Basic Books, 2004).
144 Indian Feminist Uma Narayan powerfully refutes the accusation o f “Westernization,” when she states that 
at issue is “a pain that was earlier than school and Westernization, a call to rebellion that has a different and 
more primary root, that was not conceptual or English, but in the mother-tongue.” If there seems to be a 
resemblance between the issues addressed by Third World feminists and those addressed by Western 
feminists, it is a result, she asserted, “not o f faddish mimicry, but o f the fact that women’s inequality and 
mistreatment are, unfortunately, ubiquitous features o f  many ‘Western’ and ‘ Nonwestern’ cultural contexts, 
even as their manifestations in specific contexts display important differences o f detail.” See Uma Narayan, 
“Contesting Cultures: “Westernization,” Respect for Cultures, and Third-World Feminists,” in Linda 
Nicholson (ed), The Second Wave: A. Reader in Feminist Theory (NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 396-414, at 399,401.
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social practices.145 The political legitimacy o f human rights norms is reinforced by the fact 
that the people who make them are not foreign human rights activists but the victims 
themselves from within their cultures. In their own struggles against oppression, deprivation, 
marginalization, and injustice, people have recognized human rights as an instrument of 
empowerment.146 It can be universally applicable, since the fear of cruelty is universal. 
According to Bernard Williams,
The liberalism of fear can be taken as having a different and much wider set o f  
listeners: roughly, everybody. Indeed, its relations to its listeners and its audience are the 
reverse o f the other traditional options. Its listeners, unusually, form a much larger 
group than its expected audience. It speaks to humanity. And it has a right to do this, a 
unique right, I think, because its materials are the only certainly universal materials o f  
politics: power, powerlessness, fear, cruelty, a universalism o f negative capacities.147
For Williams, since the liberalism of fear operates with the “only certainly universal 
materials o f politics,” it recognizes a set of human rights that stand against cruelties and 
that require no further philosophical justification. Seen in this light, it can avoid the 
criticism that human rights merely reflect the preferences of Western culture.
The recognition of a common human vulnerability makes human rights instruments 
necessary and desirable, and we ensure our own future by demanding the rights of others, 
since the possibility o f violation is universal.148 “If we do not remember that anyone can be 
a victim, and if we allow hatred for torture, or pity for pain, to blind us, we will unwittingly 
aid the tortures of tomorrow by overrating the victims of today.”149 As long as we remind 
ourselves that human rights empower the weak and powerless against abuses o f power, we 
can distinguish this issue from the soft-power discourse strengthening Western hegemony 
and from non-Western politicians’ appeals for cultural authenticity. Although the 
conception of human rights must respect variance in local conceptions of justice, it can
145 Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry” p. 7.
146 In so doing, we can say that the evolution o f the concept o f human rights (e.g. three generations o f  
human rights) actually responds to new threats to human life. See Philip Alston, “Conjuring Up N ew  Human 
Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control,” in American Journal of International LawVol 78(3) (1984), pp. 607-621.
147 Bernard Williams, “The liberalism o f  Fear,” in Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed) In the beginning Was the Deed:
Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Princeton University Press, 2005) pp. 52-61 at 59.
148 JI7, p. 26.
149 r ci .  m
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point to the criteria for political legitimacy in world politics and can transform them into 
tools for social criticism.
5.5 Substantive or Justificatory Minimalism?
Some may argue that if we accept Shklar’s political liberalism o f fear, then the fear-inspired 
rights scheme must be very thin— after all, the aim o f human rights is to protect 
individuals’ freedom from abuses o f power. And it seems that Shklar’s negative liberalism 
has a logical affinity to Isaiah Berlin’s notion o f negative liberty (i.e., freedom from 
interference). Ostensibly parallel with the aim of negative liberty, the aim of the liberalism 
of fear is to protect human beings against cruelty; thus human rights in this scheme must 
be restricted to the protection o f negative liberty, which by itself neither requires nor, 
indeed, allows the state to directly promote positive liberty.
Michael Ignatieff, for example, inspired by Shklar’s political liberalism o f fear, argues that 
the universal commitment to human rights, when grounded in the liberalism of fear, would 
contain a systematic agenda regarding only “negative liberty,” a minimal institutional 
safeguard.150 Human rights would constitute a “tool kit” that individuals could access in 
response to any political oppression, and could be compatible with different religious and 
cultural views. Ignatieff invokes Shklar’s ideas to clarify his assertion:
.. .what should our goals as believers in human rights be? Here my slogan would be the 
title o f the justly famous essay by my old teacher, Judith Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First.”
We may not be able to create democracies or constitutions. Liberal freedom may be 
some way off. But we could do more than we do to stop unmerited suffering and gross 
physical cruelty. That I take to be the elemental priority o f all human rights activism: to 
stop torture, beating, killings, rape, and assault and to improve, as best we can, the 
security o f ordinary people. My minimalism is not strategic at all. It is the most we can 
hope for.151
Must the scope of human rights be restricted to the protection o f negative freedom if we 
ground human rights in the liberalism of fear? I don’t think so, and it is not what Shklar
150 Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry” p. 56.
151 Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry” p 173.
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stated either. Indeed, she notes that in its concern with freedom from interference, the 
liberalism of fear resembles Berlin’s notion o f negative liberty. However, she explicitly 
argues that the two differ in very important ways.
To begin with, Shklar contends that Berlin’s notion is conceptually pure and distinct from 
“the condition of liberty.” Like Rawls, Shklar believes that an effective notion o f liberty 
must incorporate such conditions o f liberty. Negative liberty, if it is to have any political 
significance at all, must specify at least some o f the institutional characteristics o f a relatively 
free regime. Therefore, protecting individuals against oppression is not the same as 
negative liberty. Government should protect people from cruelty, whatever the source. 
Moreover, Shklar presents an “egalitarian liberalism” that is “an obvious corollary of 
putting cruelty first,”152 though the purpose o f Shklar’s liberalism is to reach egalitarianism 
on the basis not of affirming people’s equal moral worth, but of subjecting significant 
inequalities to skeptical scrutiny. For Shklar, inequalities make cruelty tempting in that 
inequality increases the “social distance” between victim and victimizer and, consequendy, 
strengthens and creates opportunities for cruelty. First of all, inequality separates the victim, 
emotionally and cognitively, from his or her victimizer, making it possible for the latter to 
exercise an internal impulse toward cruelty153. Second, because inequality provides the 
powerful a “vacuum that separates him from his subject,” it is easy for the powerful to 
abuse the weak and social inferiors.154
Thus, if the powerful operate in a climate conducive to cruelty, then equality may be a 
remedy for the weak. One should not mistake the liberal’s fear o f government with 
indifference to the sad plight of society’s disadvantaged citizens. The fear includes the 
pessimistic realization that the excesses o f official agents “are apt to burden the poor and
152 O V :29
153 Corey Robin, “Fear”, p. 19.
154 Corey Robin, “Fear”, p. 2.
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weak most heavily.”155 That is why it is important to bind those agents with legal 
constraints and to disperse power to people capable o f defending their own interests.
W hen we pay attention to how the world looks to those who have been injured by the 
functioning of the social distances and institutions surrounding them, we would defend the 
idea o f equality as the condition we must accept once we listen to the voice o f the 
marginalized. It would show why achieving negative liberty entails a positive commitment 
to “the elimination o f such forms and degrees of social inequality as expose people to 
oppressive practices.” Therefore, it is a “negative egalitarianism” which is “really a fear of 
the consequences o f inequality.”156
Shklar argues that the contrast between negative liberty and positive liberty might be 
conceptually possible but not universally applicable in all political situations. From her 
point of view, this contrast has much less relevance in the history o f the United States, for 
instance. Regarding the peculiar history of slavery, its legal institutions, and its tradition of 
litigation, the function of rights instruments in the United States is not merely to protect 
freedom from interference so that people can realize their own goals, but also to promote 
people’s demands that government “act positively in order to protect the freedom of 
minorities, o f blacks, of the weak, and of all those who are second-class citizens.”157 In this 
light, rights are two things: (1) the “open door” that would allow people to reach their own 
goals without hindrance; and (2) useful instruments that would allow people to realize their 
goals against others.158 Shklar states,
Given the brutalities, randomness, and systematic intimidation o f  daily life for most people, 
it cannot claim that its distributions are just at all without the strictest standard o f  legality.
“I have a right” speaks not only for “me,” but for all who would protest and enjoin. It is 
when we look at gross injustice that rights reveal both their negative character and their far 
from egotistical social meaning— and their importance.159
133 OV:28.
156 OV:28, 29.
157 PLNL, p. 112.
158 PLNL, p. 111.
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Furthermore, when we look back at the history of abolitionism in the United States, Shklar 
argues, we can find that negative and positive liberties are mutually supportive.
At a glance, it seems that the conflict between the black slaves and the white masters was a 
conflict between two negative liberties. Black slaves wanted to be free to do what white 
citizens could do without suffering from pronounced racial discrimination. White 
slaveholders wanted to be free to do whatever they wanted concerning black slaves, whom 
slaveholders regarded as their own property. But the real conflict was not between two 
negative liberties but between two kinds o f competing “rights.” For the two sides, the 
pursuit of negative liberty remained the pursuit o f rights.160 W hen they claimed their own 
right in court, the court had to choose between the two rights. The courts’ choice to 
recognize blacks as citizens equal to all other citizens entailed specific political constraints 
defined by law and protected by the government. In other words, it was not the inalienable 
rights of the Declaration of Independence but a new sense of the suffering o f slaves that 
brought about the abolition o f slavery in the South and that helped protect them through 
the legal realization of this idea o f rights. Shklar states,
But the change in behavior which decisions require afterward, and which they will 
require for a long time still, mean that the right to claim one’s right will remain the first o f  all 
rights. When all liberties are positive liberties, the right to fight for one’s own rights and 
for other specific rights is the most important o f all freedoms. It is an endless process.161
Rights instruments are not an open door through which one can strengthen the freedom- 
from-interference pursuit; rather, they are a useful instrument with which people can 
“address institutions of correction” and can, in this way, try to strengthen states’ positive 
protection of freedom. Rather than entail passive enjoyment o f freedom, negative freedom 
requires permanent political action.162 Again, let us consider Shklar’s comments:
However, to say that the right to take part in political life and the fact o f  being an active
160 For the abolitionist, “equal protection o f the law” was not merely a request for an equality that could limit 
the negative liberty o f the masters, but also “the political and legal realization o f  the idea o f rights.” See 
PLNL, p. 113, 121.
161 PDVL, p. 125.
162 PLNL, p. 112.
224
citizen are no more than statutes and conditions o f freedom, but not freedom itself, 
amounts to reducing negative liberty to a psychological state that is passive and empty 
of political content. Finally, what can the expression “being master in one’s own 
domain” mean if not the right to act politically in an effective way?163
The historical example cited here is an American story with its particularities. My point 
here merely responds to the argument that substantive minimalism, which narrows the 
content of human rights to negative liberties, is the corollary o f the liberalism o f fear.
While protecting individuals from cruelty, whatever the source, human rights instruments 
help us “take into account the actual political conditions under which people live, in order to 
act here and now to prevent known and real dangers,” and help compel states to act positively 
in protecting the practical uses o f freedom.164
PLNL, p. 116.
164 LFb, p. 17.
Chapter Six: 
Sense o f Injustice and the Voices o f Victims
I believe some human rights standards can be arrived at and ought to be upheld everywhere in the 
world. But.. .we are not entitled to assume the right to enforce whatever tentative conclusions happen 
to have emerged from our particular inbred set o f  debates about free speech, the division o f church 
and state, or individual autonomy. Until those debates are enriched, in a cosmopolitan way, with an 
awareness o f what is to be said about them and around them and against them, from all the variety o f  
cultural and religious and ethical perspectives that there are in the world, they remain parochial.
—  Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claimx
6.1 Asymmetrical Reciprocity and the Voices o f Victims
If the liberalism of fear can appropriately provide an epistemological foundation for 
human rights principles, then we can say that human rights are important means for 
protecting human beings against cruelty, whatever the source. The call for rights is a 
response to very real dangers in a violent world. In this way, we give a firm moral 
grounding to the idea o f human rights.
However, the task of justification has not been completed yet. Recall that there are two 
levels of human rights justification in question. One concerns the justification as to why 
societies should recognize these rights as human rights. The other concerns the justification 
as to which rights deserve societies’ recognition of them as human rights. We may furnish 
grounds for agreement and solve the first-level of justification; however, this success would 
not be sufficiently encompassing to deal with the second level o f justification regarding the 
content and the interpretation o f human rights principles.
In chapter five, I suggested that we follow my revised Rawlsian “human rights proper” if
1 Jeremy Waldron, “How to Argue for a Universal Claim,” in Columbia Human 'Rights Haw Review, 30(1999), pp. 
305-314.
we accept the idea of decency as the justification for interference with the autonomy of 
states. For Rawls, human rights principles as part of the conception o f decency constitute a 
standard for the membership o f a society o f well-ordered peoples in a world society. 
Human rights principles maintain mutual relations among peoples for the right reason and 
provide societies with sufficient ground for taking action against human rights violations. 
These principles function as a minimum threshold below which an offending society would 
no longer have good standing in international society. The principles are the reasons that 
ultimately justify intervention whose purpose is to shift societies from illegitimacy to 
legitimacy.
Accordingly, like Rawls’s human rights proper, it is plain that the content o f human rights 
from my scheme, despite omitting several rights identified in the UDHR, is more expansive 
than Ignatieff’s version, which contains mainly negative liberties. However, this relative 
expansiveness does not mean that we should give up the items that do not belong in 
human rights proper. These items can constitute the rights of citizens, and members of 
specific societies would flesh the rights out and write them into a constitution. Moreover, 
we should encourage cross-cultural dialogue to enable the members o f liberal and non­
liberal societies to resolve the conflicts between their respective treatments o f human rights 
proper, even if we accept Rawls’s idea of decency as the minimal standard for international 
legitimacy.
However, some scholars may contend that, in spite o f Shklar’s expectation that people will 
agree on the summum malum, the difficulty of reaching agreement on summum malum is no 
less daunting than the difficulty o f reaching agreement on the summum bonum because there 
is a variety of social evils just as there is a variety of social goods. Accordingly, to pick out 
one vice and to privilege it over others might have an effect similar to that o f identifying a 
highest good. In political terms, the former process might bring about a regime that would
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aspire to make people better so long as the people try to eliminate the vice that they 
consider to be the worst. It seems that one can hardly expect people to agree on the 
greatest ill when there are myriad ills just as there are myriad goods. A greatest ill is nothing 
less than a negative reflection o f a greatest good.
John Kekes, for instance, articulates the question and doubts not only the assertion that 
cruelty is the worst evil but also the effort to find the greatest ill as such. He contends,
Just as there is no summum bonum, so there is no summum malum either. There is no doubt 
that cruelty is very bad, but it is not the worst thing. The worst thing is what causes the 
most evil. In different circumstances different things will do that. There always is a 
worst thing, but there is nothing that is always the worst thing.2
Likewise, Richard Posner argues that there is no extra-cultural authoritative source for 
our moral judgment about right or wrong. He states,
There are tautological ones, such as ‘murder is wrong’ where ‘murder’ means ‘wrongful 
killing’, or ‘bribery is wrong’, where bribery means ‘wrongful paying’. But what counts as 
murder, or as bribery, varies enormously from society to society. There are a handful o f  
rudimentary principles o f social cooperation— such as don’t lie all the time or don’t 
break promises without any reason or kill your relatives or neighbors indiscriminately—  
that may be common to all human societies, and if one wants to call these rudimentary 
principles the universal moral law, that is fine with me. But they are too abstract to be 
criterial.3
Thus, it appears that the idea o f putting cruelty first is too abstract to provide any useful 
standard in particular and concrete human rights violations. One can undoubtedly accept 
the notion of summum malum, but disagree over the content of summum malum. One can 
undoubtedly accept the notion of putting cruelty first, but disagree with the content o f the 
cruelty and its connection to the language o f human rights. There are reasonable 
disagreements about the interpretations if we consider Article 5 of the UDHR: “N o one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Is there a consensus over the meaning of terms such as ‘cruel’? Is the death penalty cruel? 
If one society supports female circumcision and treats it as representing central values to
2 John Kekes, Cruelty and Liberalism, in Ethics, Vol 106(1996), pp. 834-844 at 843.
3 Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, (MA, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),
p. 6.
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the society’s way of life, can we clearly find the consensus to treat the practice as torture? 
When does discrimination, when based on gender, class, or caste, assume the form of 
torture proscribed by international human rights standards? Is it torture to scar children’s 
cheeks or other parts of the body, a ceremonial practice that is common in some African 
communities? Is corporal punishment which is popular in Asia inhuman or degrading 
treatment?
I assert that, although giving rise to the justification issue, the endeavor to find a summum 
malum is not only feasible but also necessary.4
Inevitably, there has to be a qualitative difference not only between the category of the 
greatest good and the greatest ill, but also between ills that aspire to the status o f greatest 
ill. Every society must have its own criteria to distinguish tolerable evils from intolerable 
evils or cruelties. This distinction must be contextual, and we should understand and 
appreciate the significance of each particular evil in a way o f life.5 Such criteria involve 
highly complex notions of harm, cannot be adequately conceptualized and elaborated in 
the simplistic language of cruelty or evil. Therefore, we should try to understand how 
cruelties are experienced and understood within the framework of a particular moral 
outlook. If human rights are a useful means to compel states to act positively to protect 
freedom from fear, then the success of political liberalism of fear “depends on the kinds 
of cruelty and the history o f political wrongs which are responded to.”6 Although the 
liberalism of fear carries a cosmopolitan claim that every person has basic moral rights to be 
free from cruelty and fear, the liberalism of fear does not necessarily carry the same 
interpretation about cruelties so that the treatment o f legal rights can vary from one society
4 Indeed, Shklar views with caution the effort to find a summum malum. She claims that “as a matter o f liberal 
policy we must learn to endure enormous differences in the relative importance that various individuals and 
groups attach to the vices,” as even the moral spectrum consists o f “layer upon layer o f  ancient religious and 
class rituals, ethnic inheritances o f sensibility and manners, and ideological residues whose original purpose 
has by now been utterly forgotten.” See OV, p. 4.
5 Jonathan Allen, “The Place o f Negative Political Morality in Political Theory,” in 'Political Theory Vol 29 
(3)(2001), pp. 337-363 at 351.
6 Jacob Levy, Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford University Press 2001), p.23.
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to another.7
However, when we accept the contextual argument about the criteria, we should be careful 
that we are not on a slippery slope toward cultural relativism. In this stage, we need to take 
seriously the perspectives o f different cultures if human rights are going to be appropriate 
as global normative standards for a multicultural world. Therefore, we need sincere cultural 
dialogues that help provide a given society with a basis for settling related interpretation 
problems and implementation problems and that help us learn how societies can finally 
accept a single interpretation regarding human rights principles that, when honored by a 
society, constitute a sufficient condition for the society’s immunity from outside 
interference. Amartya Sen points out,
The universality o f human rights relates to the idea o f survivability in unobstructed 
discussion— open to participation by persons across national boundaries. Partisanship is 
avoided not so much by taking either a conjunction, or an intersection, o f the views 
respectively held by dominant voices in different societies across the world (including 
very repressive ones), but through an interactive process, in particular by examining 
what would survive in public discussion, given a reasonably free flow o f information 
and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points o f view.8
But to find a reasonable and public test o f the interpretation o f human rights, we should 
not search for the solution from the angle of what was visible at the center of public life 
either starting from ideas implicit in the public political culture by Rawls’s political 
constructivism, from Nussbaum’s Aristotelian practical reasoning and Rawlsian “reflective 
equilibrium,” or from An-Na’im’s cultural orientation within a given framework of 
interpretation. To accomplish a public test o f the political legitimacy o f human rights, we 
should start from the standpoint o f the margins and look at many injustices in our 
everyday life: we should consider people who cannot easily represent themselves in
7
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti argues that the application o f human rights principles is controversial as it depends 
on three kinds o f interpretation, that is, the interpretation o f (1) the principles, (2) the case; and (3) potential 
conflicts among principles. In this regard, whether the practices are tolerable cannot be settled simply by 
judging whether the practice can be inferred directly and univocally from the fundamental principles. See 
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, “Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics: The Case o f  Female Circumcision,” 
in Constellations, Vol 14(1)(2007), pp.91-111.
8 Amartya Sen, “Elements o f a Theory o f Human Rights,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, no4 (2004), pp. 315- 
356.
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societies’ centers o f power.
Recall that, in chapter four, I argue that the claim of cultural authenticity is premised upon 
the criterion of internal acceptance. Moreover, all cultural claims should be premised on 
“the right to claim one’s right,” and a sincere cultural dialogue based on the idea of 
reciprocity requires at least three conditions: (1) Participants within internal or cross- 
cultural dialogue should not exercise power over each other, in whatever manner power is 
manifested. (2)The scope o f criticism should not be limited by the framework of 
interpretation that cultural members already shared. Deprivation and domination, not 
shared understandings, should be the focus o f attention in a sincere human rights dialogue. 
And (3) marginalized groups should have opportunities to have their perspectives heard 
directly, neither through the dominant cultures nor through the qualifications of the 
insider-outsider distinction. In the following, I will argue that, during dialogue, marginalized 
groups should have opportunities not only to voice their perspectives directly to society, 
but also to do so before privileged groups voice their perspectives. Iris Young’s idea of 
“asymmetrical reciprocity” and Shklar’s “negative liberalism” throw some light on this 
matter.
In contrast to A n-Na’im’s idea o f reciprocity, Iris Young’s idea of asymmetrical reciprocity 
proposes that the victim should speak for himself or herself. As I state in chapter four, An- 
N a’im asserts that (1) people who differ from one another regarding their perspectives can, 
by assuming the positions o f other people, perceive themselves from the perspectives of 
these other people, and that (2) mutual dialogue in this context can help people come to an 
agreement on general ethical matters. An-Na’im enjoins members o f a moral community 
to switch their perspectives and to judge one another from the perspectives of others. The 
viability o f this switching rests on the assumption that people can, through imagination, 
assume the place of another person and can judge themselves from the other person’s
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perspective. However, as Young persuasively argues,9 in making moral judgments, the idea 
of symmetrical reciprocity needs each o f us to take the perspectives of all others, and 
suggests “that we are able to understand one another because we are able to see ourselves 
reflected in the other people and find that they see themselves reflected in us.”10 N ot only 
would it ultimately reduce the complexity o f relationships between the self and the other, 
but also fail to ensure that the voice o f the marginal other is effectively represented. When
we try to put ourselves in the situation o f another, we may deploy our own particular
experiences and “privileges to imaginatively inhabit the site o f the other,” thereby 
“unknowingly misrepresenting the other’s situation.”11 Young points out,
The reciprocal recognition by which I know that I am other for you just as you are other 
for me cannot entail a reversibility o f perspectives, precisely because our positions are
partly constituted by the perspectives each o f us has on the others..................Who we are
is constituted to a considerable extent by the relations in which we stand to others, along
with our past experience o f our relations with others. Thus the standpoint o f  each o f  us
in a particular situation is partly a result o f  our experience o f the other people’s
perspectives on us. It is hard to see how any o f us could suspend our perspective
mediated by our relations to others, in order to adopt their perspectives mediated by 
their relations to us. The infinity o f the dialectical process o f selves in relation to others 
both makes it impossible to suspend our own positioning, and leaves an excess o f  
experiences when I try to put myself in the other person’s place.12
It is neither possible nor desirable to imagine what the other might want or might consent 
to without “the other” speaking for himself or herself, because our standpoints are 
asymmetrical and irreversible. Each person has his or her own life story. Also, each social 
position is framed by the structure o f relationships among positions, and positions cannot 
be taken from one context and substituted by another. For instance, when privileged
people try to “put themselves in the position of people who are less privileged,” 13 the
assumptions that the privileged people derive from their privilege often allow them
9 Young argues that the idea o f symmetrical reciprocity has three flaws: (1) the idea o f symmetrical 
reciprocity obscures difference; (2) it is based on the supposed possibility o f  reversing positions; and (3) it is 
politically suspect. See Iris Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged 
Thought,” in Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1997), pp. 44-49.
10 Ibid., p.44
11 Ibid., p. 48.
12 Ibid., p. 48.
13 Ibid., p. 48.
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unwittingly to misrepresent the other’s situation. O n the other hand, “asking the oppressed 
to reverse perspectives with the privileged in adjudicating a conflict may itself be an 
injustice and an insult.”14
Thus, by virtue of recognizing the asymmetry of subjects, we need a different account of 
what understanding is and what makes it possible. Because each interlocutor in a 
communication situation is distinguished by the particular history and social position that 
makes their relation asymmetrical, Young believes that “the other” as a member of an 
oppressed group must speak for himself or herself and must represent his or her needs 
and desires. Young suggests that one starts with the assumption that one cannot see things 
from the other person’s perspective, and “attends with respectful distance” to their 
expressions o f interests and needs. As Young explains,
...the ethical relation o f asymmetrical reciprocity looks like this. We meet and 
communicate. We mutually recognize one another, and aim to understand one another.
Each is open to such understanding by recognizing our asymmetry. A condition o f  our 
communication is that we acknowledge difference, interval, that others drag behind 
them shadows and histories, scars and traces that do not become present in our 
communication. Thus we each must be open to learning about the other person’s 
perspective, since we cannot take the other person’s standpoint and imagine that 
perspective as our own. This implies that we have the moral humility to acknowledge 
that even though there may be much I do understand about the other person’s 
perspective through her communication to me and through the constructions we have 
made common between us, there is also always a remainder, much that I do not understand 
about the other person’s experience and perspective.15
For Young, if you think you already know how other people feel simply because “you have 
imaginatively represented their perspectives to yourself,” then you may not “listen to their 
expression of their perspectives very openly.”16 In so doing, seeking to understand others 
entails patiently and respectfully taking in all of the information that the other gives us 
about his or her experience. To follow the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity in this way, we 
should try to understand the other not by simply trying to substitute the other’s perspective 
for our own perspective but by respectfully engaging with the actual other.
14 Ibid, p. 48
15 Ibid, p. 53.
16 Ibid, p. 48
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Likewise, Shklar proposes that we should listen to the victim’s voice because the complaints 
from victims provide us with a valuable source o f moral insight. In The Faces of Injustice, 
Shklar challenges the general belief about the nature and the origins of injustice. According 
to the normal model of justice, justice is a body of rules and basic principles governing the 
distribution of benefits and burdens within a community, coexisting with the establishment 
of effective and impartial institutions to guarantee the enforcement of these basic rules 
and principles. On this normal model, injustice occurs whenever we depart from any of 
these rules or principles. Moreover, according to the normal model of justice, there is a 
clear standard to distinguish injustice from misfortune. That is, only when the victim’s 
complaints match the rule-governed prohibition has he/she suffered an injustice. “If  there 
is no fit, it is only a matter of the victim’s subjective reactions, a misfortune, and not really 
unjust.”17
Shklar contends that the normal model of justice ignores many complaints by people who 
consider themselves as victims o f injustice but their sense of injustice cannot be described 
simply as violations of recognizable rules and principles. This model of engagement would 
also implicitly marginalize those who diverge from the established rules and principles. 
Furthermore, this model of engagement misconceives the fact that the distinction between 
misfortune and injustice is not a social fact that we can discover; rather, it is a political 
judgment that we should make.18
To begin with, treating injustice as merely the violations o f recognizable rules and 
principles, obscures “the full, complex and enduring character o f injustice as a social 
phenomenon.”19 The normal model of justice, which connects all injustice to established 
standards of justice, reflects what Shklar called “legalism.” 20 According to “legalism,”
17 FOI, p.7
18 See Bernard Yack, “Injustice and the Victim’s Voice,” in Michigan Law Review 89 (May 1991), pp. 1,346-1,349 
at pp. 1,341-2.
19 FOI, p. 9.
20 See Judith Shklar, Legalism: A n  Essay on Law, Morals, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
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judgments concerning law-related cases should rest on general rules. Thus, legalism is an 
ethic of rule following and can enable us to distinguish injustice from misfortune.21 
However, Shklar contends that we should not treat claims about misfortune or about 
injustice as claims about facts. Rather, the line separating misfortune from injustice is a 
political judgment about “what we may expect and demand of each other.”22 Such 
judgments are political rather than legal because, insofar as we lack omniscience, we cannot 
be confident about the accuracy o f our distinction between misfortune and injustice, even 
if we carefully apply established general rules to particular cases. Thus, our judgments 
regarding misfortune and injustice, being political, are always tentative and revisable in 
compliance with new information and perspectives23. Misfortunes of the past are the 
injustices of today, since “what is treated as unavoidable and natural, and what is regarded 
as controllable and social, is often a matter o f technology and o f ideology or
• * 5 5  24interpretation.
Furthermore, the distinction between misfortune and injustice is more complex when we 
consider the complaints from victims about what Shklar called “passive injustice.”25 Active 
injustice involves acts that violate the rules o f justice. The normal model of justice 
responds mainly to these kinds of acts. However, the harm that inspires the indignation of 
victims does not always take the form of the violation of recognized rules and principles. 
The normal model of justice is blind to passive injustice, which involves a failure to 
“prevent or oppose wrong when we have the power and occasion to do so.”26 Moreover, 
the normal model of justice would leave citizens insensitive to avoidable injuries even if
1964)
? 1 Bernard Yack, “Injustice and the Victim’s Voice,” p. 1,345.
22 Ibid., p. 1,341.
23 FOI, p. 5.
24 FOI, p. 9.
25 Shklar creates this distinction by drawing from the ideas that Cicero presents in his The Offices. Following 
the distinction between passive injustice and active injustice, Yack creates two forms o f justice, the so-called 
“active and passive justice.” See “Injustice and the Victim’s Voice” and “Active and Passive Justice,” in 
Bernard Yack (ed), Uberalism Without Illusions (Chicago, The University o f Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 191-204.
26 See FOI: p. 6.
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these wrongs are not yet counted as injustice from the legalistic model o f justice. 
Specifically, the New Orleans victims suffering from the Katrina hurricane experienced 
misfortune because the hurricane, itself, was an unavoidable natural disaster. However, the 
victims definitely suffered injustice because public officials could and should have 
prevented or mitigated much of the victims’ suffering. Many people who died might have 
been saved because of the inefficiencies of the emergency services. Many buildings 
collapsed simply because levies violated construction codes and because inspectors had 
been bribed to overlook these code violations. Few inhabitants received full warning of the 
jeopardy in advance, which technologically sophisticated devices can often predict. 
Moreover, public authorities hesitated to make any serious preparations for the eventuality. 
Katrina exemplifies the fact that passiveness can transform a natural misfortune into a 
failure of justice.
We cannot treat the line between misfortune and injustice simply as a natural given. It is 
inexcusable if we do nothing when we indeed can do something to alleviate the cause of 
suffering.
In this regard, the normal model of justice offers an inadequate account o f passive 
injustice, because the model cannot account for the full sense o f injustice from victims 
when it does not match the form of the violation of established standards. Shklar suggests 
that the best remedy to the problematic normal model is to embrace the version of the 
victims in our understanding of injustice so that we can more successfully prevent 
suffering in others. For Shklar, “victimhood has an irreducibly subjective component that the 
normal model of justice cannot easily absorb.”27 Victim’s voice is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for the construction of an adequate normative theory of justice.28 By 
criticizing the inadequacy of the invisible-hand doctrine, for instance, Shklar writes,
It seems to me that this is a poor argument because it is evident that when we can
27 FOI, p. 37.
28 See Jonathan Allen, “The Place o f Negative Political Morality in Political Theory,” p. 348.
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alleviate suffering, whatever its cause, it is passively unjust to stand by and do nothing. It 
is not the origin o f injury, but the possibility o f preventing and reducing its costs, that 
allows us to judge whether there was or was not unjustifiable passivity in the face o f  
such disaster. Nor is the sense o f injustice irrelevant. The voice o f the victims must also 
be heard first, not only to find out whether officially recognized social expectations have 
been denied, but also to attend to their interpretations o f  the situation. Are changes in the 
order o f publicly accepted claims called for? Are the rules such that the victim could 
have consented to them had she been asked? If the victim’s suffering is due to accident 
or misfortune but could be remedied by public agents, then it is unjust if  nothing is 
done to help. A valid expectation has been ignored and her sense o f injustice should 
assert itself and we should all protest.29
In challenge to Shklar’s assertions, some people might argue that privileging victims’ voices 
would violate the idea of impartiality during the dialogical process. However, because we 
lack determinate and accepted impartial standards, and the legalist model masks the passive 
injustice, the idea o f impartiality from this legalist model may unwittingly mask the ways 
that “the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality.”30 Moreover, in 
contrast to victim’s voices, public officials’ perspectives about misfortune and injustice are 
already widely represented in the public domain. As Bernard Yack responds,
Privileging the victim’s perspective may seem to violate the norms o f impartiality that 
we tend to associate very closely with the idea o f justice. But fidelity to established 
standards and impartiality in applying them— virtues that serve legal justice very well—  
remain virtues only so long as we possess relatively clear, determinate, and widely 
accepted standards to apply to particular situations. Whenever we lack access to such 
standards, as we almost always do in our judgments about passive injustice and the 
justice o f legislation, an emphasis upon the faithful and impartial application of 
whatever standards we do come up with tends to blind us to the political character of 
the judgments we have made. Such an emphasis blinds us, in particular, to the ways in 
which we both privilege some voices and stifle others when making these judgments.31
The argument here is not to say that the claims made by victims are always legitimate or 
that their sense of injustice is morally justified32. Their sense o f being victimized might be 
the result o f resentment or misunderstanding so that their claims must be proved. However, 
since there is no clear answer to the question of who determines whether their complaint is
29 FOI, p. 82.
30 Bernard Yack, “Injustice and the Victim’s Voice,” p. 1343. See also, Iris Young, “The Ideal o f Impartiality 
and the Civic Public,” in Justice and the Politics of Differences, ch 4.
31 Ibid, 1343.
32 FOI, p. 3.
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legitimate, “the claims o f sensed injustice always deserve a hearing.”33 These complaints 
would open our eyes to other things that the impartial perspective o f the defender o f a 
normal model of justice cannot see.
In contrast with An-Na’im’s perspective on cross-cultural dialogue, the approach here takes 
the voice of the victims seriously and stresses that victims should be placed at the center of 
political theorizing. “We will learn about these harmful consequences only if  we listen to the 
voices of the individuals who feel victimized by our words and actions.” As Shklar put it,
Actually, the most reliable test for what cruelties are to be endured at any place and any 
time is to ask the likeliest victims, the least powerful persons, at any given moment and 
under controlled conditions. Until that is done there is no reason not to assume that the 
liberalism of fear has much to offer to the victims o f political tyranny.34
Moreover, as I stated in chapter four, the claim to have rights is usually made in social 
conflicts in which a justification of cultural authenticity is being called for. Therefore, the 
claim to human rights arises in the context not of shared understandings, but of dissent, 
protest and resistance. Criticizing the argument that while measuring our judgments about 
justice, we should appeal to the shared understandings embedded in our practices and 
institutions, Shklar contends that:
.. .These intimations o f shared meanings, as divined by prophetic or traditionalist 
avatars o f the spirit o f the people, are never checked against actual opinion, least o f all
those o f the most disadvantaged and frightened people In the absence o f  a clear and
free account o f  their feelings, we should assume that the least advantaged members o f  a 
society resent their situation, even though— like many a black slave— they smile and sing 
in a show o f contentment.35 
According to these comments, we should make marginalized people and marginalized
structures visible and should listen direcdy to victims’ voices. Deprivation and
domination, not shared understandings, should be the focus o f attention in a sincere
human rights dialogue. During the dialogical process, if the victims express clearly that
they don’t want to remain discriminated against and oppressed in regard to any cultural
claim, we should attend to their interpretations of the situation. There is no intelligible
33 FOI, p. 90.
34 LFb, p. 17.
35 See FOI: 114-5.
I 238
reason to say that this is unreasonable simply on the ground of its incompatibility with 
cultural tradition or lack of cultural legitimacy.
In contrast to An-Na’im, I believe that, during the dialogical process, outside 
observers have the right to criticize any traditional cultural practice that they deem 
harmful to persons. People dealing with claims of human rights violations should adopt 
the viewpoint of the actual subject o f human rights, the insider perspective o f the victim 
of human rights violations, rather than the insider perspective implicit in the public 
political cultures or the insider perspective reconciled between human rights and 
tradition which fits within mainstream cultural orientation. Because the legalist 
understanding masks the passive injustice that the victims suffer, “the adjudication o f 
rights is not the end o f the politics.” 36 Fear-inspired rights scheme provided here do not 
expect to dispense with politics37.
Some may accept Nussbaum’s capabilities approach but note that it is very risky to listen to 
possible victims’ voices directly, since victims may rationalize their abuse. Therefore, my 
approach should be sensitive to these compelling objections that the voice o f the supposed 
victim is the final authority, since the individual may subject herself to non-autonomously 
formed beliefs and desires. However, as I stated in chapter three, we should be careful not 
to assume that we always know better than people directly involved and that we can 
accurately speak on behalf of them. We should also be cautious not to stereotype or 
essentialize victimhood, and then carry the projection and fantasies o f our image with our 
good intention, and take actions in the name of their wishes. For instance, we should not 
decide that certain women are intrinsically nothing hut victims o f oppression. We should be 
careful about depicting “Third World women” as a homogeneously powerless group 
possessing the characteristics o f “starvation, sexual constraint, ignorance, poverty,” and
36 See Bernard Yack, “Liberalism Without Illusions: An Introduction to Judith Shklar’s Political Thought,” in
Bernard Yack (ed), Liberalism Without Illusions (Chicago, The University o f Chicago 1996), p. 3.
37 PT, 36
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membership in backward societies.38 We must also acknowledge that there are substantial 
divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for, and those 
divergences would constitute a significant influence on the content o f what is said.39 Iris 
Young underscores the importance of receptive-listening skills:
It is more appropriate to approach a situation o f communicative interaction for the 
purpose o f arriving at a moral or political judgment with a stance o f moral humility.
In moral humility one starts with the assumption that one cannot see things from 
the other person’s perspective, and waits to learn by listening to the other person to 
what extent they have similar experiences. If I assume that there are aspects o f  
where the other person is coming from that I do not understand, I will be more 
likely to be open to listening to the specific expression o f  their experience, interests, 
and claims. Indeed, one might say that this is what listening to a person means.40
In this regard, rather than simply treat purported victims as nothing other than victims of 
false consciousness or adaptive preferences, interlocutors should separate claims that FGM, 
for instance, is a harmful practice from claims that it is a violation of human rights.41 They 
need to engage with defenders of FGM about the practices’ actual and possible harms, and 
not simply to argue FGM is an unjust practice, and condemn those who defend it as 
irrational.42They should not treat those involved in this disputed practice as simply 
suffering from adaptive preferences or false consciousness whenever those women disagree 
about the ideal proposed by them.43 The only way to show the commitment o f equal
38 . . . .  . . . .Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy o f Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,” in Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol(15)(2002), see
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/issl5/kapur.shtml. In terms o f the critique o f  gender
essentialism and cultural essentialism, see Uma Narayan, “Essence o f  Culture and a Sense o f  History: A
Feminist Critique o f Cultural Essentialism,” in Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding (eds), Decentering the
Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World (Indiana University Press, 2000), pp.
80-100; and “Undoing the ‘Packing Picture’ o f Culture,” in Sign: journal of Women in Culture and Society
(25)(2000), pp: 1083-1086.
39 See Linda Alcoff, “The Problem o f Speaking for Others,” in Cultural Studies (20)(1991), pp. 5-32. Gayatri 
Spivak also cautions against discourse that either implicitly or explicidy treats “white men” as saving “brown 
women” from “brown men.” See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Cary Nelson  
and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 
1988), pp. 271-313.
40 Iris Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity,” p. 350.
41 Richard Shweder, “What About ‘Female Genital Mutilation’? And Why Understanding Culture Matters in 
the First Place.” in Richard A. Shweder, Martha Minow and Hazel Rose Markus (eds), Engaging cultural 
differences: the multicultural challenge in liberal democracies (New York, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 
pp. 216-251.
42 Ibid., p. 220.
43 See Michele M. Moody-Adams, “Reclaiming the Ideal o f  Equality,” in Barbara Andrew, Jean Claire Keller 
and Lisa Schwartzman (eds.) Feminist Interventions in Ethics and Politics: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (Rowman
I 240
respect for person is to stand ready to engage them in rational discussion. How can we be 
careful— even moral—when, acting on our good intentions, we criticize other cultures? I 
argue that we can do so by listening directly and initially to marginalized groups and, 
subsequently, to members of the society in question.44
6.2 Universal in Its Reach
If a fear-inspired human rights scheme obliges us to do our best to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering wherever we may find it, then we should carefully listen to and think 
about the voices of victims.
In the contemporary world, globalization connects diverse peoples to one another, and 
these relations are often unequal in power and material resources. In this context, the rights 
of individuals have come to depend on national and international actors.45 
Accordingly, it is plain that the degree o f interconnectedness among states constitutes a 
“context o f justice.”46 In this regard, Rawls’ ideas suffer from two major difficulties: first, it 
is difficult for Law of Peoples to sustain the fundamental idea of basic structure defined in 
terms of self-sufficient scheme o f cooperation; and second, it is difficult for Law of Peoples 
to exhaust the fair terms o f international justice. These difficulties suggest that we should 
conceive the global basic structure as one of a complex system in which a variety of actors 
vie for power. In the system, the distribution o f power occurs according to fixed patterns 
o f domination. Thus, the system does not constitute fair terms of cooperation, as Rawls
and Littlefield, 2005), p. 178.
44 See Alison Jaggar, ‘“Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue,” in Ethics <& 
International Affairs, Vol 19(3)(2005), pp. 55-75 at 70.
45 For ideas about justice in the age o f globalism, see Andrew Linklater, “The Evolving Spheres o f  
International Justice,” in International Affairs, Vol 75(3) (1999), pp. 473-482.
46 Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Uberalism and Communitarianism. Translated by John 
M. M. Farrell (Berkley, Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 2002).
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notes.47 Therefore, we should pay attention to these relations o f power, which marginalize 
many people. Rainer Forst clearly articulates what a rigorous theory o f justice must ask:
At the global level, it (a theory o f global justice) must ask who benefits in the global 
market in what way, what are the terms o f  “cooperation,” how are they fixed, and so on.
At the micro-level, [we should] ask how these global structures support more local (or 
even traditional) structures o f domination and exploitation. The various contexts o f  
justice— local, national, international and global— are connected through the kind o f  
injustice they produce, and a theory o f justice must not remain blind to this 
interconnectednes s.4 8
In the context o f multiple dominations in global politics, therefore, it is difficult to make a 
distinction between misfortune and injustice so that the distinction applies simply within a 
national boundary.49 Moreover, as I state in chapter two, Rawls’s Law of Peoples does not 
present a plan for offering full protection to persons captured in these global power 
struggles. The problem for Rawls is that the Law of Peoples aims to elaborate a global 
conception of political justice which all well-ordered people can endorse, in a sense that 
persons who have no people (state) would have no protection. However, it is not adequate 
at all as it still leaves out those who are not part of a system of institutions anywhere.
In this regard, I assert that Iris Young’s social-connection model of political responsibility 
is better than Rawls’s scheme. The social-connection model o f responsibility can 
strengthen our ability to examine the distinctions between misfortune and injustice because 
the model obliges all people who, in whatever way, promote structural injustice to work to 
correct these injustices.
In line with Shklar’s critique o f legalism, Young contends that the current legalistic model 
of global justice is insufficient because it approaches justice on the basis only o f liability. In 
the legalistic model, there is liability only if the law describes the action in question as a
47 See Iris Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,” in Social Philosophy and 
Poliy(23)(2006), pp. 102-130 at 114.
48 See Rainer Forst, “Towards a Critical Theory o f Transnational Justice,” in Metaphilosophy, Vol 32 (2001), pp. 
160-179 at 167.
49 Traditionally, the suffering o f individuals and o f groups tended to be discounted as misfortunes at the 
international level, and “claims o f justice and injustice could only be admitted within a state or between 
states”. See Catherine Lu, “The One and Many Faces o f  Cosmopolitanism,” in Journal of Political philosophy, 
Vol 8(2) (2000), pp. 244-267.
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violation o f the law. Here, what one should or should not do rests entirely on what the law 
states.
Young contends that if the injustice has causes rooted in social structure, those who 
participate in producing and reproducing the structures are implicated in that responsibility. 
Young states,
The social connection model o f responsibility says that individuals bear responsibility 
for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to the processes that 
produce unjust outcomes. Therefore, our responsibility derives from belonging together 
with others in a system o f interdependent processes o f cooperation and competition 
through which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects. Even though we cannot 
trace the outcome we may regret our own particular actions in a direct casual chain, and 
we bear responsibility because we are part o f the process.50
Through her analysis of the anti-sweatshop movement, Young provides a clear picture of
the production-and-distribution chain that links the apparel industry’s manufacturers (most
of which are located in the developing world) to the consumers of the apparel (most of
whom are located in the developed world). Young argues that within a global system of
complex dominations, workers at the bottom of the product system suffer structural
injustice.51 In the context of complex domination, workers at the bottom  of the product
system do not merely suffer misfortune, but it is unjust because that suffering is socially
caused. In this regard, the responsibility in relation to injustice derives from “participation
in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice.”52 Moreover, when
conceiving the idea o f political responsibility in relation to structural injustice, “we are
concerned with an ongoing set o f processes that we understand is likely to continue
producing harm unless there are interventions in it.”53
If we accept the argument from the social-connection model, and recognize
marginalized people use human rights to fight injustice, then we acknowledge that
international responsibility for human rights is grounded in the fact that some structural
50 Iris Young, Global Challenges: War, S elf-Determination and Responsibility for justice (Polity Press 2007), p.175.
51 Ibid., pp. 168-170.
52 Ibid., p. 176.
53 Ibid., p. 178.
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processes connect people across the world without regard to political boundaries. Young 
discusses this responsibility clearly:
The social relations that connect us to others are not restricted to nation-state borders.
Our actions are conditioned by and contribute to institutions that affect distant others, 
and their actions contribute to the operation o f  institutions that affect us. Because our 
actions assume these others as a condition for our own actions, we have made practical 
moral commitments to them by virtue o f our actions.54
In contrast to Rawls, we should recognize that powerful solutions to problems of injustice 
cannot always be found within a national boundary, and the sufferings of the exiles, 
refugees and strangers whose persecutions cannot simply treat as misfortune by the 
distinction between international and domestic spheres. In the context of multiple 
domination and deprivation in international politics, the exiles, refugees and strangers do 
not merely suffer misfortune, but their sufferings are socially caused by the institutions and 
practices that produce unjust results. We bear responsibility if we all participate in the 
ongoing schemes o f cooperation that result from these unjust outcomes. Thus, following 
the fear-inspired human rights scheme, we should discharge political responsibility to 
engage in public actions directed at transforming those structures. If  we are aware of 
injustice but fail to address it, then our passivity contributes to injustice in Shklar’s sense. 
There is an important difference between legal responsibility and political responsibility: 
legal responsibility is backward-looking because it is directed primarily towards blaming and 
punishing; whereas political responsibility is forward-looking because it requires public 
debate and political action to change unjust institutions.55 Among those political actions, 
the effort to establish and enforce a global human rights regime is an important goal for 
discharging this political responsibility, because the protection and enforcement o f human 
rights is not only the task of “officials in formal institutions,” but also o f “ordinary people
54 Ibid., p.163.
55 In addition to point out that the political responsibility in the social connection model is forward-looking, 
Young argues that there are other four features o f the social connection model: (1) it is not isolating, (2) while 
evaluating possible harm, it should judge background conditions, (3) it is shared responsibility, and (4) it is 
discharged only through collective action. See Young, “Responsibility, Social Connection, Labor Justice”, 
pp.176-81.
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around the world.”56 In this regard, political responsibility for human rights requires us to 
heed the cries of victims and to do our best to prevent and alleviate cruelty wherever it 
may be found.
Conclusion
Inspired by Shklar’s liberalism of fear and Young’s social-connection model o f political 
responsibility, I assert that my fear-inspired human rights scheme here presents a better 
description of the moral reality o f universal human rights than do the other schemes and 
that my scheme’s normative grounding of human rights is more compelling than other 
schemes’ approaches to grounding. First, my scheme is immune from the challenges of 
ethnocentrism because, rather than serve Western political neocolonialism, my scheme 
addresses threats o f injustice that all people face, especially the most helpless people 
around the world. Moreover, my scheme can help refute the criticism that human rights 
principles lack cultural legitimacy: the universality of fear encourages people around the 
world to define and to protect their human dignity on the basis of human rights ideas.
My scheme is a liberal response to abuses of power, not a totalitarian, monarchical, or 
other regime-style response. A society and, indeed, the world can, does, and will contain 
divergent conceptions of the good; however, the “global basic structure” can be structured 
in only one way. Since WWII, the universal conception has rested on peoples’ choice to 
transform conceptions o f human right into universally applicable norms. By using these 
norms to eliminate or to mitigate the fear that people suffer from, the world community 
has strengthened the grounding— the legitimacy— of these norms. The practical successes 
of these norms highlight Shklar’s assertion that the most important goal of liberal politics
56 See Alison Jaggar, “Iris Marion Young’s Conception o f  Political Responsibility: Comments on Iris M. 
Young ‘s “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’,” in Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy, at 
http://web.mit.edu/ sgrp/2007/nol/Jaggar0107.pdf.
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Regarding universal human-rights norms, perhaps the most daunting task is to make sure 
that the common conviction in human rights is compatible with diverging conceptions of 
the good. Because peoples consider fear as one o f the worst human conditions, peoples 
around the world have a common intuition that the good includes struggles against 
oppression, arbitrariness, or intrusion, especially when the powerful are responsible for this 
injustice, whether in the public sphere or the private sphere. This bottom-up approach, 
from the marginalized to the privileged, provides us multiple routes from which we can 
reach agreements regarding the universal applicability of human rights.
57 See Michael Walzer, On Negative Politics, in Bernard Yack (ed), Liberalism Without Illusions (Chicago, The 
University o f Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 17-24 at 22.
Chapter Seven: 
Universalism with Humility
We require more than political theory or intellectual histories o f fear. To assess and affect future 
possibilities, we will need investigations o f  enlarged scope, working at levels from the intimate to the 
monumental that can galvanize the full range o f the discipline’s modes o f  study, including the 
practical tools we have acquired from philosophy and economics, sociology and history, 
mathematics and literary criticism. What we need is an effort to bring together, once again, hard- 
headed studies o f stateness with the full range o f scholarship on power, all the while motivated to 
probe how institutions and policies within the ambit o f  the liberal tradition might help us find our 
way to a more decent politics and society under dangerous and difficult conditions.
Ira Katznelson — At the Court o f Chaos: Political Science in an Age o f  Perpetual Fear1
7.1 Rethinking Human Rights in a Diverse World
In this project, I undertake the construction of my fear-inspired, historical, and practical 
human rights scheme by engaging with three recent philosophical approaches to human 
rights: John Rawls’s The Taw of Peoples', Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and An- 
N a’im’s “cross-cultural dialogue” approach.
Inspired by Shklar’s political liberalism, I worked out a theory of human rights to flesh out 
her political liberalism o f fear, to provide an epistemological underpinning of the 
conception of human rights, and to examine the form and the scope o f the political 
liberalism of fear when this liberalism works outward to the international sphere. Moreover, 
I fleshed out Rawls’s justificatory strategy in my constructive approach, and gave an 
account— different from Rawls’s account— how to ground human rights. In contrast to 
traditional controversies over competing religious or cultural perspectives o f human nature, 
I agree with Rawls’s novel suggestion (1) that we should examine human rights’ actual role
1 Ira Katznelson, “At the Court o f Chaos: Political Science in an Age o f Perpetual Fear. APSA Presidential 
Address” in Perspectives on Politics, (5)(2007), pp. 3-15.
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in the international arena and (2) that the justification for interference in states’ autonomy 
is the main purpose o f human rights. It is a more appropriate point o f departure to justify 
human rights in a pluralistic world. However, I argued that Rawls’s institutional conception 
o f human rights suffers from substantial problems that my fear-inspired scheme can solve. 
Firstly, I argued that The Law of Peoples aims to elaborate a global conception of political 
justice that all well-ordered people can reasonably be expected to endorse. However, his 
justificatory strategy cannot ground human rights successfully without a cosmopolitan 
moral ground that Rawls initially avoids. I defended the view that the nature and the 
function of human rights in international practice can be grounded on Shklar’s moral 
psychology o f personhood. It is a moral intuition o f fear that mediates between human 
rights and political legitimacy and that provides a cosmopolitan moral ground for the 
justification o f human rights. The Rawlsian scheme falls short o f presenting a sound 
argument in this regard.
Second, I argue that Rawlsian methodology makes it very difficult— for two reasons— to 
establish the universal applicability of human rights: first, Rawls’s method fails to 
convincingly explain why human rights can apply equally to outlaw states (after all, they are 
not part of the Society of Peoples); and second, Rawls’s institutional conception o f human 
rights cannot acknowledge the sufferings attributable to exiles and refugees whose 
persecutions cannot be recognized or redressed within a national boundary. By analyzing 
the relationship between sovereignty and human rights after WWII, I argued that respect 
for the human rights principle should be the premise for rather than the content of a law of 
peoples. Each state would not push other states to accept the same package of rights, but 
all of states have distinct moral duties to ensure that other states comply with their own 
duties to provide these rights. It would be a reasonable explanation as to why human rights 
principles can apply to oudaw states even though they are not part o f the Society o f 
Peoples. Moreover, inspired by the late Iris Young’s social-connection model of
responsibility, I argued that within the international-polidcs context of multiple 
dominations and deprivations, the misery o f exiles and refugees results not merely from 
misfortune but from institutions and practices that produce unjust results, as well. We bear 
responsibility if we all participate in the ongoing schemes o f cooperation that result in 
these unjust outcomes. In line with this fear-inspired human-rights scheme, the victims o f 
structural injustice appeal to us to discharge political responsibility and to engage in actions 
directed at transforming those structures. These practices can alter our perceptions 
regarding the line that separates global injustice from mere personal misfortune— an 
alteration that must take place if victims’ voices are to be heard from the very beginning. 
Third, I argued that we need to take seriously the perspectives of non-Western cultures if 
human rights are going to be appropriate as global normative standards for a multicultural 
world, but Rawls’s constructivist approach and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach place 
some substantive constraints on real engagement with non-Western perspectives. Therefore, 
we need sincere cultural dialogues to provide a public basis for settling the problems of 
interpretation and implementation. Moreover, I argued that An-Na’im’s “cross-cultural 
dialogue” approach indeed provides a good account of how to take into consideration the 
views of non-Western cultures. However, owing to the exclusive form of participation in 
internal and cross-cultural dialogue, his dialogue perspective does not involve a true cross- 
cultural exchange and, in fact, promotes a uni-directional approach to intellectual efforts 
rather than a multi-directional approach that might establish common ground. I argued that 
an approach should open itself wholly to the voices from people who lack strong 
representation at the center of political theorizing. From my bottom-up approach, we need 
to make marginalized people and marginalized structures visible, and victims’ voices should 
be heard first during cultural dialogue. Thus, the reasonable test o f the political legitimacy 
of human rights is whether or not the human rights begin with the powerless: a human- 
rights scheme that privileges powerful elites fails the test.
Finally, I argue that Rawl’s human rights proper can be expansive for reasons that are 
internal to his political constructivism. A decent society not only protects basic human 
rights to subsistence and personal security, but also secures for all o f its members the 
opportunity to choose, change, and govern their own institutions, although not all decent 
societies will necessarily fulfill these conditions within the framework o f liberal democracy. 
Therefore, a decent society is one that fulfills the minimal conditions within which a 
government can be said to be sincerely acting on behalf of its people. A decent society 
fulfills the minimal condition of legitimacy, which contains the requirements of 
participation, representation and accountability. In this regard, well-ordered societies must 
guarantee many specific political rights that are peculiar to a given society and that will flesh 
out the basic rights. A society that, being a member in good standing in the Society of 
Peoples, thus treats its people well, protects both universal basic rights and specific rights 
peculiar to that society, and is sovereign in the sense of being immune from outside 
interference.
7.2 Universalism with Humility
According to my fear-based human-rights scheme, the UDHR is a practical assertion of
specific responses to the most terrifying tragedy o f this century and, thus, protects rights
that were under great threat during the immediate post-WWII period. The UDHR
expresses an aversion to the greatest evils o f human experience. Facing terrifying tragedies,
the language of human rights has most powerfully symbolized changes that would amplify
the voices of the weak. Human rights are not the norms that characterize all cultural
traditions or all religious doctrines, but it is our choice to endow them with universal
applicability. The legitimacy of human rights norms acquires additional strength when the
people who craft these norms are victims themselves from within their own cultures. These
victims have recognized that human rights are im portant instruments o f empowerment in
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the victims’ own— and, therefore, in all persons’ and all peoples’— struggles against 
oppression.
However, there remains no global consensus on the universality o f human rights. The 
charge of ethnocentrism and o f cultural imperialism arises all the time. If  a truly global 
consensus on human rights norms cannot come to pass, the enforcement o f the existing 
international human-rights system would suffer grievously, and as a consequence, more and 
more peoples around the world would increasingly call into question the political legitimacy 
of human-rights talk, human-rights covenants, and human-rights movements.
In this regard, we need to engage in a cross-cultural dialogue. Making the matter o f human 
rights a public matter can yield a universal test for human rights norms by opening up those 
norms to the critical scrutiny of the international community. Any human-rights 
orientation that all human beings do not genuinely support is likely to provoke widespread 
skepticism. Publicity, by exposing violations, can play a manifest role in compliance. 
However, we should know that even good intentions can result in bad outcomes. We need 
to acknowledge that both the study o f and the advocacy for the oppressed must derive 
chiefly from the oppressed themselves. Thus, we should be careful not to assume that 
we— the elites o f society— always know better than those people who are direct victims of 
the bulk of societies’ oppression. In order to avoid taking up a potentially counter­
productive civilizing mission in the name o f victims, we need to help make marginalized 
peoples and marginalized structures visible, and to allow victims’ voices to be heard directly. 
Accordingly, we need to listen receptively to each other from “a stance of moral humility” 
in order to understand other perspectives before criticizing them or taking actions. As I see 
it, this approach is the best way to understand human rights that are consistent with 
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